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This dissertation is the first to propose a test of environmental management theory 
through a reflective, managerial scale, and does so through a public policy lens. It 
matches 76 managerial respondents’ (17 firms) perceptions of environmental 
management with objective, secondary data ranging between 2002 and 2014 so as to 
reflect longitudinal changes in marketplace activities which influence end consumers 
(e.g., pricing, promotional activity). Such changes are artifacts of firms’ environmental 
management of threatening government public policy. 
The findings of two studies, qualitative interviews based on a transcendental 
phenomenological design and an online survey matched to secondary marketplace data 
utilizing Hierarchical Linear Modeling, confirm the two classic orientations offered 
through environmental management theories: strategic choice and deterministic 
orientations, but extends the latter. This dissertation finds deterministic firms proactively 
avoid being determined by a force in the external business environment rather than let it 
completely determine the firms’ business.  
Additionally, this dissertation finds that environmental management is at least 
two-dimensional in that viewing the socio-political force of the external business 
environment as malleable is, in fact, a dimension of a firm’s management ability. 
However, this management ability is mitigated by a duty orientation. Finally, both studies 
  
 
 
confirm that not only do some strategic choice oriented firms use marketing skills and 
tactics (i.e. product development) to offset the public policy pressure over using political 
behaviors, but also that marketing tactics are viewed by some firms as a way to manage 
government public policy while still serving society’s stakeholders.  
While firms which manage government public policy pressures through political 
strategies affect consumers by changing promotion activities, a relatively unbeneficial 
consumer outcome, firms which manage such policy through marketing strategies benefit 
consumers by offering products of higher quality. Thus, government public policy that 
encourages firms to fight back through political behaviors create an unintended 
consequence of increasing utilization of non-personal, mass advertising rather than the 
intended improvements in safety and/or health among consumers for which the policy 
was inherently designed.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Public policy is a “political and technical approach to solving problems via 
instruments” (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007, p. 2). Marketing research typically studies 
public policy to better understand the problems it attempts to solve. For example, 
Goldberg, Gorn, and Lavack (1994) study alcohol promotions that target underage 
drinkers and Kaikati and Label (1980) study US firms operating in foreign markets 
governed through corruption. Marketing research also examines the approach a public 
policy takes in solving problems, such as taxing consumer products like soda so as to 
reduce their consumption (e.g., Andreyeva, Long, and Brownell 2010) or standardizing 
product information to aid consumer nutrition decision-making (e.g., Moorman 1996). 
Regardless of the research objective(s), marketing research involving US public policy 
aids marketers in understanding how public policy alters marketplace activities (e.g., 
consumer preference, product availability) and public policy makers in understanding 
how marketplace activities influence the effectiveness of public policy. This dissertation 
attempts to continue these trends in marketing research of US public policy by studying 
both the 1) firm response to public policy which sometimes involves marketing activities 
and 2) the manner in which public policy impacts end consumers after accounting for the 
firm’s strategic response. 
 While most US public policy aims to directly or indirectly protect and benefit end 
consumers, some policies also work to protect consumers by altering or limiting the way 
firms conduct business. The Nutrition Facts Panel (NFP) of the Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act provides information directly to consumers so as to assist in their nutrition 
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decisions, but also is designed to prompt food manufacturers to compete on nutrition 
rather than traditional attributes, such as price or convenience (e.g., Ghani and Childs 
1999; Petruccelli 1996). As another example, the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 
recent Green Guides help consumer decision-making through standardization efforts 
regarding environmental product claims, but also facilitates inter-firm litigation in which 
firms use the guidelines to legally accuse, and thus limit, competitors’ promotions (e.g., 
FTC 2013; Westervelt 2012).  
 These examples illustrate potential firm strategy in managing public policy and 
revolve around new ways to compete in the marketplace in light of threatening public 
policy, i.e., either materialized (e.g., law, fine) or immaterialized (e.g., bill, guidelines) 
local, state, national, or international government communication (e.g., documented law, 
press conference) that is threatening to a firm because it either directly or indirectly limits 
the way the firm conducts business or its ability to compete in the marketplace. 
Unintended consequences of public policy which attempt to benefit consumers through 
altered firm strategies for competition include firm strategies that instead manage the 
actual policy. Firms contribute money to Political Action Committees (PACs) so as to 
gain access to key members of Congress and influence legislative decision-making in 
favor of the given business or lobby so as to discourage legislation that limits the way a 
firm conducts business, for example.  
 This dissertation asks Why do some firms manage threatening public policy while 
others do not? Additionally, of those that do manage these pressures, why do some push 
back by influencing the policy and others push forward by influencing competition? The 
answers to these questions likely reside in environmental management theories which 
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posit that some firms perceive forces, such as the socio-political force, as determining the 
way they do business while others perceive forces as malleable and manageable (e.g., 
Child 1972; Duncan 1972; Emery and Trist 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Terreberry 
1968; Zeithaml and Zeithaml 1984). Environmental management is the firm’s “deliberate 
actions aimed at controlling, changing, influencing, or adapting to inputs” in the external 
business environment (Clark, Varadarajan, and Pride 1996, p. 23). 
Not to be confused with the natural environment, a firm’s external business 
environment can be thought of as a collection of forces including end consumer demand, 
supplier power patterns, competition, technological shifts, and socio-political influences 
(e.g., Duncan 1972; Porter 1979). While environmental management theories have yet to 
be extended to firm management of threatening public policy, literature examining firm 
political behavior distinguishes proactive from reactive political strategy. And proactive 
strategy and the environmental management theory of firm strategic choice are used 
interchangeably in environmental management literature (e.g., Bocquet, Le Bas, Mothe, 
and Poussing 2013; Zeithaml and Zeithaml 1984). For example, Meznar and Nigh (1995) 
and Blumentritt (2003) describe firms as either buffering threatening public policy, which 
includes proactive behaviors such as campaign contributions or lobbying, or bridging 
threatening public policy, which includes reactive behaviors such as tracking regulation 
trends so as to form appropriate compliance strategies. And Boddewyn and Brewer 
(1994) conceptualize bargaining strategies, such as PAC contributions, lobbying, or 
diplomatic government partnerships, in managing government pressures as more 
proactive than the nonbargaining strategy examples they offer of compliance and exit. 
Thus, this literature stream implies firms’ deliberate attempt to strategically influence the 
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government agents/agencies involved in public policy, i.e. individuals, such as publicly-
elected officials, or agencies, such as the US Federal Trade Commission, reflects an 
orientation towards strategic choice in managing public policy pressures. 
 The main objective of this dissertation is to apply environmental management 
theories to the examination of firm strategy in managing threatening public policy and, in 
doing so, fill several gaps in prior marketing literature. First, by measuring firm 
orientation towards managing public policy, this research directly extends environmental 
management theories to management of the socio-political force. Public policy pressures 
reside in the socio-political force, i.e., formal and informal social and political pressures 
arising from the external business environment. Prior literature examines firm strategic 
response to a host of various pressures in the external business environment, such as 
strategic relationships in a channel of distribution so as to effectively manage consumer 
demand (e.g., Archol and Stern 1988; Dwyer and Welsh 1985) or strategically adopting 
new technologies so as to manage the intense competition of diverse market domains 
(e.g., Miller and Friesen 1983; Porter 1979). Even though researchers continue to 
highlight the need for greater understanding of firm-government relationships (Wilkie 
and Moore 1999) and, in particular, firm strategic response to public policy (Lusch 2007), 
prior research either only tests environmental management theory with distant regard to 
threatening public policy (e.g., McDaniel and Kolari 1987) or examines firm strategies in 
influencing public policy without testing environmental management theory (e.g., Goll 
and Rasheed 2011; LaBarbera 1983; Kaikati and Label 1980). And when prior literature 
does apply environmental management theories to firm political activity, it is done so 
conceptually (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman, Keim and Schuler 2004; Zeithaml and 
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Zeithaml 1984) rather than empirically. Consequently, environmental management 
theories list the socio-political force as a force firms manage, but research has not 
explored how, in fact, firms manage this force. So as to answer these calls for research 
that examines how firms manage government pressures, this dissertation measures firm 
orientation towards managing government public policy as well as the strategies 
involved. 
 This dissertation hypothesizes and tests relationships between a proactive 
(reactive) firm orientation towards the socio-political force and strategic response (non-
response) to threatening public policy, among other relationships regarding firm strategy 
and public policy. A proactive orientation is regarded as strategic choice in 
environmental management literature (e.g., Child 1972; Zeithaml and Zeithaml 1984) and 
is generally described as a trend in firm activities reflecting attempts to strategically alter 
elements of the external business environment. And an orientation that strongly leans 
towards a reactive position, also known as deterministic (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch 
1967; Zeithaml and Zeithaml 1984), in managing threatening public policy, instead, 
likely leads firms to merely comply, adapt, exit the market domain, or close shop all 
together (see Bocquet et al. 2013; Calfee and Pappalardo 1991; or Moorman, Du, and 
Mella 2005 for examples of such reactionary management). This deterministic orientation 
reflects a trend in firm activities that reflect bowing down to an external environment that 
is too variable, complex, and illiberal to manage (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).  
Extending environmental management theories so as to include the socio-political 
force is important because it sheds light on the potential negative, unintended 
consequences of firm management of government public policy. On the one hand, an 
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orientation that strongly leans towards strategic choice in managing threatening public 
policy could lead to unintended consequences of public policy designed to protect and 
benefit end consumers, such as firms’ use of political ties or aggressive campaign 
contributions to influence those government agents with the ability to prevent or reduce 
threat involved in a given public policy (e.g., Bhuyan 2000). As will be seen in the 
subsequent section highlighting the importance and implications of this research, firm 
attempts to manage government public policy to the firm’s advantage, such as increasing 
the levels of healthy ingredients of foods while maintaining levels of unhealthy 
ingredients, also alters the consumer benefit intentions, whether direct or indirect, of the 
public policy, such as the availability of healthier food alternatives for consumers as well 
as the ease in comprehending the overall nutritional value communicated through a food 
item’s nutritional label. On the other hand, the same orientation could lead firms to act as 
the policy intended, such as firms’ attempts at improving their competitive position in the 
marketplace through product nutritional improvement or innovation to offset limitations 
of threatening public policy (e.g., Moorman and Stotegraaf 1999). 
 The second manner in which this dissertation fills the environmental management 
literature gaps previously mentioned is through consideration of firm responsibility. By 
hypothesizing and testing relationships between firm concern for stakeholders and 
marketplace strategies in managing threatening public policy, this research extends 
environmental management theory to concepts of firm concern with the way in which 
business impacts the local community or vulnerable groups of consumers, for example. 
One way in which firms impact society is through benefits offered to consumers, such as 
socially innovative or safer products. This dissertation hypothesizes and tests 
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relationships between a firm society-serving orientation and consumer benefits so as to 
offer a procedural explanation for how public policy that intends to benefit consumers 
through altered firm competition leads firms to behave in “irresponsible” manner(s). Prior 
research has expressed great interest in the motivations and societal impact of firm 
concern for external stakeholders (e.g., Friedman 1970, 1984; Goll and Rasheed 2004; 
Narver 1971). However, the literature stream on firm societal impact has yet to apply 
theories of environmental management, despite its theoretical grounding in stakeholder 
management (e.g., Carroll 1979; Goll and Rasheed 2004). In this regard, this dissertation 
fills this literature gap by comparing and contrasting the resulting strategies and 
consumer-related activities of firm orientations either strongly leaning towards serving 
stockholders or stakeholders.  
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Importance and Implications 
 Predicting firm strategic response to threatening public policy by effectively 
measuring firm orientation towards environmental management is important because 
such measurement also facilitates prediction of unintended consequences arising in public 
policy. Prior research finds firms manage threatening public policy by either pushing 
forward by competing in new ways to offset limitations placed on firms by public policy 
or pushing back so as to prevent public policy from limiting business (e.g., Goll and 
Rasheed 2011; Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010; Kaikati and Label 1980; Zeithaml and 
Zeithaml 1984). When firms push forward in light of threatening public policy, 
environmental management literature implies competitive strategies could result in 
consumer benefits, such as research and development (R&D), quality products, or 
socially innovative products (e.g., Hambrick 1983; McDaniel and Kolari 1987; Snow and 
Hrebiniak 1980). And when firms push back at threatening public policy, environmental 
management literature implies strategies involving lobbying, political ties, campaign 
contributions, etc. ensue (e.g., McDaniel and Kolari 1987; Miles and Snow 1979).  
 Take for instance lists of lawsuits and settlements between competing 
manufacturers, mostly window manufacturers, revolving around FTC Green Guides 
reported online by the FTC (FTC 2013). The Green Guides offer guidance for 
manufacturers in making substantiated and clear environmental marketing claims and for 
consumers in interpreting such claims. Media reports interpreting these lawsuits find 
firms are using the guidelines to punish competitors’ use of deceptive or unsubstantiated 
claims which, in turn, is prompting manufacturers to make products safer for the natural 
environment (e.g., Mahlum and Goodman 2013; Westervelt 2012).  
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 As another example, investigations find that US food manufacturers spent as 
much as $42 million on attempts to influence those involved in public policy (Bhuyan 
2000) in the two years following the passage of the NFP law. Instead of product 
improvement or innovation, prior research reveals lowered prices (Moorman 1998) and 
improved taste formulations of energy-dense products (Moorman 1998; Moorman, 
Ferraro, and Huber 2012) as trends in firm response to the NFP. The NFP law potentially 
aided consumers in making decisions to avoid products with poor nutritional value by 
mandating that firms display nutrition information in a factual and standardized fashion. 
Yet, while the NFP law was intended to prompt innovation among firms trying to 
differentiation food products in light of the new ease in comparing the nutrition quality of 
competing products (e.g., Ghani and Childs 1999; Petruccelli 1996), industry reports 
depict manufacturers as fighting back (Food Institute Report 1990a,b,c). For example, 
these reports detail food manufacturer spokespersons communicating concern that the 
new restrictions of the NFP law made the extensive research and compliance with 
government procedures an endeavor too risky and expensive to justify new product 
development. 
 These two examples of firm response to public policy illustrate the importance of 
predicting firm marketplace activities. While both the Green Guides and NFP policies 
were designed to benefit consumers directly and indirectly, firms responded to the Green 
Guides with aggressive marketplace competition and product improvement but to the 
NFP with aggressive political competition and stagnation in product quality. This 
dissertation seeks to explain these differential reactions and hypothesizes that when firm 
environmental management of threatening public policy involves political activities, 
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changes in price and promotions, such as increased advertising expenditures or use of 
product claims, are likely to occur. This dissertation also hypothesizes that when firm 
environmental management of threatening public policy involves competitive 
marketplace behaviors, changes in product quality and innovation are likely to occur. 
Furthermore, aggressive political behaviors are an unintended consequence of most 
society-benefiting public policies. Thus, measuring firm environmental management 
orientation towards threatening public policy offers those who develop and draft US 
public policy another tool in predicting unintended consequences and consumer benefit.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
At a glance, this chapter reviews two streams of literature, i.e. firm-stakeholder 
relationship literature and environmental management literature. In reviewing these two 
streams, four firm types in regards to environmental management that categorize firms as 
a degree of firm duty (towards stakeholders and stockholders) and firm ability (in 
managing the external environment) are developed and discussed. These firm types are 
then described as important antecedents to the strategy elements of environmental 
management. Integrating firm-stakeholder relationships into hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between environmental management and consumer outcomes is important 
because it explicates likely motives in firm decisions to not manage the socio-political 
force. This integration positions environmental management as two-dimensional, i.e. as 
involving an element of firm duty as well as an element of firm ability. 
Theories of the Firm 
 Firm Duty. The role of business and its impact on society has been at least a 
century-long debate. Two camps of perspectives have evolved with regards to duty of the 
firm, with one camp revolving around duty towards the stockholder and the other towards 
the stakeholder (e.g., Acar, Aupperle, and Lowy 2001; Buono and Nichols 1985). 
Researchers who believe firms have a duty towards stockholders essentially believe that 
the firm is private property in which the primary responsibility is to create wealth for 
these stockholders. The stockholder perspective views serving external publics, 
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individuals, groups, or entities beyond stockholders, as a secondary goal after creating 
stockholder wealth (Friedman 1962). At the other end of the duty spectrum lies the 
stakeholder perspective. This perspective takes into account firm impact and views the 
firm as existing by permission of society (e.g., Ackoff 1974; Freeman 1984). Thus, the 
stakeholder perspective views the firm as public property in which the primary 
responsibility is to serve both internal (e.g., employees, customers) and external 
stakeholders (e.g., local residents, special interest groups), and the secondary 
responsibility is to create stockholder wealth.  
 In addition to engaging in activities so as to serve society (e.g., Abbott and 
Monsen 1979; Gallego-Alvarez, Prado-Lorenzo and García-Sánchez 2011), firms also are 
understood to hold an orientation towards serving society. Conceptualizations of firm 
orientation towards society, in fact, are centered on notions of “concern” (e.g., Carroll 
1979; O’Neill, Saunders, and McCarthy 1989).  Acar, Aupperle, and Lowy (2001, p. 30) 
distinguish “the degree of eagerness for socially commendable action” from actual firm 
strategy in addressing social issues. These authors insist that firms hold values about 
society and can hold a sense of responsibility. And Maigan and Ferrell (2004) describe 
the motivations for dutiful firm behavior, in terms of duty towards external stakeholders, 
as evolving from both a need for resources as well as moral obligation. In these ways, 
prior literature depicts the firm as more than a set of decision-makers forming strategy, 
but also as an entity concerned for external stakeholders. Consistent firm behavior 
reported by a manager offers a reflection of firm concern. Thus, a society-serving 
orientation is defined as habitual firm behavior that reflects a stronger sense of duty in 
serving stakeholders than stockholders. At the other end of the duty orientation 
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continuum, a self-serving orientation is defined as the habitual firm behavior that reflects 
a stronger sense of duty in serving stockholders than stakeholders. While Freeman (1984) 
specifically defines stakeholders as any group or individual that affects, or is affected by, 
the achievement of a company's aims, this research seeks a more expanded definition and 
considers stakeholders as individuals and/or groups external to the firm with no financial 
investment in the firm, such as special interest groups or end customers. This research 
further considers stockholders as individuals and/or groups either internal or external to 
the firm who are financially invested in the firm, such as shareholders or partnering 
owners.  
 Firm Ability. While a firm’s orientation reflects the degree to which it prioritizes 
either stockholders or stakeholders, the efficacy of such duty exists within an orientation 
towards managing the external business environment. Clark, Varadarajan, and Pride 
(1996) define environmental management as “deliberate actions aimed at controlling, 
changing, influencing, or adapting to inputs” (p. 23). And the business environment can 
be thought of as a collection of external forces including end consumer demand, supplier 
power patterns, competition, technological shifts, and socio-political influences (e.g., 
Duncan 1972; Porter 1979). Theories of environmental management posit that when 
elements of a firm’s external business environment change in a manner that alters its 
business, positively or negatively, the firm can develop formal strategy in response. Such 
strategy either manages opportunities to create benefit or threats to avoid detriment (e.g., 
Zeithaml and Zeithaml 1984).  
 Emphasis, however, must be placed on the adjective can, as in ability, in regards 
to instances in which the firm chooses to manage its external environment. While early 
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researchers narrowly thought of the firm’s structure as being determined by its external 
environment (e.g., market volatility, technological turbulence, shifts in demand; e.g., 
Burns and Stalker 1961; Duncan 1972; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), evolving views 
suggest firms also have strategic choice (Anderson and Paine 1975; Barnard 1938; Dill 
1958; Emery and Trist 1965). Referred to generally as the systems perspective, the 
closed-systems perspective depicts the firm as restructuring in order to adapt to changes 
in the environment. And the open-systems perspective depicts the firm as having the 
ability to strategically alter the external environment to fit the firm’s current structure. 
Though not illustrated directly in this literature stream, most firms are situated along a 
spectrum of the systems perspective anchored by determinism and strategic choice (e.g., 
Duncan 1972; Emery and Trist 1965). Determinism is an orientation which views the 
environment as determining firm structure, and strategic choice is an orientation which 
positions the firm as having choice, or ability, in altering the environment so that it does 
not have to structurally adapt (e.g., Galbraith 1977; Miles at al. 1978; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). The firm’s location on this spectrum offers researchers the ability to 
predict strategic responses to environmental pressures. 
 Environmental management literature often studies pressures residing in various 
forces (e.g., Achrol, Reve, and Stern 1983; Achrol and Stern 1988; Miller and Friesen 
1983; Mintzbert 1973). For example, Achrol and Stern (1988) find close inter-firm 
relationships are useful in managing consumer demand pressures exerted on partners of a 
distribution channel, but are not as important in managing a small, and thus powerful, 
group of suppliers shared by the partners. This is an example of examination into firm 
management of the consumer (i.e. consumer demand pressures) and supplier forces (i.e. 
15 
 
 
 
supplier power pressures). And McDaniel and Kolari (1987) find banks offering products 
in many market domains manage competitive pressures by incorporating new 
technologies into their products, but those protecting one niche product from intense 
competition stick to relatively traditional product offerings but lower prices or offer 
superior service. This is an example of examination into firm management of the 
competition force (i.e. competitive pressures). 
Literature regarding the socio-political force is limited and most often conceptual 
(e.g., Hutt, Mokwa, and Shapiro 1986; Mahon and Murray 1981). The socio-political 
force is defined as the positive or negative influences existing in the external business 
environment derived from government or public groups so as to influence or prevent 
market change (e.g., Duncan 1972). Rather than pressures of supplier power or growing 
competition, for example, pressures exerted on the firm from the socio-political force 
might include tight industry regulation, trade tariffs, government corruption, pop culture, 
terrorist attacks, trends in shoplifting, government-induced product recalls, government-
sponsored media campaigns attempting to de-market products like alcohol or tobacco, 
intra-firm litigation, social movements in favor of natural environment sustainability, etc. 
Although some social pressures induce firm strategic response, such as consumer 
boycotts or litigation, most are less organized and more visible than political pressures, 
such as general public criticism of a firm’s use of low-quality ingredients or cultural 
trends revolving around gender roles. As such, this research examines management of 
government pressures as a management orientation continuum anchored by strategic 
choice and determinism. A strategic choice orientation is defined as habitual firm 
behavior that positions government agents as impressionable and government authority as 
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malleable. Examples of strategies likely to ensue from a strategic choice orientation 
towards threatening public policy are proactive in nature and might include marketplace 
activities, such as product differentiation or innovation, or political activities, such as 
developing ties with those agents who develop public policy or developing an internal 
PAC to raise funds in influencing public policy. In turn, a deterministic orientation is 
defined as habitual firm behavior that positions government agents and authority as 
establishing firm structure. A firm that is deterministically oriented is more likely to react 
to pressures in the external business environment than being proactive in influencing such 
pressures, and is also unlikely to strategically respond to such pressures. 
 Firm Typology. This research posits that firm strategy in light of public policy that 
threatens a firm’s business is influenced by an orientation reflecting duty towards 
external stakeholders (i.e. society-serving) as well as ability to impact the external 
environment (i.e., strategic choice). Prior literature in environmental management also 
discusses environmental management in terms of both organizational and environmental 
characteristics (e.g., Clark, Varadarajan and Pride 1996; Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985; 
Lawless and Finch 1989). This multi-dimensional perspective of firm orientation towards 
its external business environment suggests four types of responsibility orientations exist. 
Figure 1 depicts firms as either weakly (i.e. reactive, deterministic) or strongly (i.e. 
proactive, strategic choice) oriented towards managing the environment. Figure 1 also 
depicts firms as either weakly (i.e. stockholder concern, self-serving) or strongly (i.e. 
stakeholder concern, society-serving) oriented towards serving society. This typology 
combines the degree to which firms are oriented towards both strategic choice and 
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society-serving so that concern for serving society is positioned as a derivative of firm 
ability in positively impact society.  
 Cell 1 describes firms that serve society in a reactive manner. Because these firms 
do not view government agencies/agents as malleable, they are most likely to serve 
society by simply complying with public policies geared for positive societal impact. In 
contrast, however, Cell 4 describes firms that serve society in a proactive manner. These 
firms are likely to invest R&D expenditures into developing socially innovative products, 
for example, because they view the marketplace as an environment they can strategically 
alter. Similarly, Cell 3 describes firms that proactively manage customers, competitors, 
and other marketplace actors, but are more concerned with growing the return on 
investments of stockholders than engaging in activities that positively impact external 
stakeholders. These firms are also likely to invest in R&D expenditures and engage in 
product innovation, but these efforts are concerned with the ability to better compete in 
the marketplace rather than providing social benefit. And Cell 2 describes firms that serve 
stockholders in a reactive manner. These firms are concerned with growing the return on 
investments of stockholders, but take a less proactive stance than the R&D and 
innovation activities inherent in Cell 3. Instead, firms serve stockholders through 
marketplace activities which involve fewer resources and less slack, such as price 
leadership and general advertising activities. This typology of firm responsibility 
orientation is linked to firm strategy in the proceeding section to suggest that firms 
subservient to society act responsibly when powerful stakeholders, i.e. government 
agents or agencies, determine their business activities. It also suggests self-serving firms 
attempt to alter threatening public policy when stakeholders, i.e., government agents or 
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agencies, appear impressionable or when the policy appears malleable. And in later 
sections of this manuscript, firm types according to this typology are linked to  
innovation, product development, pricing, and non-personal promotional activities. 
  
 
  
Reactive Proactive
S
to
ck
h
o
ld
er
s
Self-Serving, 
Deterministic 
Orientation         
2 
Self-Serving, 
Strategic Choice 
Orientation          
3
S
ta
ke
h
o
ld
er
s Society-Serving, 
Deterministic 
Orientation          
1
Society-Serving, 
Strategic Choice 
Orientation         
4
Environmental Management
E
x
te
rn
al
 C
o
n
ce
rn
FIGURE 1
Firm Typology
19 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Strategic Response to Threatening Public Policy 
 Public policy derived from government agents or agencies can appear threatening 
to a firm when it negatively alters the way the firm conducts business or limits the firm’s 
functioning in the marketplace. This might involve, for example, potential but not yet 
enacted public policy that would fine a firm for emitting too much pollution in 
manufacturing products or recently increased employee minimum wage requirements. 
Such threats are likely to induce a firm response when the firm holds a strategic choice 
orientation towards managing political pressures. The preceding literature review 
suggests firms respond to a threatening force of the external business environment 
through formal strategy, but empirical examination most often considers forces other than 
that of socio-political pressures, such as consumer demand (e.g., Archol and Stern 1988; 
Dwyer and Welsh 1985) or intense competition (e.g., Miller and Friesen 1983; Porter 
1979). Instead, environmental management research regarding the socio-political force 
most often examines strategy type (e.g., Alt, Carlson, Heum and Johansen 1999; Bhuyan 
2000; Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010; Getz 2001; Goll and Rasheed 2011; Keillor, Hauser 
and Dannemiller 2009; Keim and Zeithaml 1986; Kolk and Levy 2001; LaBarbera 1983; 
Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou 2008; Lux 2008; Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011; Mahon and 
Murray 1981; Shaffer 1995; Shaffer and Hillman 2000; Shaffer, Quasney, and Grimm 
2009; Sheng, Zhou and Li 2011) rather than orientation type, as in orientation towards 
managing the socio-political force. Yet, research examining types of strategies involved 
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in managing socio-political pressures provides three insights important in understanding 
firm response to public policy pressures. The following literature review delves further 
into environmental management of threatening public policy and these three insights. 
 First, literature examining environmental management of the socio-political force 
indicates that firms manage political threats derived from government agents or agencies 
through formal strategy (e.g., Getz 2001; Keillor and Lewison 2003). For example, in a 
study of US multinational firms’ executive use of political strategies, Keillor and 
Lewison (2003) find firm strategy to vary depending on the form of environmental threat. 
Firms utilize host country lobbying, industry alliances, and political inducements when 
the political threat concerns local product content regulation, but public relations and 
political contributions strategies when the threat involves government restrictions and, 
specifically, restrictions on the trade of products between the firm’s home and host 
countries. As another example, Goll and Rasheed (2011) find air carriers’ most common 
strategic response to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 involved cost leadership, but 
air carriers’ most common strategic response to terrorist attacks creating consumer 
demand droughts involved a change in service scope away from passenger transportation 
and towards freight transportation. 
 Literature finds or conceptualizes firm strategy in managing public policy threats 
to be distinct from strategy in managing pressures from other forces (e.g., Lux, Crook, 
and Woehr 2011; Mahon and Murray 1981; Zeithaml and Zeithaml 1984). Goll and 
Rasheed (2011) find firm strategy in response to public policy pressures to revolve 
around finding a new sense of market stability, but strategy in response to consumer 
demand pressures to rely on exploring new market domains in search of additional 
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demand. And Lux, Crook, and Woehr (2011) find increased political competition (i.e. the 
number of firms competing over a policy through monetary contributions), is positively 
related to firm use of political strategies (i.e. campaign contributions, lobbying, executive 
testimony before legislators and regulators, operating a government relations office, PAC 
contributions), but market competition as negatively related to use of political strategies. 
Mirrored in Zeithaml and Zeithaml’s (1984) environmental management 
conceptualization, this literature stream finds socio-political pressures to prompt the non-
market strategies of political activities, while pressures residing in market-related forces 
(i.e. consumer demand, supplier power, market domain competition) to prompt market 
strategies, such as product differentiation or comparative advertising. 
 Second, literature examining management of the socio-political force implies that 
firms that develop strategy to manage public policy threats hold a strategic choice 
orientation towards government agents/agencies (e.g., Keillor, Hauser, and Dannemiller 
2009; Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, and Van Ness 2010; Holburn and Zelner 2010; Shaffer 
1995). Weidenbaum (1980) distinguishes reactive from proactive strategic responses to 
public policy by describing firms as either deciding to play no role in policy formulation, 
play no role in formulation but formally account for the limitations and opportunities 
public policy sometimes present, or engage in political activities so as to directly shape 
public policy. Similarly, Meznar and Nigh (1995) and Blumentritt (2003) describe firms 
as either buffering threatening public policy, which includes proactive behaviors such as 
campaign contributions or lobbying, or bridging threatening public policy, which 
includes reactive behaviors such as tracking regulation trends so as to form appropriate 
compliance strategies. And Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) conceptualize bargaining 
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strategies in managing government pressures, such as PACs, lobbyists, or diplomatic 
government partnerships, as more proactive than the nonbargaining strategy examples 
they offer of compliance or exit. Proactive strategies and a strategic orientation are used 
interchangeably in environmental management literature (e.g., Bocquet et al. 2013; 
Zeithaml and Zeithaml 1984). Thus, a firm that engages in political behaviors in an 
attempt to prevent, alter, or mitigate public policy likely has a strategic choice orientation 
towards government agent(s).  
 Furthermore, evidence of the same policy or government trend leading to 
differing strategies among firms suggests that strategic response is an artifact of firm 
orientation rather than power of the socio-political force. Take for instance evidence of 
close government relations facilitating the dominant market position of one auto 
manufacturer but distant government relations limiting that of another’s position (Frynas, 
Mellahi, and Pigman 2006). This research found a cyclical pattern between an auto 
manufacturer’s offerings and government specialized orders from the manufacturer. 
Because the Government continued requesting special auto requests for military 
purposes, and because the given manufacturer continuously responded accordingly, the 
close firm-government relationship gave the firm relative resource, informational, and 
technological advantages in a way that reduced the market position of its major 
competitor. As another example, LaBarbera (1983) describes public complaints, 
litigation, and threat of government regulation as leading some advertising firms to alter 
advertising content and others to continue to focus on marketplace competition without 
altering content. The former reflects deterministic or reactive orientations towards the 
public policy trend, while the latter reflects strategic choice or proactive orientations.  
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 Third, this literature also finds that firms develop either policy- or competition-
altering strategies in managing political pressures. Competition-altering strategy is 
defined as involving firm marketplace activities useful for maintaining or improving a 
competitive marketplace position in light of threatening public policy. Policy-altering 
strategy is defined as involving firm activity that attempts to prevent or reduce the threat 
of the public policy. In studying firm response to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
Kaikati and Label (1980) find firms to either develop marketing or political strategies. 
Their study found marketing strategies to include exporting through foreign subsidiaries, 
entering joint bids in seeking foreign contracts, or utilizing consumer demand 
advantages. They found political strategies to include payoffs to minor officials or other 
bribery tactics, so as to continue operating in corrupt foreign markets. And Zeithaml and 
Zeithaml’s (1984) seminal typology of firm environmental management strategies also 
ranges from political (e.g., Public Relations, Political Action) to market (e.g., 
Competitive Aggression, Diversification) maneuvering. While Kaikati and Label’s 
(1980) study of foreign expansion strategy compares both competition- and policy-
altering strategies, it is the only one of its kind. Most studies in this literature stream 
examine only one of these strategic themes. For example, Bhuyan (2000) examines only 
the policy-altering strategies of PAC contributions, lobbying, and political ties of the US 
food manufacturing industry in the face of increased regulation. And as another example, 
Fuchs and Kalfagianni (2010) examine only the competition-altering strategies of supply 
chain control, acquisitions, and market concentration facilitation of European Union food 
retailers in light of food system health concerns.  
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 The preceding review of literature examining firm management of threatening 
public policy suggests that this management 1) involves formal strategy when the firm 
holds a strategic choice orientation towards government agents/agencies and 2) could 
involve policy- or competition-altering strategy. As such, this research hypothesizes a 
positive relationship between firm orientation more strongly leaning towards strategic 
choice and the incidence of strategic response, whether it is through policy- or 
competition-altering strategy. In other words, the stronger the firm’s orientation towards 
managing government agents/agencies leans towards strategic choice, the more 
frequently will the firm strategically respond to various public policies seemingly 
threatening to the firm’s business or marketplace functions. And the stronger the firm’s 
orientation towards managing government agents/agencies leans towards deterministic, 
the less frequently will the firm strategically respond to threatening public policies. These 
relationships have not been studied in prior research. In fact, the only examination of a 
relationship between environmental management orientations and firm response to public 
policy is that of Bocquet, Le Bas, Mothe, and Poussing (2013) who study firm innovation 
as a result of European Union regulation regarding firm waste and pollution. These 
researchers only study firm response to government pressures in protecting the natural 
environment. In addition, instead of measuring firm orientation, these researchers code 
managers’ publicized reports of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities as either 
proactive or reactive.   
 Research has yet to link both society-serving and strategic choice orientations to 
strategic responses towards threatening public policy. However, research conceptualizing 
a socially responsible orientation posits this orientation to be multi-dimensional and 
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include a legal responsibility, in addition to profit, ethical and community responsibilities 
(Carroll 1979). In addition to simply obeying laws, firms which hold an orientation that 
strongly leans towards society-serving are also likely to serve government stakeholder 
individuals/groups by obeying the public policy process. And while a management 
orientation that strongly leans towards strategic choice positions government 
agents/agencies involved in creating and implementing public policy as malleable, this 
orientation also positions marketplace competition as malleable. Thus, a firm concerned 
with serving external stakeholders is unlikely to negate the intended societal benefits of 
public policy even if it does limit the firm’s business or marketplace functions. Instead, a 
firm that is more strongly oriented towards serving society than stockholders will attempt 
to influence marketplace competition if it also holds a strategic choice orientation.   
 Narver’s (1971) thesis on corporate responsibilities and firm welfare echoes this 
logic when he describes firm survival in the long-run as dependent on the ability to avoid 
long-run sanctions, particularly from government sources. This ability signals to investors 
that the firm is able to maximize long-term wealth. Thus, while firms strongly orientated 
towards society-serving prioritize concern for serving external stakeholders, these firms 
must also effectively transform environmental inputs into market outputs so as to survive 
and persist. Finding ways to maintain performance (e.g., sales, market share) in the 
marketplace in light of public policy that limits the way the firm conducts business or its 
marketplace functions is one way in which firms greatly concerned with serving society 
can serve stockholders so as to serve stakeholders. In essence, serving stakeholders 
requires some degree of firm wealth attributable to satisfied stockholders. 
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 Prior research indicates that firms strongly oriented towards serving society 
sometimes respond to socio-political pressures through market-based strategies for an 
effective competitive position (e.g., Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010; Hart 1995; Porter and 
van der Linde 1995; Ogle, Hyllegard, and Dunbar 2004; Russo and Fouts 1997). This 
research stream describes serving society as involving, and sometimes requiring, firm 
resources derived from successfully competing in the marketplace. In fact, social 
activities are described as a “virtuous circle” in that activities involved in serving society 
require, as well as create, intangible firm resources (e.g., Bansal 2005; Brammer and 
Millington 2009; Gallego-Álvarez, Prado-Lorenzo, and García-Sánchez 2011; Husted 
and Allen 2007; López, Pérez and Rodríguez 2008; McWilliams and Siegel 2001; 
Surroca, Tribó, and Waddock 2010). For instance, creating better products so as to better 
serve customers might require the firm resources of R&D and innovation, but the 
resulting intangible firm resource of customer value also contributes to the firm resources 
of revenue or market share which, in turn, can facilitate the resources of R&D and 
innovation. As such, the following hypotheses suggest that firms strongly oriented 
towards strategic choice will respond to threatening public policy through formal 
strategy, but firms also strongly oriented towards society-serving will only strategically 
respond by better competing in the marketplace so as to accrue benefits useful in 
offsetting public policy threats. 
H1: A society-serving, strategic choice firm orientation is positively associated 
with a competition-altering strategic response to threatening public policy.  
H2: A society-serving, deterministic firm orientation is positively associated with 
a non-strategic response to threatening public policy. 
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Consumer-Related Outcomes 
 Orientation to Firm Strategy. While the preceding sections discuss the 
relationships between threatening public policy and firm-level behavior, the following 
section examines prior environmental management literature so as to suggest a 
relationship between firm orientations towards and strategies involved in socio-politics 
and end consumer impact. Depending on the type of strategy a firm turns to in light of 
threatening public policy, policy- or competition-altering, one of two types of consumer-
related outcomes are likely to occur, i.e. process- or product-focused. The distinction 
between these two types of outcomes lies in the type of firm focus on the threatening 
public policy.  
 In Mahon and Murray’s (1981) seminal conceptualization of strategic planning of 
regulated firms, the authors describe the degree to which environmental strategy differs 
from firm to firm as depending on the type of government pressures exerted. They 
discuss these differences in terms of firm focus on either the process inherent in or the 
likely product, as in outcome, of the policy pressures. According to Mahon and Murray, 
and with regards to managing the socio-political pressure of government public policy, a 
firm’s process-focused response to such pressures is “the management of ongoing, 
dynamic relationships among the firm and various actors external to it” (p. 253) and a 
firm’s product-focused response centers on “the more substantive outcome, or result, of 
the regulatory process” (p. 254). Although they suggest any one firm could adopt both 
types of responses in effectively overcoming a public policy threat, it is indicated that the 
degree of focus towards one over the other potentially impacts the end consumer. When a 
firm exerts more effort and resources on a product-focused strategy, the firm focuses on 
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how the public policy threat is likely to impact the firm’s marketplace strategies in 
influencing end consumers. For example, a firm focused on the product of the threatening 
public policy might, as a result, focus on how new government depreciation policies will 
position manufacturing machinery important to product innovation strategies as risky. 
And when a firm exerts more energy and resources on a process-focused strategy in 
managing a public policy threat, the firm focuses on relationship strategies in dealing 
with government entities (e.g., political contributions, political ties) and, in turn, begins to 
“delearn” important marketing skills and marketplace strategies (e.g., product 
differentiation, salesforce management strategies). Mahon and Murray describe these two 
strategic responses as requiring different skill sets, such as negotiation skills in 
attempting to offset the threat of public policy processes and marketing skills in 
attempting to offset the threat of public policy outcomes. In fact, they describe a focus on 
one strategic response as leading to an underutilization of the skills involved in the other 
strategic response as similar to a human muscle that deteriorates.  
 Firm Strategy to Consumer-Related Outcomes. A firm that responds to 
threatening public policy through policy-altering strategy is likely to exert resources 
towards and develop skill in policy-focused activities which should, in turn, divert firm 
resources and skill away from product-focused activities that potentially improve product 
quality for consumers, such as innovation and new product development. For the 
purposes of this research, process-focused activities are defined as involving firm 
dedication of tangible resources away from market activities heavily dependent on firm 
research (i.e. R&D, marketing research) and product-focused activities are defined as 
involving firm dedication of tangible resources toward market activities heavily 
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dependent on firm research. Although Mahon and Murray do not offer detail as to what 
activities these two strategies might entail, examples of process-focused activities would 
likely include product price reductions and/or increased use of product claims. Price 
reductions and use of product claims require relatively less firm research to develop than 
activities likely to substantially improve a firm’s marketplace position, such as the 
product development and innovation activities involved in product-focused activities. In 
turn, the relatively few resources needed in developing pricing and product claim 
activities allow the firm to exert more focus on altering the policy through process-related 
measures (e.g., lobbying, PACs). These relationships are more thoroughly discussed in 
the subsequent section in which empirical findings related to forms of public policy focus 
are reviewed.  
 In addition to theoretical support, empirical research confirms the 
conceptualization of process- and product-focused firm activities. Based on Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) typology of firm environmental management, firms with a narrow product 
mix operating in a small industry niche are successful because their predictable and stable 
environments allow them to specialize in production efficiency and cost-control activities 
rather than new product development or innovation. Thus, firms dependent on stable 
environments threatened by public policy that alters the basis of competition are more 
likely to expend resources in altering the threat rather than their niche, and are likely to 
resort to pricing and general promotion strategies. McDaniel and Kolari (1987) confirm 
this in finding that firms defending an industry niche and which rely on stable 
environments do in fact place high importance on pricing strategies and Miles and Snow 
(1978) suggest these firms are also likely to emphasize general, non-personal promotion 
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strategies, such as mass advertising over personal selling. Miles and Snow (1978) 
describe firms defending an industry niche as never developing skills in personal selling 
activities because they place so much emphasis and concern on efficiency. They go so far 
as to describe the decision-makers of such defending firms as particularly skilled in 
production and production control management. As further confirmation, prior research 
consistently finds these defensive firms to place little emphasis on product development 
(Hambrick 1983; McDaniel and Kolari 1987; Snow and Hrebiniak 1980) and marketing 
research (McDaniel and Kolari 1987). This pattern of logic in prior environmental 
management literature indicates a positive relationship between the frequency of policy-
altering strategies in response to threatening public policy and the consumer-related 
outcomes of price and general promotion change is likely.  
H3a: Policy-altering firm strategy is positively associated with firm product pricing 
change.  
H3b: Policy-altering firm strategy is positively associated with firm non-personal 
promotions change. 
H4a: Competition-altering firm strategy is positively associated with a change in 
firm innovativeness. 
H4b: Competition-altering firm strategy is positively associated with a change in 
firm product development. 
 
Firm Impact 
 Prior literature often examines the firm impact of various strategies by measuring 
firm gross profit margin, market position, sales growth rates, stock returns, return on 
investments, return on assets, etc. Research that examines the relationship between 
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environmental orientations and firm performance is common, but mixed. Environmental 
management theory posits that firms cannot survive their complex external business 
environment in the long-run without proactive, strategic maneuvering (i.e. strategic 
choice behavior; Aldrich 1974). In fact, differing levels of performance among firms in 
the same industry is argued as an artifact of strategic choice (e.g., Child 1972; Hambrick, 
MacMillan and Day 1982; Schendel and Patton 1978). Because competition-altering 
strategies are described in the preceding literature review as involving marketplace 
activities (i.e. pricing, product, promotion, innovation activities) designed to increase 
consumer purchases and/or decrease purchases of competing offers, competition-altering 
strategies are also likely to improve firm marketplace performance. And prior research 
examining firm political behaviors often finds the same strategy-performance relationship 
even when firms resort to policy-alerting strategies. When firm strategy includes 
lobbying, campaign contributions, political ties, and/or PAC activity, an increase in firm 
performance relative to before the political activity takes place is noted (e.g., Chan, 
Parsley, and Yang 2010; Hill et al. 2010; Keillor, Hauser, and Dannemiller 2009; Li et al. 
2001; Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011; Shaffer, Quasney, and Grimm 2009; Sheng, Zhou, 
and Li 2011), though this research does not directly measure political activity as a 
response to threatening public policy. Other research, however, finds no relationship 
between political activity and firm performance (e.g., Hersch, Netter, and Pope 2008; 
Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999; Keillor, Hauser, and Dannemiller 2009; Kim 
2008). Thus, it is reasonable to posit that both policy- and competition-altering strategy 
will improve firm performance.  
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 Prior research also finds a positive relationship between society serving activities 
and firm performance (e.g., Cochran and Wood 1984; Goll and Rasheed 2004; Ingram 
1978; Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Pava and Krausz 1996). In fact, many argue (e.g., Cho 
and Pucik 2005; Hart 1995; Hedstrom, Poltorzycki, and Stroh 1998; McWilliams, Fleet, 
and Cory 2002; Nidumoluu, Prahalad, and Rangaswami 2009) and Russo and Fouts 
(1997) and Rennings and Rammar (2011) confirm that firms acting socially responsible 
often develop a unique, inimitable capability that provides a sustained competitive 
advantage. Thus, a proactive strategy (i.e. strategic choice orientation) in response to 
threatening policy, regardless of the type of strategy involved or the degree to which the 
firm is oriented towards serving society, should lead to improved firm performance. 
Finally, to clearly argue for the mediated relationships of H5b and H6b, it must be noted 
that it is the THREAT that causes the response. In other words, a marked change in firm 
performance unrelated to normal operations would not occur due to the firm’s orientation 
alone.  
H5a: A competition-altering strategy is positively associated with firm 
performance. 
H5b: A competition-altering strategy is a mediating variable between a society-
serving, strategic choice orientation and firm performance.  
H6a: A policy-altering strategy is positively associated with firm performance.  
H6b: A policy-altering strategy is a mediating variable between a society-
serving, strategic choice orientation and firm performance.  
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Social Impact 
 A preceding section of this dissertation discusses innovation strategies which are 
generally concerned with R&D and are not specific to social benefits. In addition to this 
traditional firm strategy, firms also engage in social innovation through product 
development activities. A socially innovative product provides end consumers with a 
social benefit in a novel way and provides unique incentives to firms strongly oriented 
towards society-serving as well as self-serving. Socially innovative products benefit firms 
with a strong society-serving orientation because they provide a direct link between a 
society-serving goal and stakeholder, which include consumers, benefits. In addition, 
socially innovative products benefit firms with a strong self-serving orientation by way of 
a competitive advantage. Prior research examining firm engagement in socially 
responsible activities finds these activities lead to positive consumer perceptions of the 
firm (Bhattacharya and Sen 2003; Brown and Dacin 1997; Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 
2007; Fombrun and Shanley 1990), improved brand value (Chu and Keh 2006; Fombrun 
and Shanley 1990), positive stock market returns (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006), reduced 
idiosyncratic risk (Luo and Bhattacharya 2009), and firm differentiation from competitors 
(Hull and Rothenberg 2008).  
 While this literature stream offers a clear link between competition-altering 
strategies of firms strongly oriented towards self-serving and socially innovative product 
development, it is also likely that such product development is an outcome of competitive 
strategies of firms strongly oriented towards society-serving. When firms concerned 
about serving external stakeholders are faced with a public policy that limits its ability to 
effectively compete in the marketplace, attempts to combine the positive social and 
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competitive benefits of socially innovative product development are likely to occur. 
Firms which hold an orientation that strongly leans towards deterministic, however, are 
unlikely to respond to threatening public policy at all, let alone through product 
development or innovation. And because policy-alerting strategy in light of threatening 
public policy involves policy process-focused strategies that divert skills and resources 
away from innovation and product development, policy-altering strategy decreases the 
likelihood of firms developing socially innovative products.   
Finally, to clearly argue for the mediated relationship of H7b, it must be noted that it 
is the THREAT that causes the response. While strategic choice alone is likely to cause a 
firm to take innovation risks, duty alone is not. It is the threat that makes response 
automatic, and in this case only a dutiful firm will have dutiful responses. Additionally, a 
policy focused response would involve delearning and, therefore, not innovation. In other 
words, a marked change in social innovation immediately following the implementation 
of a strategic response to the government public policy would not occur due to the firm’s 
orientation alone.  
H7a: A competition-altering strategy is positively associated with a change in 
firm social innovativeness.   
H7b: A competition-altering strategy is a mediating variable between a society-
serving, strategic choice orientation and an increase in firm social 
innovativeness.  
 
 In essence, this dissertation examines the societal impact of public policy that 
attempts to limit the business and/or marketplace functions of firms by taking into 
account firm environmental management of socio-political pressures. First, by 
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hypothesizing that a strong self-serving, strategic choice orientation is positively related 
to public policy-altering strategy, this research suggests a firm’s orientation in managing 
its external business environment predicts how firms will respond to public policy that is 
threatening to the firm’s business. If confirmed, this allows researchers an additional tool 
in predicting firm strategy in managing the socio-political force as well as the firm’s 
impact on society (i.e. improved consumer products, social innovation). In this way, firm 
orientation also allows researchers to predict how public policy impacts society by taking 
into account firm strategy. 
 Second, this dissertation proposes unintended consequences of threatening public 
policy through hypotheses that suggest a strong self-serving, strategic choice orientation 
is negatively related to societal benefits (i.e. improved consumer products, social 
innovation), both directly and indirectly. Thus, not only are firm attempts to change 
seemingly threatening public policy an unintended consequence of public policy, but also 
firms not engaging in product improvement and/or social innovation in response to public 
policy that often attempts to benefit end consumers by altering the basis of firm 
competition is an unintended consequence.  
 Third, this dissertation hypothesizes that strong deterministic, society-serving 
oriented firms do not respond to threatening public policy by competing in new ways. It 
is understood that firms strongly oriented towards society-serving serve external 
stakeholders out of concern for firm impact on society. However, it is also proposed that 
firms strongly oriented towards society-serving serve society when threatening public 
policy evokes proactively oriented firms to compete in new ways so as to offset limiting 
public policy. In addition, this research hypothesizes a firm strongly oriented towards 
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self-serving leads to societal benefit (i.e. social innovation) because this orientation-
benefit relationship is believed to be mediated by competition-altering strategy when the 
firm also holds a strong strategic choice orientation. If confirmed, this relationship 
suggests firms which prioritize stockholder over stakeholder concerns can benefit society 
in ways similar to firms that prioritize stakeholder over stockholder concerns. Most 
importantly, this dissertation offers tools for public policy leaders to provoke societal 
benefit through healthy marketplace competition. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 Although prior literature discussing environmental management is largely 
conceptual, academics have provided some detail in firm behavior likely involved in this 
management process. For example, researchers describe a firm with an orientation that 
leans deterministic as most likely responding to a threat in the external environment 
through restructuring, such as increased communication across departments (Burns and 
Stalker 1961; Hague and Aiken 1969; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Stinchombe 1959), 
specialized administrative roles in dealing with specific dimensions of the environment 
(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), such as a public affairs-government relations manager 
(Baysinger and Woodan 1982), and centralized decision-making in which most decisions 
are made by top managers and merely conveyed to lower managers (Hage 1965). Yet, 
researchers describing the behavior of a firm with an orientation that leans toward 
strategic choice suggest this type of firm is most likely to respond to environmental 
threats by using material technology to alter products and compete in new ways (Child 
1972), choosing to compete in additional market domains so as to dilute environmental 
risks like product-specific regulation (Bourgeois 1984), forming close relationships with 
other organizations (Baybrooke and Lindblom 1963; Terreberry 1968), and bargaining 
with institutional stakeholders, such as professional associations, government agencies, 
business organizations, or union constituents (Scott 1983).  
While these rich discussions offer future research some detail in what firm 
environmental management might entail depending on the firm’s orientation, no 
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measurement scale has been developed to test the relationship between firm orientation 
and environmental management strategies. Instead, researchers testing environmental 
management orientations either judge a firm’s orientation through secondary data or 
collect primary data but question managers or customers about the respective firm’s 
activities. For example, Lawless and Finch (1989) use secondary census and economic 
data to compare firm performance (e.g., return on investment, earnings per share) across 
four firm profiles: firms that have minimum, differentiated, maximum, or incremental 
choice in managing the environment. But these four environmental management profiles 
are developed solely by the authors and based on their judgment of the degree to which 
the market a firm competes in involves determinism and strategic choice through 
examination of secondary data. And while other research utilizes survey data that 
questions managers directly about firm behavior, the approaches do not generalize to 
classifying firm orientation towards environmental management.  
Sharma and Vredenburg (1998) survey business customers of railroad industry 
firms but the questioning is specific to reduced purchases, new use, or reduced waste so 
as that answers reflect firm responses to government pressures in protecting the natural 
environment instead of perceptions of the malleability of the external environment. 
Similarly, Bocquet and colleagues (2013) survey managers about their CSR practices, but 
code proactive or reactive CSR profiles themselves using publicized documentation of 
CSR motivations, practices, agendas and a measure of perceived benefits involved in 
CSR are then coded by the authors to reflect either a  reactive or proactive CSR. And Hitt 
and Tyler (1991) perhaps come closest to measuring environmental management 
orientations through primary data involving managerial perceptions, but do so by 
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examining the risk propensity, cognitive ability, and demographics of the responding 
manager. Research examining environmental management needs to develop an 
orientation classification scale because a firm’s orientation towards managing the 
external environment, and the extent to which this orientation involves having the ability 
to alter the environment or being determined by the environment, offers practitioners and 
academics a tool that extends additional context and environmental pressures. Measuring 
the firm’s vantage point in terms of how manageable the environment is offers better 
prediction of general firm response to a given force than measuring a firm’s specific 
activities in reacting to a specific pressure.  
This dissertation follows the researcher’s Institution Research Board (IRB) 
recommendations in utilizing a mixed method approach so as to better understand the 
dimensions and characteristics of an environmental management orientation as well as to 
test the outcomes involved. Mixed method approaches are useful to research in that 
qualitative and quantitative research methods combine so as to complement the unique 
tools and potential contributions of each design (Creswell and Clark 2010). Qualitative 
data is used in this research to collect direct, rich answers from managers to questions 
about the environmental management orientations of their respective firms and the 
outcomes involved. And quantitative research is used to test the relationships 
hypothesized between environmental management and firm marketplace strategies 
developed in Chapter 2 for research goals involving generalization of findings to various 
contexts. When combined, these two research tools aid in providing understanding of the 
literal, as well as the theoretical, aspects of firm environmental management. 
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  This dissertation is composed of two studies, beginning with a qualitative study. 
The purpose of this initial study is three-fold. First, interviews with managers regarding 
their view of the external business environment and government policies that influence 
their employer’s business were useful in selecting the most appropriate key informant for 
Study 2. These interviews confirmed that all managers involved in strategy formulation 
are appropriate key informants of firm behavior, regardless of their key management 
area, such as marketing or external communications. Second, interviews complemented 
the development of the environmental management orientation measurement scale tested 
in Study 2. Third, interviews offered information about the complete model of 
environmental management useful for testing the hypotheses of Study 2. In other words, 
interview questions asked participants in one sitting about an environmental management 
orientation that characterizes their respective firm, its direct effect on strategy in 
responding to threatening public policy, and its indirect effect on activities likely to affect 
consumers.  
 The purpose of Study 2 is also three-fold. First, quantitative survey responses to 
an originally-developed environmental management orientation scale offer the marketing 
literature the first tool in testing environmental management’s outcomes through primary 
data collection. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, of the three studies that 
utilize primary data to assess environmental management, only Bocquet and colleagues’ 
(2013) study involves firm behavior assessed through managerial reports. Sharma and 
Vredenburg (1998) research specific firm responses to natural environmental pressures 
by surveying customers of the firms in question and Hitt and Tyler (1991) research only 
managers’ individual traits. And even though Bocquet and colleagues’ (2012) study does 
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involve primary data collected from managers, these researchers use the managerial 
responses to categorize the firms’ environmental management stance based on 
managerial reports of CSR practices, documentation, and motives. As such, these authors 
did not measure environmental management in a way that’s useful for predicting a 
broader spectrum of firm responses to environmental threats because only reports of CSR 
practices and motives, rather than beliefs about and/or perceptions of ability in 
environmental management, are used to measure environmental management. Although 
tailored for perceptions involved in managing the socio-political force specifically, the 
goal of this dissertation research is to develop an environmental management construct 
useful for future research in predicting various firm strategic responses to many 
environmental threats. 
Second, survey data collection was used to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 2. And third, the nature of the survey questioning allowed this dissertation 
research to examine the direct relationship between threatening public policy and the 
formal strategic response involved because managers were asked to indicate if their 
employing firm has faced a threatening public policy and then describe the firm’s 
strategic response to this threat. In addition to capturing a direct relationship between 
policy and strategy, this survey design is unique in that this research carries the potential 
to capture strategic responses to a whole host of public policies, unlike specific policies 
as would be typical of case studies. Finally, all methods were conducted according to the 
researcher’s IRB with recommendations beyond basic instructions offered in Appendix C 
(p. 169). 
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Study 1: Qualitative Inquiry 
Study Context.  Interviews with 40 senior-level executives of both for- and non-
profit firms took place during the summers of 2013 and 2014. The mode of interview 
depended on the participant’s scheduling and the degree of comfort requested. As such, 
some interviews took place over the phone, some through face-to-face meetings, and 
some through email. A colleague (i.e. Marketing practitioner and close acquaintance) 
unfamiliar with this dissertation’s hypotheses was asked to pick a random subset of 
interviews conducted and note the mode of interview guessed after reviewing the content 
of the interview (i.e. the researcher’s notes and participant’s comments). Among the 
notes of these randomly-picked interviews, the mode through which the interview took 
place was guessed correctly only 47 percent of the time, suggesting the mode did not 
impact the data collected. No market sector, type of business (e.g., business-to-consumer, 
business-to-business), or degree of government monitoring was targeted in choosing 
executives and firms to interview for this qualitative inquiry.  
 Recruitment.  Convenience and snowball participant sampling designs were 
utilized for this study. Convenience sampling is a nonprobability sampling design that 
involves recruitment of personal contacts. Snowball sampling is also a nonprobability 
sampling design that involves asking current participants to suggest their own personal 
contacts for further interview recruitment. It is suggested in prior research that a snowball 
sampling procedure “can be utilized to make statistical inferences about various aspects 
of the relationships present in the population” (Goodman 1961, p. 148) when a recruited 
individual (i.e. s stage) recruits a number of additional individuals (i.e. k name) for the 
study, relative to a random sample of individuals or binomial snowball sampling, for 
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example. However, snowball and convenience sampling are only used in Study 1 to 
explore (versus test) environmental management theories. Thus, convenience and 
snowball sampling are appropriate for an exploratory study considering that Study 1 does 
not involve confirmation, hypothesis testing, or generalization of findings to other 
contexts or groups of managers.  
Recruitment started with contacting members of advisory boards of the 
researcher’s university as this allowed for convenient recruitment. Then, these 
participants were asked at the end of the interview to offer the name and contact 
information of a colleague likely to agree to participate in this study. Finally, some of the 
interview participants were recruited during the quantitative data collection phase of 
Study 2 in using the third-party recruitment data purchased, to be discussed in greater 
detail in a subsequent section of this chapter. Senior-level executives were typically 
contacted initially via email and, if the Executive agreed to participate, signed a 
researcher confidentiality assurance form (see Appendix C, pp. 172-3) before beginning 
the interview. This form, drafted according to the researcher’s IRB guidelines, informed 
the participant that no incentives were available for participation and that information 
shared with the researcher would be reported anonymously, among other items. 
Participants.  From this recruitment process, a very heterogeneous sample of 40 
senior-level executives participated in interviews that typically lasted approximately 45 
minutes. Detailed descriptions of these executive participants and the firms they 
represented in the interview can be seen by referring to Table 3 (pp. 78-9). This table 
indicates that 39 of the firms represented were for-profit, 39 of the Executives were 
currently employed by the firm they represented in the interview, and all of the 
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executives have at least three years tenure with their respective firm. Executives qualified 
for Study 1 if they described themselves as involved in strategy formulation, i.e. the 
formal generation of business ideas among senior-level management. Because this 
dissertation is interested in understanding how firms behave, executive participants acted 
as key informants in providing information about how their employing firm behaves in 
the external business environment. Key informants are considered a significant source of 
information (Wollcott 2008), because they are the gatekeepers in the organization who 
allowed researcher access, who are acquainted with the goals and strategies of their 
employer, and who have been employed by (or own) the firm relatively longer than other 
employees (i.e. potential informants; Wollcott 2008).  
 Analysis.  According to Merriam-Webster (2014), a firm is defined as “1: the 
name or title under which a company transacts business 2: a partnership of two or more 
persons that is not recognized as a legal person distinct from the members composing it 
3: a business unit or enterprise.” As such, the firm is made up relationships external and 
internal to the firm. The firm transacts with both people and other firms in the external 
business environment through transactions that involve trust, contracts, negotiations, etc. 
And the firm partners with people internal to the unit through membership, which also 
involves transactions of money, skill, and/or production, as well as partnerships occurring 
between and among members. The firm is a complex collection of people and processes 
that poses challenges for scholarly researchers who must make assumptions about the 
manner in which firms behave and use predetermined meanings or categories to test 
theories of the firm.  
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The challenge with a research approach that involves assumption and 
predisposition revolves around firms’ “inherent messiness, contradictions and puzzling 
character of reality” (Chia 2011, p. 183). All the while, the scholar conducting the 
research has constructed an owned meaning of the world making it even more 
challenging to understand the complex and varying views of their participants without 
using their own meanings and understandings of the way the world works to interpret 
such participant views. One way to overcome these challenges is to induct meaning 
through the constructivist worldview of qualitative research.  
Social constructivist research relies on a belief that participants construct their 
own meanings of the world surrounding them (Creswell 2013). Based on this belief, 
qualitative methods close the distance between the researcher and participant and 
prioritize the knowledge and experiences of participants over that of the researcher 
(Creswell 2012). To achieve this, the qualitative researcher uses open-ended questioning 
that allows participants to share their own views and uncovers the unique particularities 
of the context a given participant is situated within. Furthermore, qualitative research 
utilizes inductive methodologies in which meaning is a derivative of data only (Crotty 
1998), often complemented by co-interpretation among the researcher and participants. 
Qualitative Design: Phenomenology.  To reiterate Chapter 1, the research 
questions Study 1 attempts to answer revolve around how firms experience government 
public policy influence that affects the way they do business. Specifically, the research 
questions ask Do orientations towards managing the government force indeed exist? And, 
if so, what types of management techniques do they entail? At the heart of these 
questions are why firms might experience the same government public policy influence 
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differently, such as through a deterministic or strategic choice lens. This unique, 
perceptual experience of an event that makes up the observer’s knowledge of the event is 
the essence of phenomenology. Merriam-Webster (2014) defines phenomena as “an 
object or aspect known through the senses rather than by thought or intuition” or “a 
temporal or object of sensory experience as distinguished from a fact.” Thus, letting the 
observer share the experience and knowledge of the phenomenon through the open-
ended, generally unstructured data collection of qualitative designs allows meaning to be 
induced without the inherent constraint of closed-ended, structure questioning developed 
by the researcher’s own experience and knowledge. Additionally, because the essence of 
understanding phenomena is understanding how observers of the same phenomenon 
experience it differently, phenomenology, a type of qualitative research, is a tool 
necessary to this research because it “seeks to illuminate experience through 
comprehensive description and vivid renderings” (Moustakas 1994, p. 15). 
Unique to phenomena of government public policy influence is the 1) likelihood 
that the business-trained and experienced marketing scholar conducting the researcher 
has owned experience and self-constructed knowledge of this phenomena and 2) potential 
participant discomfort with sharing perceived threats derived from a governing body 
involved in these phenomena. Thus, in order to illuminate firms’ experience of 
government public policy influence, transcendental phenomenology was chosen as the 
most appropriate method in collecting and analyzing data to answer the research 
questions posed in this study.  
Transcendental phenomenology is different from other phenomenology methods 
because it is “free from the researcher’s preconceptions, beliefs, knowledge from … the 
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researcher’s prior experiences,” allowing the researcher to be “naïve in listening to the 
participants’ description of experience.” It places emphasis on the “underlying meaning 
of experience and how this underlay provides an understanding of feelings, thoughts, etc. 
evoked by the experience” (Moustakas 1994, p. 22). In other words, transcendental 
phenomenology allows the marketing scholar to collect descriptions of phenomena free 
from the scholar’s own professional experiences related to government public policy 
influence (and the marketing tools involved) and allows the researcher to interpret 
feelings of government threat even when the participant is uncomfortable with describing 
this negative, and perhaps socially inappropriate, feeling explicitly. 
Philosophical Assumptions.  This study’s philosophical assumptions lie within 
what Husserl (1931) refers to as directedness, i.e. “the mind is directed toward some 
entity whether the entity exists or not” (p. 32). In this study firms may be directed to 
sense a threat or opportunity from a government public policy influence. This 
directedness is likely an artifact of past experience, such as prior fines, government 
product purchases, political ties with government agency members, etc., used by the firm 
in understanding how the external business environment works. And the directedness 
may be used as a coping mechanism for survival, success, reinvention, persistence, etc.  
Transcendental phenomenology is all about intention or “the wish for the content 
wished” (p. 28) and, thus, requires the researcher to parse out the structured meaning 
from the underlying meaning in the experiences described by participants. Individuals 
perceive phenomena through both consciousness and the object in reality to better 
understand what a phenomenon means. An individual has acquired knowledge in 
experiencing the ‘real world’ in a way that is unique from how others experience it and, 
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thus, combines consciousness with the object in reality to create meaning. The likelihood 
that two individuals might experience the same object or event differently is the essence 
of the phenomenon.   
As the Merriam-Webster (2014) definition noted previously suggests, a 
phenomenon is an experience and that experience is made up of sensing what is separate 
from fact. However, transcendental phenomenology combines the directed object 
(sensing) with objective reality (fact) for holistic meaning. Ihde (1977) explains that 
sensation actually transcends into description of the event, rather than the other way 
around. The individual creates meaning of the phenomenon by allowing the noesis, or the 
underlying meaning, to transcend into the noetic, or the structural meaning (Husserl 
1931). When a participant shares an experience of an event, such as government public 
policy influence, the oral description the researcher hears is really the manner deemed 
most appropriate by the participant in structuring senses possessed (Keen 1975).  
Since the essence of the phenomenon is how the individual (firm) experienced the 
event (policy influence) but it is understood through transcendental phenomena research 
that experience is through sensing, the transcendental researcher assumes that the 
participant’s experience story is really the noetic meaning (Husserl 1931). This noetic 
meaning originated from the noesis meaning (Husserl 1931). In other words, the 
transcendental phenomena researcher conducts an interview under the philosophical 
assumption that what is heard is a description that originated, or has been transcended 
from, sensing. Thus, the researcher looks for both neomatic (textural or oral) and noetic 
(structural) dimensions of meaning in an interview. 
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In returning back to what Moustakas (1994) refers to as the essence of the 
phenomenon, one further assumption should be noted  to help guide the reader in 
understanding the interview analysis in a subsequent section. In this study, the essence of 
the phenomenon is defined as the temporal experience of government public policy 
influence, which could be one or several instances, so that the manner in which the firm 
interprets and responds to the influence varies across firms. This variation is the 
phenomenon and is hypothesized to be experienced through a deterministic or strategic 
choice lens. The language used by participants in describing the experience of 
government public policy influence, such as through the words “threat,” “reinvent,” 
“crisis,” “nudge,” “diligence,” etc., is one tool in assisting the researcher in identifying 
this essence, or noesis.  
Data Collection Procedures.  The transcendental phenomenology data collection 
prescriptions of Moustakas (1994) were followed. Moustakas is one of only a few 
scholars who have championed transcendental phenomenology research methods and 
whose recommendations are followed by researchers examining management styles (e.g., 
Moerrer-Urdahl and Creswell 2004), CEO strategy (e.g. Goldman 2006), and marketing 
(e.g., Baker and Gentry 1996; Scherf 1974). Moustakas’ championing is mostly due to 
what scholars describe as phenomenological researchers’ presentation of data in a “raw 
form to demonstrate their authenticity and to permit a holistic interpretation… data are 
typically analyzed through somewhat introspective techniques” (Suddaby 2006, p. 635). 
Accordingly, three basic collection stages were conducted. First, participants were 
encouraged to self-report on the topic so as to convey the seriousness and usefulness of 
participant descriptions. To do so, participants were pre-qualified via email or phone, 
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depending on the participants’ requests. This involved describing the topic to participants 
as “an exploration of a management theory which suggests firms strategically and 
formally manage forces in the external business environment, such as societal concerns 
and government public policy.” Then the researcher discussed with the participant their 
comfort level with speaking to this topic as well as with representing their employing 
firm.  
Although Moustakas recommends that participants write self-reports just before 
an interview is conducted, in this study participants engaged in self-reporting through 
discussion of two comfort-level questions during pre-qualification for convenience 
purposes (see Appendix A, p. 165). In answering these two questions, a very informal 
pre-interview took place in which the participant was asked to 1) share examples and 
discussion of the topic and 2) their involvement in strategy development for their 
employing firm (i.e. comfort-level questions; also available in Appendix A, p. 165). In 
addition, the formal, semi-structured interview guide was sent to the participant upon 
qualification via email and described as a tool for reflection until the scheduled, formal 
interview took place. 
 Second, and according to Moustakas’ (1994) recommendations, “long” and 
“informal” interviews were conducted that revolved around “interactive” and “open-
ended” questioning. These interviews were recorded using researcher note-taking rather 
than audio or video recording. However, the interview excerpts in the Study 2 Findings 
Section should be considered verbatim while the words or phrases in brackets are 
researcher-inserted so as to complement clarification. The interview started with a 
discussion of the researcher’s stage in graduate school as well as the researcher’s career 
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goals (i.e. academic research, classroom instruction) for “social conversation to put the 
participant at ease and create an environment that encourages open sharing” (Moustakas 
1994, p. 114). This was followed by open-ended questions about firm products, 
participant tenure, and participant day-to-day activities, with emphasis (follow-up 
questions) on involvement in marketing and product strategy. Next the participant was 
asked to “take a few moments to focus on the experience,” which in this study involved 
focusing on a “time in which government public policy changed the way you do business 
or make decisions.” Only in cases when the participants’ “story has not tapped into 
experience sufficiently with depth and meaning” (Moustakas 1994, p. 116) were the 
general interview questions used. These questions included, “Can you think of a time 
when government public policy provided you a business opportunity?” and “Are there 
times when you use marketing activities to offset the limitation of a government public 
policy?”, for example (see Appendix A for the full guide). In most interviews, the 
participant was asked if the researcher might get different information and opinions if 
another manager of the same firm was interviewed, with “no” being the common answer. 
And in approximately 25 percent of the cases, additional follow-up questions were 
necessary and took place via email.   
 Finally, both throughout and at the end of the interview, participant statements 
were read aloud so as to “check with others regarding what they perceive, feel, and think” 
(Moustakas 1994, p. 95) and in this “communalization there constantly occurs an 
alteration of validity through reciprocal correction” (Husserl 1970, p. 163). For example, 
if it was not completely clear to the researcher, the participant might have been asked 
mid-interview, after reading back to the participant one or more relevant statements noted 
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by the researcher, if the government public policy influence just described was a threat 
(benefit) based on the researcher’s orally described interpretation. And every interview 
ended with a very brief description of the researcher’s overall, general dissertation 
hypothesis. This was done by first telling the participant, “I want to tell you my 
hypothesis and just get your reaction, whether that be agreement or disagreement, ability 
to relate or not, further examples that confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis, etc.” After 
the hypothesis was described, the researcher noted the participant’s reaction. Then the 
researcher explained, based on the interview just conducted, whether the participant’s 
experience of government public policy influence was through a deterministic or strategic 
choice lens, as diagnosed in real-time by the researcher. This was followed by a question 
for the participant that asked if there was agreement or similar interpretation in this 
conclusion after the hypothesis and experience dichotomies were explained. This co-
interpretation was used to “debrief” (p. 110) participants in (dis)confirming the meaning 
interpreted, as Moustakas (1994) recommends.  
Data Analysis.  Following Moustakas’ (1994) prescribed methods for analyzing 
data collected through transcendental phenomenology, the following six analysis steps 
were conducted. First, horizonalizing was conducted in which the researcher regards 
“every horizon or statement most relevant to the topic as holding equal value” 
(Moustakas 1994, p. 118). Thus, this research defines horizonalizing as identifying 
statements significant, i.e. relevant to the other statements given, and important, i.e. 
relevant to the overall research topic, within a participant’s interview for developing 
meaning units important in the proceeding sections of transcendental phenomenological 
analysis. In this process the researcher isolated every statement that was meaningful to 
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the topic (i.e. horizonalized). Second, from each horizonalized statement, one or more 
meaning units were listed. Although not every horizonalized statement included both, 
two types of meaning units were developed: textural and structural. The textural meaning 
unit represents the noematic meaning and literal meaning suggested by the text noted 
(orally) of the participant’s statement. And the structural meaning represents noetic 
meaning, which is the underlying meaning of the participant’s statement (Keen 1975; 
Moustakas 1994). If the meaning unit was unclear from the statement, even when 
removed from isolation and placed back within the context of the entire interview, it was 
left without a unit. Combined, the textural and structural meanings (units) integrate and 
construct the “meanings and essence of the phenomenon” (Moustakas 1994, p. 119).  
Third, for each interview all meaning units, both structural and textural, are listed 
together, but separate from the horizonalized statements, so as to look for patterns. These 
patterns are referred to by Moustakas (1994) as clusters and represent units that are 
similar in text and/or similar in meaning that combine into one larger meaning unit. 
Fourth, clusters of each interview are used to aid the researcher in developing 
descriptions of the experiences or to “construct thematic portrayals” that offer a “vivid 
account of the underlying experience” (Moustakas 1994, p. 135). In other words, each 
interview is analyzed in this way so that the conclusion of interpretation portrays the 
firm’s factual (textual) and temporal (structural) experience of government public policy 
influence, with portrayal emphasis on experience occurring through a deterministic or 
strategic choice lens. Then, the fourth and fifth steps are repeated by isolating each 
interview’s thematic portrayal into one list of overall themes which are grouped into 
patterns and concluded with one overall thematic portrayal of the study. Finally, a 
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narrative of the overall thematic portrayal is created that connects the overall identified 
themes into a coherent whole (Wollcot 2008).  
Validity and Reliability.  Moustakas (1994) refers to interview participants as co-
researchers and emphasizes this researcher-participant relationship when prescribing 
methods for validating the research conclusions of transcendental phenomenology. As 
such, validation of the analysis conclusions of Study 1 was conducted in three ways. The 
first two are already described in the preceding section and include co-interpretation in 
real-time using discussion of significant statements and concluding interviews with 
discussion of the researcher’s diagnosed orientation. First, repeating aloud statements the 
researcher considers significant throughout a given interview so as to ask the participant 
for real-time feedback on a potential conclusion, gives the researcher the opportunity to 
validate analysis in a live, ongoing, and iterative process. For example, in most 
interviews participants spent relatively greater time describing government public policy 
threats and their reactions to such. As such, the researcher would often ask the 
participants if they generally perceived government public policy as mostly threatening, 
rather than benefiting, the way they did business by immediately following the question 
by reading back to the participant statements necessary to summarize the threats offered 
at that point in the interview. At that point, mid-interview, the researcher and participant 
could validate the firm’s perception of government public policy together and in real-
time. 
Second, ending every interview by describing the orientation towards government 
public policy the researcher believed the key informant’s firm held based on data 
collected through a given interview allowed the participant to (dis)agree and validate the 
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researcher’s interpretation. Similar to the process just described, this involved using only 
a statement or two to describe to the participant the researcher’s general, overall 
hypothesis. Then the researcher would offer the orientation that fit the participant’s 
shared experience and justify this orientation diagnosis by reading back significant 
statements that led to this conclusion. This allowed the participant to disagree with the 
researcher’s logic and interpretation and, thus, (in)validate the qualitative measure. 
Finally, validation is an artifact of the transparent reporting offered in the 
Findings Chapter (Chapter 5) and a noteworthy element of Moustakas’ prescribed 
procedures for conducting transcendental phenomenological research (e.g., Suddaby 
2006). Unlike other qualitative research designs, such as grounded theory, transcendental 
phenomenology relies on sharing the lived experience of a phenomenon experienced by a 
participant with the reader in a transparent way. In essence, reporting a great deal of data 
collected in transcendental phenomenological designs, rather than just themes, for 
example, generates transparency in the researcher’s induction of themes and conclusions 
from the story shared in an interview.  
Reliability of the conclusions and themes identified in Study 1 was assessed by 
asking a scholar uninvolved in this dissertation research to attempt to understand the 
researcher’s logic in the qualitative deduction involved in Study 1. This scholar is a 
Marketing PhD student of the researcher’s same academic program and was asked to pick 
a subset of interviews at random to check. Among these interviews, the scholar was asked 
to determine if the researcher’s logic behind the qualitative conclusions could be 
identified. In other words, reliability in this study is not assessed based on agreement, but 
rather on an understanding of the researcher’s deduction in logic. While Moustakas 
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(1994) believes “good” validation of data is when the researcher sends each participant 
their own researcher-constructed portrayal for participant corrections, the “good” 
examples Moustakas offers in his method prescriptions (1994) are not as sensitive in 
nature as asking senior-level executives to represent their employing firm and do not 
involve more than around 15 participants (versus 40). 
Then this scholar was asked to make notes of cases in which it could not be 
figured out how the researcher made a meaning unit, identified a statement as significant, 
came up with a conclusion, etc. And if the outside scholar found many cases in which the 
researcher’s deduction could not be understood (i.e. identified), another subset of 
interviews was to be picked at random by the outside scholar to repeat the process in 
determining if the conclusions are reliable. If the outside scholar could identify most or 
all of the researcher’s deduction in conclusions, no further random sampling of 
interviews was to be conducted. This scholar did not identify any conclusions, including 
themes, interview portrayals, meaning units, clusters, and horizonalized statements of the 
randomly chosen subset of the 40 interviews conducted in which the deductive logic 
behind each of these conclusions could not be identified and understood by the outside 
scholar, suggesting the qualitative measures of Study 1 are reliable. 
Study 2: Quantitative Confirmation 
Study Context.  Firm response to threatening public policy and the activities 
involved in the strategic response was quantitatively measured in Study 2 utilizing an 
online survey. Only business-to-consumer firms manufacturing consumer-packaged, 
consumer raw material (e.g., wood, siding, decking) useful for residential construction or 
improvement, and consumer medical devices (e.g., blood glucose meters) often 
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purchased through a medical doctor’s office were sampled. Both privately- and publicly-
held firms were recruited for this study as well as both for- and non-profit firms so long 
as the firm had a consumer good for sale in the marketplace.  
Recruitment.  The probability sampling designs of census and purposive sampling 
were utilized in recruiting participants in Study 2. First, DatabaseUSA, a third-party 
research firm, supplied three lists of manager profiles requested by the researcher. The 
first list included 1,409 records of the senior-most manager of firms rated, or at least 
reviewed, by Consumer Reports of the Consumer’s Union. The second list included 
19,111 records of managers whose professional title included the key words/phrases 
Director, Marketing, Vice President, Product, Brand, and Chief Marketing Officer and 
whose employing firm is rated, or at least reviewed, by Consumer Reports. The final list 
included 929 records and was similar to the first two, but expanded to include managers 
in the areas of communications, public relations, and product liability.  
All three lists were purchased between February and May of 2014 and included 
the name, professional title, email, employer and other information useful for tailoring 
recruitment messages. This method is one of probability in that only managers whose 
employer offers a product rated or reviewed by Consumer Reports were recruited and 
potentially sampled because, to be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section 
describing measures, two outcome measures involved in this dissertation’s hypotheses 
involved data collected, developed and reported in published magazines of Consumer 
Reports. Additionally, respondents recruited through these methods had the opportunity 
to refer a colleague to the researcher at the end of the online survey to be contacted for 
potential participation. Respondents who completed the online survey of Study 2 and 
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referred a colleague who also completed the online study was entered into a raffle 
drawing for 2 gift cards to a national chain which offers office supplies, for a total of 
$300. This incentive was described to respondents in the survey as a gift the respondent 
could share with the business student of their choice in assisting the student in buying 
academic supplies. In a similar manner, this incentive was described in recruitment 
emails. 
Managers first received an email from the researcher through Qualtrics that 
merely introduced the researcher and the survey. This email included a cover letter in the 
body of the email to explain the significance of the study. A few days later, managers 
were emailed a second time with the link to the online survey, also created through 
Qualtrics. This email included instructions for participation in the body of the email. 
Managers who attempted to participate were qualified through a single item screener 
question at the beginning of the online survey, to be discussed in greater detail in a 
subsequent section. This census sampling design is an effort to overcome potentially low-
response rates typical of research involving senior-level managers.  
One week after sending managers the survey link, a follow-up email was sent to 
those managers who had not completed the survey so as to serve as a reminder and 
encourage participation. Thus, each manager whose name appeared in one of the three 
third-party recruitment lists received three recruitment emails, all of which were designed 
according to the researcher’s IRB recommendations (see Appendix C for full IRB 
recommendations). These multiple attempts at recruitment were intended to ensure that at 
least two managers per firm were represented in the final dataset so as to better capture 
firm behavior over managerial behavior.  
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Respondents.  As a result of this recruitment process, a total of 400 managers 
attempted participation in the online survey. This represents a participation rate of 9 
percent out of 4,259 (i.e. 4,249 via DatabaseUSA plus 10 referrals) managers contacted 
for participation. Of these 400 managerial attempts, 183 completed the online survey 
fully, and 135 qualified (passed the screener question criterion) for analysis. Setting aside 
qualified participants for the moment, this led to a completion rate of approximately four 
percent. It is believed the sensitive nature of the topic of Study 2, i.e. senior-level 
executives reporting the threatening nature of government public policy as well as the 
political activities engaged in so as to fight limiting policies, greatly impacted the 
completion rate of this survey. 
To reiterate, qualified respondents were senior-level executives who could act as 
key informants for their employing firm’s overall strategies. Qualification was assessed 
utilizing one screener question that appeared at the beginning of the online survey which 
asked respondents to rate the degree to which they are “knowledgeable of the 
development of high-level strategies” of their employing firm on an eleven-point Likert-
type scale anchored by “not at all” (i.e. 1) and “extremely” (i.e. 10). Respondents who 
answered this question with a seven or higher were considered qualified. Three 
respondents who chose an answer to this question lower than seven but provided at least 
two examples of government public policies that limited the way their firm does (did) 
business and the specific strategic firm response to such in a series of closed- and open-
ended questions later in the survey were considered qualified respondents to act as key 
informants in reporting on the nature of their employing firm’s management of the 
government force. Additionally, qualified respondents responded to survey items and 
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questions in a manner that did not suggest the respondent’s goal was to offer only 
socially desirable responses. To be explained in greater detail in Chapter 5, no evidence 
of social desirability is found in the final dataset, eliminating the need to look for this bias 
respondent by respondent. 
As a result, 135 managers completed the survey and were qualified to report their 
firm’s strategic management of the government force. These 135 respondents represented 
91 unique firms because several managers were recruited per firm. Of these 91 firms, 
only 17 were represented by two or more managers. So as to effectively utilize 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) in analyzing the data collected in Study 2, any 
respondent representing a firm not also represented by at least one other manager was 
removed from the final dataset. This resulted in a final manager sample size of 76 
managers and a final firm sample size of 17 firms. 
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Data Collection Procedures.  Utilizing Qualtrics survey design and data 
collection services, data collection took place online on any device the respondent chose 
which was able to connect to the Internet and was compatible for completing the online 
survey. Data collection took place during the Spring of 2014. The online survey 
measured the focal constructs of society-serving, strategic choice and determinism 
orientations, instances of government public policy influence on the respondent’s firm’s 
operations, firm strategic responses to such policy influences and additional measures 
used to measure respondent biases to be discussed further in a subsequent section of this 
Base Title
Chief Marketing Officer 1%
Executive Director 1%
Program Director 22%
Product Development 5%
Strategy 4%
Marketing Executive 22%
Sales Executive 34%
Account Management 3%
Govt., Public Affairs 3%
Legal 1%
Manager, Info. Tech. 1%
Tenure with Sampled Firm
10 years + 100%
Response to Screener
7-8 64%
8-9 36%
mean 8.68
Respondent Descriptive Characteristics
TABLE 1
n = 76 respondents, 17 firms
62 
 
 
 
chapter. The overall goal of this survey was to examine the relationship between firm 
orientation and strategic management of the government force. 
Respondents were informed that the survey link would expire in 72 hours upon 
receiving the email containing the link, though there was no expiration component 
actually applied. Among those respondents who completed the survey in one day, the 
average completion time was 17.02 minutes. A z-test comparing the mean response to 
items of the survey measuring the society-serving orientation of those completing the 
survey in one day to those completing it over more than one day suggests completion 
duration did not affect survey responses (p = .87). 
The first page respondents saw upon clicking the survey link offered a three-
sentence promise to keep answers anonymous. This included both the IRB reference 
number for Study 2 as well as the official IRB letter (see Appendix C, pp. 169-171) 
granting data collection for Study 2 as a link which allowed respondents to download the 
letter in the case IRB contact information to verify this promise was desired by the 
participant. This was followed by a three-sentence explanation of the topic and goal of 
the survey. This page also informed respondents that by clicking on the arrow icon which 
directed respondents to the next page of the survey, they were agreeing to the IRB 
conditions. The next page required participants to sign-in using the email address the 
researcher used to contact respondents so that the respondent’s survey answers could later 
be matched to secondary data describing their employing firm as well as to prevent 
multiple survey attempts.  
Finally, respondents were instructed to choose answers as if answering for the 
entire firm they are employed by (or own). They were also instructed to consider both 
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formal (e.g., law) and informal (e.g., firm specific guidelines), potential (e.g., bills under 
consideration) and actual public policy (e.g., law), and all levels of government (i.e. local, 
state, federal, international) when considering answers to items and questions involving 
government public policy. This definition of government public policy was offered at the 
beginning of the survey and several times throughout so as to remind respondents. 
Measures 
This section will outline how each variable used in data analysis of Study 2 was 
measured and will be proceeded by a section outlining additional measures included to 
test response biases. The organization of this section does not parallel the organization of 
the online survey. The survey first measured constructs, then measured variables used to 
test response biases, and finished by measuring government public policy influences and 
strategic responses to such.  
 Construct Development.  Two constructs measured in Study 2 are originally 
developed by the author: strategic choice orientation and deterministic orientation. The 
procedures for developing these constructs are briefly outlined here. First, the domain of 
the constructs was identified (Churchill 1979). As seen in Chapter 2, both constructs’ 
definitions involve two key words, habitual and behavior. Thus, the domain of a strategic 
choice orientation was specified as frequent and typical (i.e. habitual) firm behaviors, 
rather than beliefs, attitudes, etc., which reflect a unique firm vantage point in which 
government agents and agencies are malleable and manageable. And the domain of a 
deterministic orientation follows the same logic except the vantage point involves agents 
and agencies as part of a force that determines the way the firm does business (i.e. not 
manageable). Next, a sample of items was collected so as to potentially measure both 
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constructs (Churchill 1979). Because these two constructs tap into the same concept, i.e. 
environmental management, but at vastly different degrees, the samples for both often 
came from the same sources, i.e. pilot test, qualitative interviews, and environmental 
management literature. A deterministic item sampled from a pilot test includes “It is 
important that we break-down large departments into smaller, more differentiated 
departments when faced with government public policy that changes the way we do 
business,” an interview “We are not big enough to influence a government public policy 
that changes the way we do business,” and environmental management literature “Our 
business relies on negotiating with those involved in developing government public 
policy,” for example. This item generation concluded with 26 total items used to reflect 
the domains of both strategic choice and deterministic orientations. 
 As recommended by Churchill (1979), Cronbach alpha was developed for each 
construct after conducting the pilot test. Churchill (1979) suggests using this test as the 
first method for purifying the constructs. A Cronbach alpha close to or above .70 was 
desired (Nunally 1978). After examining SPSS output which revealed both the alpha for 
each construct as well as what the alpha would change to should a given item be dropped 
from the construct scale, 11 items in total were dropped. One additional method of 
purifying these two constructs involved a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in which 
both the manner in which items converged onto their respective factor (i.e. construct) as 
well as the fit of data collected to the measurement model involving the two constructs 
was analyzed. Because the first analysis revealed poor fit and a lack of convergent 
validity, five additional items were dropped from these two constructs with a second 
convergent validity (i.e. CFA) analysis revealing the measures as purified. This analysis 
65 
 
 
 
is discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section. The final steps in assessing the 
meaning and accuracy of the two constructs involved measuring reliability and validity of 
each construct utilizing new (versus pilot) data (Churchill 1979). Again, as described in 
greater detail in the Findings Chapter, Cronbach alphas of the strategic choice and 
deterministic orientations developed using data of the final dataset reveal reliability 
coefficients close to or above Nunally’s (1978) criterion. And the Table (Table 2, p. 72) 
of correlations of Study 2 reveal no significant correlations among any of these 
constructs, including these two originally developed constructs (i.e. strategic choice and 
deterministic orientation constructs), suggesting the item generation and construct 
purification successfully provided valid constructs. 
Strategic Choice Orientation.  The strategic choice orientation was measured 
through an originally-developed scale that taps into firm activities and outcomes desired 
in managing threatening public policy. A strategic choice orientation is defined as 
habitual firm behavior that positions government agents as impressionable and 
government authority as malleable. The items measuring this scale are derived from both 
environmental management literature (e.g., Duncan 1972; Emery and Trist 1965) and 
insight gained from Study 1. This scale is made up of 4 items which are all measured on a 
7-point Likert-type answer option scale. As was done with items measuring the two other 
constructs of this study (i.e. society-serving, determinism orientations), some items’ 
answer option scales were anchored by “very infrequently” and “very frequently” while 
others were anchored by “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree” to prevent respondents 
from relying on a common method in biasedly responding to survey items.  
66 
 
 
 
The items of this scale measure perceptions about the ability to (e.g., “We attempt 
to change government public policy that affects our businesses rather than change our 
business.”) and motives involved in (e.g., “We experience a high level of profit because 
of our ability to influence government public policy.”) managing and attempting to alter 
threatening public policy. Higher scores on this construct reflect an orientation that leans 
towards a strategic choice orientation in managing government pressures of the socio-
political force and lower scores a perception of the socio-political force that indicates the 
firm does not view it as malleable. As seen in Table 2, this construct has a reliability 
coefficient of .61 which is close to Nunnally’s (1978) suggested criterion for a reliable 
construct (and a reliability coefficient of .85 in the larger dataset that includes all 
respondents who met the screener question (n=135)). 
Deterministic Orientation.  The deterministic orientation was also measured 
through an originally-developed scale that taps into both firm activities involved in 
restructuring business operations so as to react to government public policy pressures as 
well as perceptions that indicate the firm views the government force as an entity that 
determines (e.g., forces) the way it does business. A deterministic orientation is defined 
as habitual firm behavior that positions government agents and authority as establishing 
firm structure. As is the strategic choice orientation construct, the items measuring this 
scale are derived from both environmental management literature and insight gained from 
Study 1. This scale is made up of 9 items which are all measured on a 7-point Likert-type 
answer option scale and anchored by the phrases very (in)frequently or strongly 
(dis)agree, depending on the item.  
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The items of this scale measure reactions that suggest perceptions about the 
ability to manage government public policy (e.g., We break-down large departments into 
smaller, more differentiated departments when faced with government public policy that 
changes the way we do business.) and perceptions involved in being determined by 
government public policy (e.g., Government public policy constrains our ability to 
develop marketplace strategy.). Higher scores on this construct reflect an orientation that 
leans towards a deterministic orientation in managing government pressures of the socio-
political force and lower scores an orientation that views the government force as an 
entity that does NOT force the firm to react and/or restructure its operations. This 
construct has a reliability coefficient of .82 which meets Nunnally’s (1978) suggested 
criterion for a reliable construct (and a reliability coefficient of .75 in the larger dataset 
that includes all respondents who met the screener question (n=135)). 
 Society-Serving Orientation.  The society-serving orientation was measured 
through an existing, multi-dimensional, 23-item scale that taps into firm activities in 
serving stakeholders. The scale was originated by Lerner and Fryxell (1994) and is 
referred to as the CEO Stakeholder Orientation scale. This multi-dimensional scale 
measures activities in serving customers (e.g., “If we encounter a customer complaint 
regarding a product or service deficiency, we respond quickly.”), community (e.g., “We 
financially support charitable and philanthropic activities.”), stockholders (e.g., “We 
pursue opportunities that have the highest expectations for maximizing earnings.”), 
government (e.g., “We cooperate with governmental and regulatory agencies.”) and 
employees (e.g., “We provide employee programs to cope with work and family stress.”). 
Rather than adapting items assessing activities in serving stockholders, an eighth answer 
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option indicating the statement was not applicable to the responding privately-held firm 
(respondent) was available for all items of the society-serving construct and for all 
respondents. Setting aside this “N/A” answer option, these items were measured on a 7-
point Likert-type answer option scale. So as to stay true to the original scale, answer 
options were only anchored by “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree.” Higher scores 
reflect an orientation that leans towards serving stakeholders and lower scores an 
orientation that leans towards serving stockholders. This construct has a reliability 
coefficient of .91 which meets Nunnally’s (1978) suggested criterion for a reliable 
construct (and a reliability coefficient of .91 in the larger dataset that includes all 
respondents who met the screener question (n=135)). 
 Threatening Public Policy and Strategic Response.  After responding to construct 
items as well as items useful in measuring response bias, respondents were informed that 
the next part of the survey involved describing five instances of government public policy 
which altered the way the respondent’s firm does business. To assess such instances, 
respondents saw the same series of questions revolving around the influence and response 
five times. After reporting the fifth instance, respondents were asked if they could think 
of additional instances. If the respondent replied “yes,” they were directed to the same 
series of questions for up to five additional instances. In other words, respondents could 
report on as many as 10 instances of government public policy altering the firm’s 
business operations and the firm’s response to such influence.  
The first question in this series to measure government public policy and the firm 
response to such asked respondents to “Think of a time when public policy (potentially) 
altered the way your firm does business. Now, choose the best option that categorizes this 
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instance.” Prior research in public administration describes public policy as falling into 
one of four categories, i.e. public ownership and management, regulation, incentives, and 
information disclosure (e.g., Bengston, Fletcher, and Nelson 2004; Lascoumes and Le 
Gales 2007). The respondent could choose among these four types of government public 
policy as well as “less formal government behavior not listed” and an “other” option. 
This question not only formally measured the type of government public policy that 
influenced the firm, but also served as a warm-up exercise in effectively answering the 
following question that asked for specific details of the influence. In other words, instead 
of offering examples that illustrated a government public policy which altered the way a 
firm does business, and potentially biasing answers narrowly towards these examples, 
respondents were first asked to think of the type of policy in a way that might have made 
the respondent open-minded in considering all of the government public policies the firm 
has experienced.  
Because it is likely that a firm’s orientation evolves over time due to change in 
leadership, economic strength indicators, society’s ethics, government administrators 
elected, etc., questions revolving around instances of government public policy influence 
instructed the respondent to only think of and report on instances occurring over the past 
10 years. The second question of the series used to assess government public policy 
influence and the firm strategic response involved asking respondents to “Now, briefly 
describe this time you just categorized in the box below,” while also reminding the 
respondent that the instance should not have occurred outside 10 years, what definition of 
government public policy the respondent should be keeping in mind when responding, 
and that the respondent would be asked about four (three, two, one) additional instances 
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later in the survey. This second question allowed the respondent to describe the policy in 
detail in an open-ended question so as to both provide the researcher with a richer 
understanding as well as the opportunity to code the response for type of government 
public policy in the case that the preceding question offering choices of type was not 
answered. It should also be noted that government public policy was never described as 
threatening or beneficial to the respondent in the two questions just described, but the 
respondent did have the opportunity to describe the instance as threatening or beneficial 
in the third question of this series.  
The fourth question in the series used to assess instances of government public 
policy influence and strategic response involved asking respondents to first categorize the 
firm’s response to the influence and then describe it, as was done in the first two 
questions. Respondents were first asked to “Please complete the following statement: Our 
strategic response to this public policy mostly revolved around...” which involved answer 
option choices including marketing activities (i.e. “marketing activities (product, price, 
promotion, distribution changes)”), political activities (i.e. “gov. interaction (1-/2-way, 
(in)direct, written/spoken, with agents/agencies)”), no response (i.e. “nothing; we did not 
formally respond”), “compliance only,” and an “other activities” option. And this 
multiple-choice question was proceeded with a question asking respondents “Could you 
briefly describe this strategic response?” with a box for typing in the open-ended 
response. Again, the open-ended question which allowed respondents to detail the 
response provided the researcher with a richer description of firm strategies as well as an 
opportunity for coding response types if the respondent did not answer the preceding 
multiple-choice question.  
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 Instances in which the two multiple-choice questions (i.e. policy type, response 
type) were skipped by the respondent required researcher subjective coding. However, 
additional scholars, a Communications PhD student and Management PhD student 
attending the researcher’s academic institution and unaware of this dissertation’s 
hypotheses and goals, were invited to also code these missing values. This research 
desired a reliability coefficient of .90 considering the coding involves meaning-oriented 
decisions (e.g., coding the meaning which was derived by the respondent’s text versus 
coding if the text is duplicative) by the coders. According to Rust and Cooil (1994) two 
additional judges are needed to produce a desired coding reliability coefficient of .90 
after accounting for the proportion of expected loss that is avoided when data are used to 
make decisions. Rust and Cooil (1994, p. 11) describe this loss in reliability as resulting 
from the “fuzzy nature of marketing concepts” in that coding for marketing variables 
often involves the imprecision of thinking and feeling. After three researchers in total – 
including the researcher – coded text into five categories (i.e. marketing activity, political 
activity, no response, compliance, other), an 88 percent inter-rater agreement was 
reached. This suggests the resulting coding was objective and reliable. 
Each strategic response chosen that reflects competing in the marketplace in a 
new or improved way (i.e. marketing activities) was coded as +1 and each one that 
reflects attempts at altering public policy or influencing government agents/agencies (i.e. 
political activities) was coded as -1. A choice of neither competition- or policy-altering 
responses to threatening public policy (i.e. “nothing; no response choice”) was coded as 
0. These codes were then averaged across respondent instance reports so that each 
respondent was assigned a tendency score, in that strategic responses to a government 
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public policy influence carries a tendency in responding typically through marketing or 
political activities. Higher scores reflect a firm tendency to respond to public policy 
through competition-altering strategy and lower scores a tendency to respond through 
public policy-altering strategy. Although it is possible for a firm to use both types of 
strategies depending on the type of public policy threat, this measure offers an overall 
firm tendency descriptive of firm behavior.  
 Each open-ended response was followed by a multiple-choice question asking the 
respondent to indicate the year in which the firm implemented the given strategic 
response. Any set of responses indicating the strategic response predated the instructed 
10-year time period was deleted from the final dataset. This resulted in the removal of 
seven total instances. Additionally, a removal procedure was conducted to ensure the 
same instance was not described by two or more employees of the same firm. A spread 
sheet of policies was created so that each tab represented a firm. Then each instance of 
duplicate policy instances was coded. Each tab included all respondents’ answers (i.e. 
regarding policy type, policy description, response type, response description, year of 
implementation) for the given firm. Two colleagues, a Marketing PhD student in the 
researcher’s academic program and a marketing practitioner, both unaware of the 
dissertation’s hypotheses and goals, were invited to also code these policy instances so as 
to find duplicate government public policy influences among managers of the same firm. 
All identifiers were removed and coded with alphabet letters so that the invited 
colleagues could not identify the firm or respondent. The three coding attempts into two 
categories (i.e. duplicate, not) led to 12 randomly chosen policy influences (one policy of 
a pair of duplicate policies from two colleagues representing the same firm, for example) 
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to be excluded from the final dataset. The three judges coding with two categories 
produced a 98 percent inter-rater agreement. This suggests the resulting coding was 
objective and reliable. 
 Process-Focused Activities.  The hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 posit some 
degree of change in the consumer-related activities of product pricing and non-personal 
product promotional activity will occur as a result of firm strategic response to 
threatening public policy. Chapter 2 also describes these two activities as process-focused 
in that they are the default result of firm resources being dedicated to altering the political 
process of the threatening public policy. A single-item measure of change in the mass 
advertising budget in response to the government public policy influence was used to 
assess the process-focused activity of strategic change in advertising. Respondents were 
asked “Thinking only of the product(s) most affected, please indicate the degree to which 
this public policy led your firm to change (decrease or increase) advertising 
expenditures...” and could answer the question using a 7-point Likert-type answer option 
scale anchored by “extreme decrease” and “extreme increase” with the middle option 
reflecting “no change.” Although the goal of this study was to rely on secondary 
marketplace data (activity) to offer evidence of strategic management of government 
public policy, it was important that the measure of strategic change in advertising activity 
was self-reported because some of the firms sampled are privately-held and no reliable 
secondary data exists for this measure among privately-held firms. 
Consumer Reports publications were used to measure a change in firm product 
quality and price as a result of the firm’s strategic response to the government public 
policy influence. The Consumer Reports’ rating measure served as a proxy for product 
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quality, as is done in prior research of environmental management (Moorman, Ferraro, 
and Huber 2013). Additionally, when the researchers of this Union rate a product, they 
also list the product’s price in the publication. Every product in a sampled firm’s product 
portfolio rated by Consumer Reports between and including 2014 and 2002 was noted for 
the publication’s record of rating and price. Pricing strategies (change in price) is not a 
processed-focused activity, but is noted here in relation to this study’s reliance on 
Consumer Reports publications. Consumer Reports uses a 5-point pictorial rating system 
anchored by poor and excellent (i.e. “POOR”=1, “FAIR”=2, “GOOD”=3, “VERY 
GOOD”=4, “EXCELLENT”=5). And Consumer Reports typically rates a given product 
on several attributes, with each attribute receiving a rating on the 5-point scale.  
Next, every rating recorded for the products of interest were averaged across 
attributes, months, and then brands so that every firm was assigned one quality measure 
per year. As such, and because the year the firm implemented its strategic response to a 
government public policy influence was reported in the online survey, a change in 
product quality was calculated as the percent change in average ratings across two years: 
the year preceding the strategy implementation noted by the respondent in the online 
survey and the year proceeding.  
In some cases, there was no immediate pre- or post-measure of quality or price. In 
such cases, the nearest measure was used. For example, products of Roche Diagnostics 
were not rated by Consumer Reports in 2013 or in 2012. So, if a respondent described a 
strategic response to a government public policy influence which was implemented in 
2012, product quality and price measures of 2014 served as the post-response measures 
and measures of 2011 as the pre-response measures. Just as prices were adjusted to 
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reflect the value of a dollar in 2014, it is believed that Consumer Union (i.e. Consumer 
Reports) researchers rated products relative to the marketplace at the time the rating was 
created. For example, in 2003 Genuine Parts Company’s NAPA battery product was 
rated by Union researchers within the context of the 2003 market for automotive batteries 
only. NAPA batteries would have a specific market share, brand value, competitive 
market position, etc. unique to 2013 and likely different from the rating context of 2010, 
for example. In other words, there is no need to adjust ratings for year of rating and there 
is no such thing as an outdated rating because each rating was true to the marketplace at 
the time of the rating procedure. 
 Product-Focused Activities.  In addition to process-focused activities, the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 also posit some degree of change in the consumer-
related activities of product innovation and product development will occur as a result of 
firm strategic response to threatening public policy. Chapter 2 describes these two 
activities as product-focused in that they are the result of firm resources dedicated to 
offsetting the potentially negative impact on the firm because of the threatening public 
policy.  
Consumer Reports always reports price per unit, such as the price per ounce of 
sunscreen or the price per the recommended daily intake of aspirin. However, two 
products’ unit pricing criterion was inconsistent between 2003 and 2014. As such, the 
researcher always calculated the price per two batteries and one light bulb, rather than a 
pack of light bulbs, a pack of six batteries, one battery, etc. After noting every price of 
the products of interest reported by Consumer Reports between 2003 and 2014, prices 
were averaged across months and brands so that every firm was assigned one price 
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measure per year. Finally, prices were adjusted for inflation by referring to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ calculations of the US Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2014) so that prices reflected 2014 dollar figures. Thus, a change in product price was 
calculated as the percent change in average price across two years: the year preceding the 
strategy implementation noted by the respondent in the online survey and the year 
proceeding. Finally, because there is a 6-month lag between the time a Consumer 
Reports’ researcher assigns ratings or price to a product and the time these measures are 
published, measurement was adjusted accordingly. For example, a product rated in the 
January 2005 issue of Consumer Reports was considered a 2004 rating (and price). 
Innovativeness is measured here as patent counts because this dissertation’s 
interest is in the development of new technologies useful for offsetting a limitation posed 
by the external environment and, thus, is defined using similar, prior research on 
innovativeness in managing the external environment: patent counts in the interest of 
“innovativeness of a firm’s technological...ability to formulate and develop new 
products” (Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999, p. 246).  
Searches for the firm’s name using the US Patent and Trademark Office online 
patent application database was conducted using the website’s Boolean language and 
codes. For example, searching for General Electric’s patent applications for the year 2007 
included the following Boolean phrase: AN/”General Electric” and PD/1/1/2007-
>12/31/2007, where AN represents the Assignee’s name (i.e. the entity or person 
submitting the application) and PD the publication date range to search within for 
applications. Focal brand names (i.e. brands of firms featured through Consumer Reports) 
were also searched in the case that some applications were submitted with the brand’s 
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name as the Assignee’s name, such as searching for Fenway Partners’ Easton-Bell Sports 
brand. Finally, every firm’s year’s tally of patents was divided by a firm’s product 
portfolio. Product portfolio, in this study, is the number of products in a firm’s portfolio 
divided by the number of brands in the given firm’s brand portfolio. This allows for a 
more appropriate measure of innovativeness because it assumes smaller firms, i.e. firms 
with a smaller product portfolio, can be relatively innovative. Thus, a change in 
innovativeness as a strategic response to government public policy influence was 
calculated as the percent change in average application tallies across two years: the year 
preceding the strategy implementation noted by the respondent in the online survey and 
the year proceeding.   
 Social Impact.  Social innovativeness was also measured by tallying US patent 
application data. Kinder Lydenberg Domini Inc.’s PRO-str-X measure of socially 
innovative products is often used in prior research to measure a firm’s positive social 
impact (e.g., Sharfman 1996; Wagner 2010). And Pro-str-A is an extension of the MSCI-
adjusted Kinder Lyndenberg Domini (KLD) Inc.’s PRO-str-X’s measure of socially 
innovative products. MSCI’s Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) Index used to 
guide customers’ investment portfolio(s) defines a quality social product (i.e. PRO-str-A) 
as the “firm’s efforts to improve the safety and health effects of its products/services” 
(MSCI 2011, p. 11) but evaluates only a small set of publicly-traded US firms.  
 So as to more effectively match a firm’s social impact with perceptual measures 
captured in the online survey across a larger list of diverse firms both privately- and 
publicly-held, the US Patent and Trademark Office’s online patent application database 
was searched for applications submitted by the sampled firms which included either 
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“safety” or “health” in the applications’ abstracts. An example of a search for socially 
innovative patent applications includes the Boolean phrase: AN/”General Electric” and 
PD/1/1/2007->12/31/2007 and ABST/(safe$ or health$), where AN refers to the 
application’s Assignee name, PD the patent dates to search within, ABST the content of 
an application’s abstract, and $ the ability for searches to include other versions of the 
searched word (e.g., safety, healthy).  
 Firm Impact.  Firm performance was measured as market share, i.e. the firm’s 
total sales divided by sales of the industry in which the firm competes (Srinivasan, Lilien, 
and Sridhar 2011). Market share is a reflection of a firm’s capabilities useful for 
competing in the marketplace (e.g., Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999) and, thus, 
appropriately reflects one dimension of firm success in either preventing public policy 
from limiting firm marketplace functions or competing in the marketplace in new ways. 
Respondents were asked to “Please note the % of your firm's net sales relative to your 
largest industry competitor.” and could choose among options of <25%, 25-49.9%, 50-
74.9%, 75-100%, “largest in sales”, or “can’t even guess.” While actual sales figures are 
ideal, these only exist for publicly-traded firms and the dataset contains both publicly- 
and privately-held firms. And the entire survey is full of sensitive questioning regarding 
political behaviors that in some cases could threaten a firm’s public image, public policy 
as a degree of threat to a firm’s business operations, the government as constraining the 
way a firm does business, etc. Thus, while a specific percentage is ideal, the combination 
of a sensitive survey topic with a sensitive performance question prevented the 
researcher’s ability to capture actual market share. To be discussed in greater detail in 
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Chapter 5, neither self-reported survey measurement (i.e. “knowledge” screener question, 
market share question) correlated with the measure of social desirability. 
 Controls.  Recruitment data purchased through DatabaseUSA included the 
average range of individuals employed and sales per firm. Both were used as control 
measures in assessing a firm’s relative size. To check the validity of these two measures 
developed by DatabaseUSA, a sample of executives were emailed after having completed 
the online survey with regards to the accuracy of the two measures. The email explained 
to the respondent that the researcher had information about the number of employees the 
given firm employs as well as average sales and had gained this information from the 
same source that identifiers and contact information had been gained for recruiting the 
given respondent. Then the text of this email reported the two measures of the given firm 
and asked if they were accurate measures. All respondents of this random subset replied 
with a message indicating the measures were accurate. Because measures of employees 
per firm were only available in ranges (e.g., 500-999 employees), this variable was 
converted into an ordinal variable where 250-499 employees was coded as 1, 500-999 as 
2, 1,000-4,999 as 3, 5,000-9,999 as 4, and 10,000+ as 5.  
 To be illustrated with greater detail in the Findings Chapter, these measures 
controlled for additional explanations of unit changes in outcome variables within tests 
by entering these variables into the tests first. In other words, the analysis used in Study 2 
allows initial antecedents (i.e. controls) entered into the test first to ‘soak up’ or explain 
variance in the dependent variable so that any variance the focal antecedent, entered into 
the test after the controls, explains is unique to that antecedent’s movement of units of the 
outcome variable. This allows a unique examination of the relationship between the focal 
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antecedent and outcome variable that cannot be explained by other likely, but 
uninteresting in the given study, antecedents. 
 Data reported on the annual reports of publicly-traded firms was accessed using 
COMPUSTAT, a financial dataset made available through Wharton Research Data 
Services of the University of Pennsylvania (https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/). 
While annual reports accessed through COMPUSTAT included 2012 average sales per 
publicly-traded firm, but excluded privately-traded firms, this measure was still used as a 
control considering it represented most respondents in the final dataset. Only 12 of the 76 
respondents in the final dataset could not be matched with a COMPUSTAT measure of 
firm sales. And because this measure is included in this study only to more accurately 
explain the variance in the data explained by focal constructs (i.e. a control variable),  
some missing data in this variable still allows sales of privately-traded firms to represent 
a useful control measure of firm size. 
 Firm age was also controlled for by utilizing the year the represented firm was 
first established. This piece of information is widely available on the Internet and mostly 
gained through firm-originated websites or wikipedia.org when necessary. In addition, 
binary measures of firm type (i.e. privately-held, publicly-traded) and industry type (i.e. 
consumer packaged foods, home improvement/remodel products) served as controls in 
testing the hypotheses. Finally, a binary measure of product type was developed and used 
as a control measure. Firms which feature a product that is either consumed (e.g., chicken 
nuggets, toothpaste) or applied physically (e.g., sunscreen, electric razors) by consumers 
was coded as 1 to represent firms that have a product portfolio at risk for directly and 
physically endangering consumers. It is believed that this product type might encourage 
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relatively greater government attention in terms of monitoring and regulating the safety 
of such products. 
 
 
Analytic Approach 
 
 Unit of Analysis.  Several public policy threats were captured in this online 
survey. In addition, several managers representing one firm were sampled. However, 
because the strategic responses (codes) were averaged to reflect firm behavior (tendency), 
the firm is considered the conceptual unit of analysis (with the actual respondent the 
literal unit of analysis nested within the firm) when testing hypotheses which posit 
relationships between firm orientation and firm strategic response tendencies (i.e. H1-2). 
So as to measure firm type (i.e. Self-Serving, Strategic Choice; Society-Serving, Strategic 
Choice; Self-Serving, Deterministic; Society-Serving, Deterministic), interaction terms 
between the corresponding constructs were utilized as the independent variable in this 
hypothesis testing.  
For hypotheses H3-7b, which posit the relationship between strategic tendencies 
and marketplace activities, the policy instance nested within the given firm served as the 
Society-
Serving
Strategic 
Choice
Determinism
Strategic 
Tendency
Market Share
Firm Strategy 
Knowledge
Social 
Desirability
SS (.91)
SC -.01 (.66)
D -.21 .14 (.82)
ST .27 .02 -.16 (  )
MS .02 -.03 -.10 .09 (  )
FSK .10 .13 .05 .06 -.03 (  )
SD -.12 -.20 .20 .20 .06 -.14 (.95)
Means 6.06 4.74 3.23 .14 3.84 8.68 1.42
Std. Deviation .63 1.06 .98 .77 -1.50 1.61 .17
(  ) in digonals represent Cronnbach alphas. Empty parentheses represent single items with no reliability coefficient.
* represents significant correlations.
Market share is measured using a categorical answer option scale with options including sales relative to the firm's largest competitor 
of <25%, 25-49%, 50-74%, 75-100%, and "we are the largest in sales."
TABLE 2
Construct and Item Reliabilities and Correlations (n = 76 respondents, 17 firms)
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unit of analysis. Among all 76 respondents and 17 firms in the final dataset, 219 policy 
instances were reported. Of these 219 instances, 208 were accompanied by the report of a 
strategic response, typically because the firm felt comfortable in sharing this information 
and vice versa. Approximately a quarter of all 219 policy instances were reported as 
involving a response involving only compliance. And after excluding instances in which 
it was indicated that the strategic response for the given policy influence was something 
“other” than what was listed in the options to choose from, 100 instances of government 
public policy influence accompanied by a report of the strategic response involved were 
left for analysis, i.e. offered enough and the relevant information to calculate the strategic 
response tendency necessary for the testing of all 12 hypotheses and included a strategic 
response falling into the categories of marketing activities, political activities, or 
choosing not to respond.  
 Confirmatory Factor Analysis.  Utilizing MPlus software package Version 7.1 so 
that each of the constructs were allowed to co-vary with each other, a CFA was 
conducted. This was done in order to ensure that each item loaded onto the correct 
construct. Convergent validity, which suggests that the items that comprise a construct 
share a high proportion of variance, was assessed by examining the factor loadings of the 
items in the study. Loadings that are significant and substantial are considered desirable 
by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). An additional assessment of convergent validity 
included calculating the average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct (Fornell 
and Larker 1981). Discriminant validity, which examines how dissimilar constructs are 
from each other, was assessed by comparing the AVE to the square of the inter-
correlations among factors (Fornell and Larcker 1981).  
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Common Method Variance.  Following the procedure for assessing common 
method variance advocated by Lindell and Whitney (2001), two marker variables were 
measured and then tested as antecedents to all focal variables of this study using simple 
regression. A subset of online surveys captured only Nowlis, Kahn, and Dahr’s (2002), 
four-item shopping ambivalence scale with adjustments in wording and anchors so that 
frequency anchors adjusted to agreement anchors. One item was reversed (i.e. 
emotionally mixed reversed to emotionally confident) to prevent respondents from 
rushing through this construct’s items. Another subset of online surveys only measured a 
four-item job satisfaction scale (Comer, Machleit, and Lagace 1989; Lagace, Goolsby, 
and Gassenheimer 1993). Two different marker variables were measured for a more 
robust test of common method variance. These marker variables were chosen because 
they are believed to be unrelated to any of the ideas measured in this study and are 
believed to be unrelated to all variables measured.  
These marker variables were regressed onto all focal variables in the study using 
ordinary least squares simple regression to assess if they significantly predict the focal 
variables of Study 2. If the marker variable showed a significant coefficient in measuring 
a given relationship, an issue with common methods variance potentially exists 
(Williams, Hartman, and Cavazotte 2010). This is believed to be true, because a marker 
variable significantly predicting a focal variable suggests the method by which the 
respondent chose answers, such as only choosing middle options across all or most of the 
answers in the online survey, artificially creates a significant relationship since the 
marker variable is not reasonably related to the focal variables of this study. In such an 
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instance, it is the method of choosing common answers that predicts the outcome 
variable, not the antecedent proposed to be a predictor. 
 Social Desirability.  So as to make sure that patterns in these data collected are 
not due to a respondent’s desire to help the researcher achieve the desired study goals 
(i.e. supported hypotheses) and/or a desire to only report information deemed as socially 
acceptable, a scale was measured in the online survey that measures social desirability. 
This scale is a shortened, 10-item version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale (MCSDS; 1960) adapted by Greenwald and Satow (1970) and proven adequate by 
prior testing of shorter versions of the full MCSDS (e.g., Ballard 1992; Strahan and 
Gerbasi 1972). It measures socially desirable response tendencies affected by 
defensiveness, protection of self-esteem, and affect inhibition of a respondent and 
involves true-false answer options. Focal variables are allowed to correlate with this 
measure of desirability bias to assess a spillover in bias onto the other focal measures of 
this study. A large and significant correlation between the social desirability variable and 
another focal variable indicates responses within the given focal variable are biased due 
to the respondent’s desire for socially appropriate answers. 
Analytical Tool.  HLM will serve as the method for testing this study’s 
hypotheses. HLM is necessary for the structure of the data collected, considering that 
policy instances belong to particular respondents, and respondents to firms. This tool is 
efficient for these data in that it does not assume cases are independent and, instead, 
assumes the relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable is 
different across groups. In this study groups are firms and, thus, these relationships 
between independent and dependent variables is contextual, i.e. depends on the firm 
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being examined. As such, HLM nests respondents within their respective firms so as to 
allow for the dependency of responses to be based on the firm the respondent works for. 
In other words, HLM efficiently assumes respondents of the same firm are NOT 
independent and nests them together within the firm for this reason. Thus, HLM is the 
most appropriate tool in testing relationships among nested data, like the nested data of 
Study 2.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
FINDINGS 
Study 1: Qualitative Inquiry 
 The following are the conclusions of the horizonalizing process prescribed by 
Moustakas (1994), in which the significant statements of 40 interviews created clusters, 
themes, and orientation portrayals of 40 unique firms. As Table 3 displays, all but one of 
the 40 executives interviewed work for or own a for-profit firm (versus a non-profit firm) 
and 25 for privately held firms (versus publicly-traded firms). The average age of the 
firms is 57.4 years. One of the key informants retired a year before the interview took 
place (in italics), and while the market sectors each firm operates in varies greatly, the 
more popular sectors represented by participating firms (i.e. executives) in this study are 
financial services, food and beverage, hospital and health care, and insurance sectors. In 
terms of the number of people employed, 18 of the 40 are small (500 or fewer 
employees) and 10 are large firms (5k or more). 
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TABLE 3 
Study 1 Participant Descriptive Characteristics (n = 40) 
Title Administered Employees Orientation 
CEO Private 11-50 SC 
Senior Director of Store 
Planning 
Public 5-10,000 SC 
President, CEO Private 1-5,000 SC 
CEO and CFO Public 1-5,000 SC 
President, CEO Private 501-1,000 SC 
Founder, Owner Private 11-50 SC 
Founding, Managing 
Partner 
Private 0-20 SC 
President Private 1-5,000 D 
Executive Chairman Private 501-1,000 D 
Corporate Chief Actuary Private 1-5,000 SC 
Founding, Managing 
Partner and President 
Private 501-1,000 SC 
Senior Corporate Analyst - 
Strategic Pricing 
Public 10,000+ SC 
President, CEO Private 11-50 neither 
Senior Director 
Transactions and 
eCommerce 
Public 5-10,000 D 
Senior VP, CTO Private 201-500 D 
VP Public 5-10,000 SC 
President, CEO Private 0-10 D 
VP Patient Outreach and 
Program Support, Health, 
Wellness, and Fitness 
Non-Profit 0-10 SC 
Founding, Managing 
Partner 
Private 11-50 SC 
President Private 11-50 D 
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TABLE 3 
Study 1 Participant Descriptive Characteristics, Continued (n = 40) 
Title Administered Employees Orientation 
President, CEO Private 201-500 D 
Senior Business Analyst Private 1-5,000 SC 
Founder, President Private 0 SC 
Director of Marketing Private 1-5,000 SC 
Account Executive Private 51-200 SC 
President, CEO Public 10,000+ SC 
Director of Sales and 
Marketing 
Private 11-50 SC 
VP Product Development 
and Marketing 
Public 201-500 SC 
Executive VP Private 1-5,000 D 
President, CEO Public 51-200 D 
Marketing Director Private 1-5,000 SC 
Senior Product Manager - 
Chemicals 
Public 10,000+ SC 
President, Nebraska 
Operations 
Public 10,000+ SC 
President, CEO Private 201-500 SC 
President, CEO Private 51-200 SC 
President, CEO Public 10,000+ SC 
CEO Private 501-1,000 SC 
Director of HR Strategic 
Intelligence 
Public 10,000 D 
Founder, President Public 11-50 SC 
Chief Communications 
Officer 
Public 10,000+ SC 
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 To reiterate the previous chapters of this dissertation, the goal of this study was 
two-fold, i.e. to confirm the orientations proposed in managing the external business 
environment and to explore the nature and details of the strategies involved in such 
management. Thus, the following conclusions first revisit environmental management 
theories and ask if the orientations proposed in the original theories, strategic choice and 
determinism, exist in the interviews conducted and then explores the marketing and 
political activities involved in the strategies of firms holding either of these orientations. 
Additionally, the analysis accidentally finds two additional strategies aside from mostly 
marketing or political emphasis as well as uncovers who exactly holds these orientations. 
Finally, and as explained in the Research Methods Chapter, the interview excerpts can be 
considered verbatim participant statements with brackets indicating researcher-added 
words to offer further clarification and parentheses indicating the researcher’s attempt at 
maintaining anonymity. 
Firm Orientations 
 The first question this qualitative research sought to answer lies in 
(dis)confirmation of the core idea of environmental management theories, i.e. that firms’ 
view of government agencies make up an orientation towards government public policy 
that predicts (re)action by the firm. The two orientations of strategic choice and 
determinism were very clearly voiced in the interviews, suggesting firm orientations in 
viewing government agents/agencies as malleable or rigid do indeed exist. In fact, in only 
one interview was an orientation unclear and this indecision was an artifact of a firm very 
rarely impacted by government public policy. Of the 40 interviews conducted, 29 
reflected a firm oriented with strategic choice, 10 determinism, and 1 not influenced by 
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government public policy enough to develop an orientation in the first place. These 
orientations are discussed in greater detail in the subsequent sections. 
Strategic Choice. Those executives of firms with a strategic choice orientation 
indicated that influencing government public policy through political behaviors is 
necessary to remain competitive. Political behaviors used included political ties, paying 
for politician’s travels, lobbying, contributions to PACs, contributions to industry 
lobbying associations, presenting research to legislators unfavorable towards the 
undesirable policy, photo opportunities as incentives in persuading politicians, building 
relationships with politicians, serving on industry boards, providing agencies with 
internal data, direct aid in getting candidates elected to political offices, etc. Participants 
explained that influencing government agents is a matter of protecting products that are 
desirable to customers, a strategy for driving sales and profit, a way of protecting their 
core product, etc. In most cases, firms influence agents with political behaviors to keep a 
successful product or consumer segment safe, as seen in the following interview excerpts. 
“see if we can help craft a final decision that is best for the consumer and appropriate for us.” 
–CEO, private, 500-1k 
“I don’t look at like you’re being forced to do something, I look at it basically [as] making 
decisions based on ... how positively can impact your company?” –Director of Sales and 
Marketing, private, 11-50 
“Banks sent out comments so the government can make tweaks, our people waded through 
900 pages to make comments and send in[to] the government. Our philosophy is we wanna 
obviously comply with regulation cause we don’t have a choice but we will try to modify 
regulation as much as possible, such as talking with regulators.” –President and CEO, private, 
500-1k 
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While the majority of executives of firms with a strategic choice orientation 
viewed influencing government agencies as a part of remaining competitive, others 
suggested it was a matter of survival; in line with many environmental management 
theories (e.g., Aldrich 1974). In the minds of participants, survival revolves around 
persisting in spite of public policies that drastically altered the way they did business. 
Policies changed entire business models, eliminated products and key consumer 
segments, etc. 
“For [a] financial services organization, always, always a challenge.” “[We’ve] always a 
company that understands [the] effect of regulation, [and] has a culture of doing something about it 
and acting, participating, engaging, basically speaking. This is [an] industry issue that goes to 
survival of [the] company, not just culture.” “If don’t engage, then entire business [is] at risk.” –
Founder and President, private, 501-1k 
“I was lobbying for, since [the] Federal Government [is] taking over everything…” “In other 
kinds of insurance, like life, government, auto, government hasn’t taken over. I would just go to 
private actors and pay them money or something. But with this government, taken over industry, 
government runs exchanges, so they cut out all different private parties that were involved.” –
Founding Partner, Insurance, private, 11-50 
Finally, in 10 percent of the interviews, shaping public policy is a firm’s due 
diligence. These executives believe their entrepreneurial skills are not only useful in 
correcting for politicians’ mistakes in dictating businesses without business 
experience, but also believe playing a role in the political process is their 
responsibility. It is about firms that get involved and “step up and help” rather than 
“bitch.” A very common expression across interviews revolved around frustration that 
businesspeople with business skills and experience are dictated by entities and people 
who “don’t understand the economics and finance behind it” and are “ignorant” with 
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regards to economic and marketplace consequences of policies. This sentiment is 
expressed in a quarter of the interviews, regardless of the orientation, exemplified in 
the following interview excerpts. 
“But in some way it forces small banks out of business and we get their business. This is sad, 
sad [that a] local corner bank no longer can help. Unfortunate in our opinion. So much regulation 
that they don’t have enough expertise and personnel to keep up.” –President and CEO, private, 
500-1k 
“As business leaders we cannot bury [our] head in [the] sand. Have to be participants in [the] 
process.”  “…participation for greater good. I better participate in industry associations trying to 
make [the] total industry better.” –President and CEO, public, 10k+ 
“We have to.”  “We’ve had nine straight years of record growth. Our share in our two major 
categories are 60 and 40 percent. [The] reason is faster learning cycles and being creative. So 
utopia would be for [a] government to understand what that means.” “Unfortunately, we have 
bureaucracies with no accountability and don’t deal with consequences cause [they believe] those 
things will work itself out.” –Director of Marketing, private, 1-5k 
A Belief.  Staying true to the definitions of orientations posed in Chapter 1, an 
orientation towards government public policy reflects a firm belief, or lack thereof, in its 
ability to influence government agents/agencies. Although beliefs were certainly present 
in the interviews conducted, a real divide between trends and beliefs appeared. Of the 29 
firms (i.e. executives) oriented towards strategic choice, 8 rested almost entirely on 
belief. In other words, these 8 executives experience government public policy with 
strong conviction in possessing the ability to influence the agents or agencies involved, 
but absent an actual influence. In some of these instances, the lack of activity to support 
such a strategic choice orientation can be attributed merely to a lack of opportunity to 
influence agencies. For example, one of these firms has only been established for a 
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couple of years and another executive described policy influence as coming but yet to 
materialize, respectively, as demonstrated in the following two interview excerpts. 
 “A lot of conversation and movement, [but] not really materialized. It’s coming. [We’re a] 
start up, [but] looking to have one of our board members experienced in monitoring. Even in big 
companies, like Google (participant’s previous employer), with money floating around, have 
someone like legal monitoring or hire to lobby.” (Plans?) “Not yet, cause we are such a young 
company; thinking on it, we are thinking of it.” –Founder and President, public, 11-50 
 (Political activities?) “No, not yet because even our attorneys don’t know what’s even going 
to occur. When [the] time comes and it presents itself, we will be? fully armed.” –Founder and 
Owner, private, 11-50 
 However, the remaining firms with a strong belief in being able to influence 
government public policy had not really done so for fear of a negative public reaction 
and/or strong feelings that doing so is unethical business. In fact, worry over negative 
public reactions to firm influence of government public policy was a theme across many 
types of firms (i.e. executives) with both orientations. And this worry often prevents firm 
political behaviors in attempts to shape public policy, regardless of the firm’s orientation. 
Although most instances of such worry revolved around avoiding negative reactions 
among citizens and customers, some revolved instead around avoiding negative 
impressions among those agents and agencies in charge of drafting and enforcing 
government public policy. Because the interviews reveal these beliefs in the power of 
public image as related to public policy management strategies, instances and themes of 
such will be discussed further in a subsequent section of these findings titled, “Non-
Traditional Management Strategies.” 
Deterministic.  As hinted in the preceding section, a quarter of participating 
executives experience government public policy influence as determining the way they 
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do business (i.e. deterministic orientation). In one case, the firm’s market was truly 
determined by government public policy. The Biotechnology firm’s market relies heavily 
on government protection and regulation in being able to bring a product to market. Yet, 
other executives of firms described an explicit strategy in avoiding markets with heavy 
government oversight and/or products likely to call government attention. Thus, the 
Biotechnology firm has, in essence, voluntarily entered a deterministic context. 
In all other interviews a general sense of helplessness was echoed across 
deterministic firms. Vivid accounts of the Government being in complete control as a 
“mindless animal” that “can destroy things” were offered. In most of these cases, 
influencing government public policy is not realistic or not a consideration to begin with. 
“We have much more control over our own actions than we do over those of the various 
governments.” “you need to learn how to live in it” - Executive Chairman, Consumer Goods, 
private, 501-1k, 1921 
“I don’t know that our business would be able to have [an] impact on policy” –President, 
private, 1-5k 
“[it’s] a determination of whether we can successfully compete given the new mandate.  ... If 
so, we proceed. If not, we withdraw.” “Our feelings are that public policy is a cost of doing 
business in a highly regulated industry.” –Executive Vice President, private, 1-5k 
And in other cases, deterministic executives of firms feel as if their only option is to 
conduct business in a way that reduces the public policy threat. 
“…that’s something [that] could restrict us from buying a company, very real parameter, 
antitrust rules flex and move with the times.” “…still can be reviewed, but that threshold changes 
over time, but that’s something we keep abreast of, not necessarily influence but know would 
wanna be aware of.” –VP, public, 5-10k 
“If [the] Department of Labor eliminates this we would have to rethink, cause now we pay [$] 
per hour, always under consideration,” “[For] me, this small, clearly [have] to avoid but stay 
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aware of potential threats, I think that’s how most approach, constantly staying aware [of] the 
threat and work to shape, work to minimize [the] threat associated.” –President, private, 1-5k 
 Being “too small” was also a very common contingency to action. Almost all 
deterministic firms (i.e. executives) claim to be too small to have the resources, “hire a 
lobbyist”, have “legislative clout”, hold political ties, etc. 
“I cannot, nor can my company influence what’s gonna happen given our size... watch what 
happens and there’s nothing you can do about it except through associations, and minimal even at 
that. Frustration.” –President and CEO, public, 51-200 
Apparent in this last interview excerpt is that even though the deterministic firms claim 
that influencing government public policy cannot be considered because they are too 
small and lack the resources, half report being part of a larger industry effort, such as an 
industry association that lobbies government or a PAC. Keep in mind, this was NOT part 
of the interview questioning and, instead, was volunteered. Thus, this estimate of 
involvement is very likely a conservative estimate. Yet, even after mentioning these 
industry resources, executives of deterministic firms still appear to experience 
government public policy as constraining. 
“I don’t always agree with what [the] Association says, and again influence you have within 
[an] association is related to, [in a] certain sense, size of company, Kraft Foods [is a] multibillion 
[dollar] company, so they’re gonna have more influence in [the] Association than us, because 
[they] contribute more money, have more resources.” “Some company our size isn’t going [to] 
have all that. I happen to be on [a] committee where I have voice but there’s 30 people on that 
committee, so really finite opportunity to say a lot, or influence a lot.” –President and CEO, 
public, 51-200 
Aside from literal resources deterministic firms have at their disposal in influencing 
public policy, there also existed contradictions in literal size. The next interview excerpt 
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is from a deterministic firm that described itself as “too small” to be able to influence 
government, but in another part of the interview, as seen below, explains with regard to 
government influence on a firm,  
“[It] sort of ramps up when you get bigger and bigger as [a] company when dealing with 
government. Even though we are approaching a billion dollars, we are still small to mid-sized.” –
President and CEO, public, 51-200.  
 This confusion with the relationship between firm size and ability to influence 
government public policy is noteworthy because it is not factual. Table 3 indicates that 
roughly a third of deterministic firms employ approximately 10,000 individuals, another 
third between 1 and 5,000, and the remaining third a number relatively more 
representative of a small firm, at least with regard to employment. And a similar 
distribution in size exists among the executives of firms interviewed with a strategic 
choice orientation. In fact, a larger portion of firms with a strategic choice orientation 
employ 200 or fewer employees, i.e. are small firms. Approximately half of those firms 
with a deterministic orientation are private, and little over half of those firms with a 
strategic choice orientation are private. Although it might be concluded that there are 
more strategic choice than deterministic firms with a founding date predating the 19
th
 
Century, no patterns of expressed experience with government public policy and/or 
politics appeared. In fact, the opposite was found.  
 No obvious pattern in tangible resources explained a firm’s orientation, 
suggesting it is a belief largely shaped by the way the firm experiences government 
public policy. The most politically active firm interviewed explained, “as a small player 
we are surprised we can have any influence” and is usually satisfied if they have 
“nudged” government public policy their way. Consider the political behaviors and 
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experience in influencing government public policy this small, strategic choice firm 
engaged in at their very young age, as expressed in the interview excerpt below.  
“Just met with senior IT people, business people working on those exact same projects, not 
necessarily legislators. We did go through [politician]’s office in [neighboring state] and a friend 
of mine who is President of [the] [political] party. He connected me to [the] Health Care Office, 
then they connected me. [It] ultimately led to [us], less than ultimately talking directly to 
legislators.” –Founding Partner, private, 11-50 
And in the next interview excerpt, the same young, small, private firm discusses hiring a 
lobbyist and even lobbying himself.  
“He had previously worked for [the] board of people making this decision we were bidding for, 
so he knows [the] decision process, some of the correct budgeting decisions, and can explain things. 
Later in the process we met another lobbyist…” “[Insurance Firm]’s [too] small to hire lobbyists, 
but [we] just happened to be one of best vendors bidding.” “…part of what we had to do.” –
Founding Partner, private, 11-50 
The participant goes on to explain, 
“Since government [is] changing these, I had to investigate how models would impact people; 
impacted many, including smaller companies, I feel I’m uniquely capable of building these 
networks to lobby myself.” “I think only bigger companies engaging in politics is usually correct 
but not always.” “If serious about interrupting industry, [you] have to hire lobbyists early to 
forecast.” –Founding Partner,  private, 11-50. 
In addition to being too small to influence public policy, one of the largest firms, in terms 
of employment, interviewed might just be too big. 
“Jesse Jackson’s leading [a] picket line outside Santa Clara. [The] environment demanding 
[we] look at this. Threat of regulation. Negative repercussions.” “He was upset. He felt like there 
wasn’t a reasonable amount of business being supplied to underrepresented minorities. In order to 
manage that potential negative perception, potential negative regulation or impact, [the] company 
put [a] strategic program in place. [It’s] perception risk mitigation. What it was is we had to have 
98 
 
 
 
this program or gonna suffer pretty severe consequences with minorities in business.” –HR 
Strategic Intelligence, public, 10k+ 
The participant goes on to describe an entirely different government public policy that 
determined their business operations; relatively large operations that involve 10,000 
employees. 
“Everything changed. Now [we’re] making sure in compliance, being proactive in focusing 
attention in that area. We either comply or it’s bad news, but it wasn’t us going out and 
influencing that external environment. It was us modifying us in compliance.” “…because there’s 
a carrot and a stick. The stick is they’re gonna be hit by this stick cause there’s a federal 
repercussion or consequence.” –HR Strategic Intelligence, public, 10k+ 
 Thus far, deterministic firms have been described as believing size constrains 
their ability to influence government public policy and holding a belief that the 
government force is too large to be able to influence. One last characteristic of some 
firms (i.e. executives) worth describing is a belief that it is unethical to attempt to 
influence government agents/agencies. Ironically, the two firms (i.e. executives) that are 
against intervening in public policy do, in fact, engage in political behaviors. These 
behaviors are described as attempts to influence government public policy and include 
presenting “the facts” to legislators, trying to “ask for particular legislation”, engaging in 
a “tremendous amount of education going on in D.C.,” and creating “maybe a slight 
budge” in government public policy because “the amount [of] regulation [that] exists is 
enormous.” While the next, immediate excerpt comes from the interview of a strategic 
choice firm, the excerpt that follows it is from a firm which holds no clear orientation. 
“Only two times did we go to legislature and ask for particular legislation. Never felt like it 
was our role to do that; we respond.” “It is about looking at our missions which is to serve 
people.” “Companies generally don’t just sit back and wait.” “Can have heavy handed influence or 
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more moderate. [We say to government], ‘Here are the facts, here are how things work, you can 
do things this way, but here are the unintended consequences.’ Other companies use very strong, 
over the top mechanisms of quasi threats.” – 
Founder and President, private, 0 
“No, would be unethical and very short sided and we are not just wired that way. Would 
rather get it done right; go forward.” –President and CEO, private, 250-499 
Orientation Contingencies.  As part of the co-interpretation process, every 
interview was concluded by the researcher diagnosing the firm with one of the two 
orientations, explaining the diagnosis by reading back significant statements supporting 
such, and asking the participant for (dis)agreement. In all but one interview did a 
participant confirm the idea that firms are indeed oriented toward government public 
policy influence. This participating firm suggests that “…people that can and do 
influence policy tend to be in industries that are emerging and evolving and Government 
hasn’t fully sunk [their] teeth in” and doesn’t think of the government as a force when 
probed further. Further, this food-related product executive explains, “we are in a very 
large, complex category…so, what one can do is almost irrelevant. [It’s] a very mature 
segment of the economy (President and CEO, private, 250-499).” Admittedly, this is the 
only firm interviewed in which no clear orientation could be concluded.  
However, every firm oriented towards strategic choice interviewed indicated that 
such an orientation is not a belief, but rather a series of marketplace contingencies. In 
other words, they all indicated that “it depends.” These contingencies range from size, as 
mentioned before, to the personal motives of legislators drafting public policy, to whether 
the firm is publicly traded, and so on. And while the participants had many reasons to 
suggest that their decisions to influence government public policy was anything but an 
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orientation, there is no real pattern in such reasoning to discount the orientations 
concluded. For example, only one of the executives (i.e. President and CEO, private, 250-
499) interviewed in the food industry suggested that acting depends on the complexity or 
maturity of the product category. And, as another example, while some participants 
explained that there is too much uncertainty in predicting government public policy to be 
able to act, there are no common characteristics among these firms. In fact, some hold a 
strategic choice orientation while others hold a deterministic orientation. Examples of 
contingencies in deciding TO influence government public policy include: 
 caused a major disruption -Founding Partner, private, 11-50; 
 if the customer is hurt by the policy -VP, public, 5-10k; 
 when business analysis (impact on money, profit) makes sense -Director of 
Sales and Marketing, private, 11-50; and 
 depends on size because “it's no big deal for large companies to be hassled or 
punished” -Senior Corporate Analyst Strategic Pricing, public, 10k+. 
And examples of contingencies used in deciding NOT to influence government public 
policy among firms with a strategic choice orientation include: 
 industry is too powerful -Founding and Managing Partner, private, 1-10; 
 uncertainty -Executive Chairman, private, 501-1k; 
 public image prevents influence -Account Executive, private, 51-200; and 
 lack of understanding, so rarely act -Founder and Owner, private, 11-50. 
 Thus far, these findings have clarified that firm orientations discussed in prior 
environmental management literature do in fact exist and can be described as strategic 
choice and determinism. The next section goes further to delve into whom exactly holds 
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these orientations. While prior environmental management literature discusses these 
orientations as belonging to the firm, this study is unique in that it uses key informants to 
clarify this distinction. The differences between firm and leader orientations are parsed in 
the subsequent section by returning to the interview content and analysis. 
Are Firms or Leaders Oriented? 
 While the preceding section explicates the beliefs behind the orientations of 
strategic choice and deterministic, these findings have yet to confirm such orientations as 
firm- rather than leader-based. In parsing out these differences, Moustakas (1994) 
suggests examining the language used by participants as a tool in discerning underlying 
meaning. Language used in describing tendencies is one of many ways to (dis)confirm 
firm-based orientations used in this study. When describing decisions to influence 
government public policy (or not), “we,” “us,” “our,” etc. were used. And phrases such as 
“reflects our company,” “we support,” “it’s a mindset,” and “part of our culture” were the 
norm rather than the exception. However, words like “I” and “my” as well as phrases like 
“what most influences me is” or “I personally believe” were used in describing 
government public policy influences. In fact, words indicating concern for constraining 
public policy influence and distaste for government actions as personal occurred in 
almost all interviews. In most interviews, the topics discussed were highly moving and 
expressed with strong conviction, using adverbs like “maddening” and adjectives like 
“crazy” and even “creepy.” And in a little less than a quarter of the interviews, it was 
clear that the firm’s decision to influence government public policy (or not) was also a 
personal belief.  
102 
 
 
 
 Yet, it is only in the accounts of one firm (i.e. CEO and President, private, 201-
500) in which the participant’s ideology appeared to bias what was shared about 
experiences with government public policy influence. This – looking for structural 
meaning units – is the second tool useful in parsing the difference between environmental 
management as firm- or leader-based. The participating firm (i.e. CEO and President, 
private, 201-500) suggests, for example, “[The] only thing standing from radical 
progressives and their goals is a Republican Congress.” And while others could usually 
think of at least one opportunity government public policy has provided their business, 
this same firm responds to such a query with, “Oh boy, [it] would [be] hard to be even 
think of one, and hard to spend my business’ capital on public policy.”  Two other 
executives of firms (i.e. Founder and President, private, 0; CEO and President, private, 0-
10) also used personal motives in describing decisions to influence government public 
policy, but these firms employ 0 and 8 individuals, respectively, and these employees are 
the only strategy developers of their firms in these respects. 
 The third, and most convincing, tool in confirming environmental management 
orientations as firm- over leader-based is ending the interview by asking if the diagnosed 
orientation was a part of culture or the result of a leader. In doing so, it was 
overwhelmingly indicated that the tendency to allow government public policy to dictate 
ones business is the culture. And the tendency to push back against legislators 
constraining ones business is also the culture, but of senior-level executives. In other 
words, while only the three executives of firms just described as personally motivated (or 
biased) could not explain action with cultural accounts, all of those with deterministic 
orientations accounted their reactions to culture and a about half of those executives of 
103 
 
 
 
firms with strategic choice orientations to the culture of “the leaders.” In these cases of 
strategic choice, personal motives and interest in the political process was texturally 
indicated, as seen in the following interview excerpts.  
“[An] entrepreneurial firm is a founder with a vision. Even Google’s (participant’s previous 
employer) culture is still founded on [a] few visions. A lot of companies are about founders and 
vision of big leaders.” “I believe that it is more about visionary founders than some esoteric 
company because companies are wiring.” Still being led by leaders, [but] when watch who is bold 
and … bump into policy but get people to go meet to [the] FTC, [it’s] really, [I] think it’s about 
visionary.” –Founder and President, public, 11-50 
“I became more interested in politics as a result. Generally, I've been someone who has not 
paid that much attention to politics and its impact on business. However, the more senior I become 
in our organization and more experienced in business as a whole, public policy has become 
something that I want to stay in-tune with and impact, if possibly through my vote.” –Senior 
Business Analyst, private, 1-5k  
“It’s a very personal thing. It would break my heart. Bad enough to lose your own job, but 
people who depend on you leaving? Very personal. Ten years ago, [we] kept hiring, and our CEO 
[says], ‘what if there was a slow patch? Don’t wanna lay anyone off; can’t let these people down.’ 
I go to church with them, their kids know my kids.  I don’t see it (policy). I see it in the way of 
people having lifetime jobs; people less than 100 feet away from me out in the factory.” –Director 
of Marketing, private, 1-5k 
 This distinction is important in two ways. First, literature related to environmental 
management suggests some firms “serve” stakeholders (Friedman 1962) and hold even 
“concern” for some stakeholders (e.g., Carroll 1979; O’Neill, Saunders and McCarthy 
1989), but does not clearly distinguish behaviors from strategy. And the descriptions of 
marketplace context, firm management tools, environmental management decisions, etc. 
used in literature offering environmental management theories are often descriptions 
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emphasizing firm strategy (e.g., Duncan 1972; Porter 1979). This research suggests 
orientations are neither organizational behaviors or purely strategic. To reiterate, almost 
all firm executives attributed orientations to culture, and in many cases, to personal 
convictions. Instead, and as suggested in the literature review of Chapter 2, orientations 
may be more appropriately described as habits. While habits suggest an almost accidental 
behavior (i.e. cultural), they also suggest repeated activities (i.e. strategic tendencies). 
 Second, there appears to be two types of strategic choice orientations, i.e. strong 
choice in acting and strong belief in choice in acting. The former describes firms with a 
strategic choice orientation that display real tendencies in influencing government public 
policy, likely because of the strong conviction in doing so among leaders. The latter 
describes firms with the same strategic choice orientation as the former, but with 
relatively fewer tendencies in acting and likely because a firm culture is less provoking 
than the conviction of the senior-most leaders. Some of those executives of firms with a 
strategic choice orientation attribute the orientation to culture and others to the personal 
conviction of leaders. Remember also, that in a preceding section it was noted that some 
of those firms with a strategic choice orientation actually have tendencies to influence 
government public policy, while others believed in their ability to influence government 
agencies/agents but typically choose not to do so. Further examination of these strategic 
choice orientation groups reveals the two distinctions, i.e. culture of who and actual 
behavior, are related. In fact, almost all of those who have actual tendencies to act out 
strategic choice orientations in influencing government public policy also attribute their 
orientation to the personal conviction and interest in public policy.  
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 Thus far, the discussion of Study 1 findings has focused on the first confirmation 
goal: to confirm that strategic choice and deterministic orientations do indeed exist in 
managing the government force. Additionally, these data found that while these two 
orientations exist, the strategic choice orientation exists at a belief and tendency level. 
Furthermore, it was uncovered that environmental management research must allow 
orientations to exist at both the firm- and leader-level. Finally, although many 
contingencies in influencing government public policy were found, the lack of common 
pattern among such contingencies suggests orientations in managing government public 
policy are two-dimensional (i.e. belief, tendency) and that the orientations found exist at 
the noesis level in which participants structure meaning by using textural descriptions, 
sometimes contradictorily, of the underlying meaning of their perceptions and actions 
surrounding the phenomenon. In other words, while this research confirms the strategic 
choice and deterministic orientations, it did so largely through the design that 
transcendental phenomenology qualitative design allows. 
Pushing Forward versus Pushing Back 
The second general question of this research asks, If firms do in fact hold an 
orientation towards managing the government force, what tools and activities are 
involved in such management? Specifically, do firms use marketing activities to push 
forward in the marketplace in spite of a government public policy threat and political 
behaviors to push back against the threat? The examples participants used in this study 
offer answers to these questions. The two subsequent sections sort through such examples 
and find generally that firms use both marketing activities and political behaviors in their 
management strategies, but rarely simultaneously. Then, marketing and political activities 
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aside, new and non-traditional strategies revolving around neither of these activities were 
uncovered and are discussed. These revolve around strategic avoidance of government 
public policy threats through intentional product development and/or market entry choice 
as well as varying approaches in interacting with the Government in reference to 
corporate responsible behavior.  
 The review of both marketing and political science literature offered in Chapter 2 
suggests that firms sometimes use marketing activities, such as expansion of the scope of 
services a firm offers (Goll and Rasheed 2011) or advertising content alterations 
(LaBarbera 1983), when managing a government public policy threat that limits the way 
they do business. It was hypothesized in this same chapter that these marketing activities 
are used by firms with a strategic choice orientation to offset the limits the threat placed 
on the firm. If a firm can maintain a valuable marketplace position and/or improve such a 
position through adjusting its marketing activities, the firm is likely to prevent or cancel 
out the market limitation created by the public policy threat. Also, if a firm holds a 
strategic choice orientation it is likely to manage the government public policy threat, but 
may instead choose to do so by pushing back against the threat by using political 
activities designed to persuade government agents or agencies. The same literature 
review suggests these firm management activities, such as lobbying (Keillor and Lewison 
2003) or political campaign contributions (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011), are also 
designed to prevent or mitigate the public policy threat. The interviews of Study 1 
confirm that firms do indeed use marketing, political, or a combination of both types of 
activities in their formal, explicit management strategies. And the following discussion 
explicates these activities. 
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 Management through Political Behaviors.  It was more often the case that a 
participating firm with a strategic choice orientation described management of public 
policy threats through political behaviors (22 of 29 firms) than through marketing 
activities (6 of 29 firms). However, only 3 of the 29 strategic choice oriented firms (i.e. 
executives) mentioned utilizing both types of management strategies. When executives 
described pushing back against a public policy threat, it was very often with general 
statements about lobbying through industry associations. However, other political 
behaviors described involved providing internal data analysis to fuel the fight,  
“one way we help banks is we have transaction data from numerous customers, we can help 
them say you’re really not seeing [a] positive impact on regulating customers” –Senior Corporate 
Analyst Strategic Pricing, public, 10k+, 
“strategically provide information to the government force that helps articulate the case that 
my company is taking. For example, if we oppose a proposed government mandate, we would put 
together the facts that support our argument against the proposal.” –VP Product Development and 
Marketing, public, 201-500; 
acting as consultants in assisting the Government in drafting legislation advantageous to 
the given firm, 
 “banks sent out comments so the government can make tweaks, our people waded through 
900 pages to make comments and send in[to] the government” “sometimes they come in to get our 
opinion of changing banking” –Founder and President, private, 501-1k,     
 “now government comes to us for help, say [the] Government has [a] program [it] wants to 
run, they use us as an example, [a] very large … team of surveyors that come to us so we can train 
them on how business can be run” –CEO and President, private, 51-200, 
“we try to work with the government in advance of a final ruling to better understand their 
objective” “see if we can help craft a final decision that is best for the consumer and appropriate 
for us.” –CEO,  private, 500-1k;  
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using political ties to sway agents or agencies for favorable legislation,  
 “we have involvement, we have relationships with people …create legislation so we have a 
say in that there’s kind of a national [bias or basis] with support groups that try to sway Congress, 
but definitely groups that help to push legislation to go our way” “gives notoriety if we can partner 
with [the] Mayor’s office” –CEO and President, private, 51-200, 
 “when I get involved in product liability legislation, I’m looking into [the] interest of my 
company and how it might help me, [but] influencing my senator friends might be a matter of 
simple ego, [they] respect me for knowing something” –CEO and President, private, 0-10, 
We did go through [politician]’s office in [neighboring state] and a friend of mine who is 
President of [the] [political] party. He connected me to [the] Health Care Office, then they 
connected me” –Founding Partner, 11-50; 
financially contributing to political campaigns to increase the likelihood that the 
favorable candidate is elected and, thus, favorable legislation is passed,  
 “try to get professional business people elected at [the] state level, … if they can’t get elected 
it doesn’t do you any good, the California Feed and Grain Association, all have PACs, we all 
contribute money to those PACs”  “Democrat in [city] …, his trip [was] paid for by PACs” –CEO 
and President, private, 201-500;  
encouraging the firm’s retailers to talk to and get to know local representatives for 
potential persuasion in legislation favorable to the given firm, 
“also, [we’ll] try to get our retailers, we sell in 2000 retailer locations, they get much more 
access to money cause they employee and have more access to transportation dollars; … ABC 
[firm product] of Lincoln could make [a] larger influence in their community that we, a billion 
dollar company, could, …but very rarely [do they] have the bandwidth to go [and] talk to [the] 
Mayor, but we send [them the] message that they will be heard” –Marketing Director, private, 1-
5k;  
using product experts in the effort to persuade government agents,  
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“the Farm Bill winds around [the] Senate and House every 4 years, I ‘m not gonna be able to 
affect that but what I can affect is that the same principles [that are] being advocating, we’ll have 
cream and dairy experts making sure our position is advocated” –President and CEO, public, 
10k+; 
or looking for loopholes in efforts to limit the threat of the public policy; 
 “if regulation limits driving to 10 hours and round trip is 12, we have to rethink if we can 
even do that, if [it’s a] critical part of business I might say I can’t do this and I’ll hire a third party 
to do this and worry about service regulation, … I’m not going to break law in any way, [but] may 
hire someone suspect [of] not following law” –CEO and President, private, 201-500. 
Although a majority of management strategies in dealing with the government force 
revolve around political tactics, some firms, instead, rely on marketing skills. The 
following section describes these firms and illustrates that marketing activities are used to 
offset business limitations a public policy threat creates.  
 Management through Marketing Activities.  Executives described decisions to 
develop new products, alter product labeling, protect product strategies by buying ahead 
of the public policy threat, steal customers away from firms which do not have the 
capacity to maintain market share when limited by the threat, and many more examples 
of marketing activities used to offset the public policy threat. Consider these examples of 
pushing forward in the marketplace: 
 “a lot of our competition ran out of business, our strategy is diversification, we hedge against 
this risk by entering in a whole set of businesses, 20 legs under [a] table [is] gonna stand” –CEO 
and CFO, public, 1-5k 
 “work with [the] product and development team to make sure labels [are] not dealing with 
something [the] public doesn’t want to have” –Founding and Managing Partner, private, 1-10 
“when times like this happen, you look at your expenditures as well, found ways to cut 
expenses to offset, whether changing vendors or renegotiation contracts to get lower rates, … 
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changed vendors that offer [the] same level of business but at [a] lower rate” –CEO and President, 
private, 51-200 
“intent was [a] product [that] for most part [was] convenient and take consumers away from 
borrowing” “[the] checking account product [was] more, people couldn’t afford that account, so 
[we] had to change products accordingly” –President of Neb. Operations, public, 10k+ 
While these examples offer only a glimpse into pushing forward in spite of the public 
policy threat, other firm descriptions of such marketing strategies were much more 
specific. Take, for instance, one firm’s strategic public policy forecasting so as to pre-buy 
the affected product in bulk as the following interview excerpt describes. 
“there may be some particular type of cocoa, cocoa [is] primarily affected by government 
policy in countries around [the] horn of Africa, [it’s] highly volatile areas government-wise so 
[we’re] constantly monitoring” “if [I] believe [that] volatility [is] gonna go up, [I] can… pre-buy if 
I have enough storage and resources, before [the] volatile government [is] gonna hit those 
countries, to mitigate my risk” –President and CEO, public, 10k+ 
Because this firm’s industry is constantly being affected by government public policy, the 
firm is rarely surprised and, instead, is able to stay ahead of competitors and steal away 
customers because it has cheaper and more accessible products in demand. Purchasing 
ahead of the threat allows the firm a competitive advantage. However, the participant 
suggests only the larger firms are able to manage public policy this way. The participant 
goes on to explain, 
 “you have to have enough critical mass to [be able to] afford [the] overhead necessary to hire 
these new staff, so I can say to clients, you need to be with us cause I have the resources to ensure 
every one of our plants have the highest safety standards” –President and CEO, public, 10k+   
Other firms rely on large business overhauls and significant product revamping so as to 
reduce the threat of a government public policy, as seen in the next interview excerpt. 
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“recently … 2 percent cut of medical reimbursement, as CEO … [I] have to find ways to 
make up revenue” “have to supplement business,  new lines of business” “we got a campus where 
we have an assisted living center, [we] portioned off 20 percent of those rooms and created [a] 
secure environment for Alzheimer’s patients, invested $250k in renovations, but will see 
additional revenue because [it] will offset because this center [involves] private pay and is 
sheltered from government revenue” “not having to rely on government resources  added a whole 
new line of business” “with this private line of business,  now only 60 percent of revenue [is 
dependent on government reimbursements]” –CEO and President, private, 51-200 
In this example, the firm used product development to mitigate the threat. However, other 
firms’ marketing strategies involved product development in staying ahead of the threat. 
While this mostly involved descriptions of accurate policy forecasting, it also often 
involved rich descriptions of a perceived disconnect between government and marketing 
skill among government agents and agencies. Unlike the previous example that illustrates 
product development to mitigate the threat of te public policy, the next example 
illustrates product development that outwits public policy. 
 “we don’t wanna adjust our old products, [we] wanna fulfill these things (public policies) but 
bring something new to the marketplace” “continue to be entrepreneurial and push the envelope, 
cause [we] will be out in front of [the] Government at some point and they gotta catch up” “we 
gotta innovate and be unique, if you try to manage a stagnant business you get more and more 
boggled down” “[the] Government struggled with keeping up with this technology, funny seeing 
them trying to keep up, problems with leakage of [government] information, problems with 
Target, inability to prosecute these people” “obviously [we] have to comply, but can also invent 
yourself out of it rather than try to go backwards” –Director of Marketing, private, 1-5k 
Technological and entrepreneurial creativity allows this firm to not only survive, but also 
to thrive. “We’ve had 9 straight years of record growth. Our market share in our two 
major categories are 60 and 40 percent. [The] reason is faster learning cycles and being 
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creative,” explained the participant. The examples of firms pushing forward in spite of 
threatening public policy provided thus far illustrate proactivity, aggressiveness, and 
persuasion. However, not all firms (i.e. executives) pushing forward with marketing 
activities displayed such active strategies. In fact, approximately half of the strategic 
choice oriented firms (i.e. executives) using marketing activities to manage public policy 
described such a stance as simply less risky than relying on political behaviors. 
“it’s not clear yet on privacy, but we want to have certain things in process, two pricing ideas, 
not sure which to use until polices [are] more formal, so both legal contracts and  sales 
presentations” –Founder and President, public, 11-50 
“can’t bet [the] whole farm on influencing policy” –CEO and CFO, public, 1-5k 
Firms engaging in marketing activities vary in their strategies. This section demonstrated 
that while some firms use basic marketing tactics, such as package message alteration, 
other firms rely on major product changes. And it further demonstrated that some of the 
marketing strategies used to offset limitations on how a product can be sold or advertised, 
for example, involve marketing activities, such as inventing new products not yet 
regulated. Yet, other examples of marketing activities to push forward rely on skill, such 
as cost-benefit analysis of marketing over political action. 
 It should also be noted that almost all of the executives of firms holding a 
strategic choice orientation tended to prioritize political over marketing behaviors in 
management strategies, but 3 of the 29 firms (i.e. executives) oriented in strategic choice 
approached government influence strategies purely through a marketing approach. 
Another three approached decisions to and action in influence government public policy 
with equal consideration of both political and marketing behaviors. And all six of these 
executives of firms who seem to place special emphasis in using marketing activities to 
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manage the government force sell products consumed or applied physically by 
consumers, i.e. consumer-packaged foods, baby products, student loans, “community” 
banking, and personal grooming products. 
Non-Traditional Management Strategies 
 While the preceding two sections discussed the two most common types of 
managing government public policy, i.e. through marketing or political activities, this 
research uncovered two other strategies somewhat unrelated to pushing forward and 
back. These two strategies are developing policy-neutral products and managing 
government agencies through the façade of responsible corporate behavior, to be 
discussed in greater detail in the two subsequent sections. 
 Policy-Neutral Management.  Ten percent of participants described management 
of government public policy as revolving around themes of avoidance. Thus, rather than 
the firm engaging in pushing forward strategies that emphasize marketing activities or 
pushing back strategies requiring political behaviors, a few firms use avoidance strategies 
that are just as proactive as those using pushing forward or back strategies. Ironically, 
these strategies involved avoiding interaction with or attention from the Government (i.e. 
public policy). Yet, these strategies greatly relied on formal and explicit marketing 
tactics. Take the following interview excerpts as examples of strategic choice firms 
taking into account the markets to enter/exit based on the degree of government oversight 
or attention. 
“as much as I can, I try to limit my dependency on them (Government)” “big force, and [a] 
force you can’t ignore” “we’ve got to have a good balance, …increase our government awareness, 
but increase our ability to not rely on them, I got to play that line very carefully” –CEO and 
President, private, 51-200   
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“if we were looking at a company and its portfolio full of, …[we’re] not in [the] tobacco 
business, tobacco, … [we] wouldn’t wanna necessarily have a negative…” “Hart-Scott-Rodino, … 
antitrust affects, American and United Airlines bonding together, [the] perception of if [you] put 
two [big] market share products together, [it’s] not good for consumers as a whole, so when 
looking at acquisitions that’s something [that] could restrict us from buying a company, [it’s a] 
very real parameter” –VP,  public, 5-10k 
While these offer subtle examples of proactive avoidance strategies, other firms (i.e. 
executives) created a neutral business atmosphere for themselves by placing great care 
into offering a good product and/or doing the right thing (according to government public 
policy) in creating the product.   
“PPE, personal protection equipment, …., hard hats, safety glasses, jeans, steel-toed boots, 
shields, breathing protection, we work constantly on that, yes it is requirement but it’s important 
and something we constantly dwell on, [we] have safety meetings once a quarter about lifting 
properly, what to do when [it’s] too hot [or] too cold, [we give] constant reminders of this 
equipment, how to hold things and not cut yourself, [it’s] never ending” –President, private, 11-50 
 “we will make [the] right products for consumers and much prefer not getting involved in 
policy” -President and CEO, public, 51-200 
These executives, i.e. firms whose management strategies in dealing with potentially 
threatening government public policy revolve around avoiding attention by avoiding 
government sanctions (e.g., regulation, fines, direct monitoring), place great care and 
focus on consumers and the employees that indirectly affect consumers. This is different 
than care and focus placed on market position in spite of threatening public policy as well 
as care and focus placed on the political process. Both of these types of management 
strategies occur in spite of a threat while avoidance occurs notwithstanding the threat, but 
with awareness of the threat. And, not surprisingly, these executives of firms hold a 
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deterministic orientation, but one different than that described in management and 
marketing literature. This literature stream suggests a deterministic orientation is one in 
which the firm views forces, e.g., socio-political force, as determining the way the firm 
does business and structures its operations (e.g., Duncan 1972; Porter 1979). Rather, 
avoidance strategies are proactive in nature, despite still being deterministic. Firms 
engaging in avoidance strategies proactively develop products and enter markets that are 
understood to involve little to no government monitoring. The interviews with executives 
of firms engaging in avoidance strategies were vivid and specific in terms of the 
decisions and tactics that go into an avoidance strategy. These decisions were described 
as plans to avoid government threats, which is a very proactive stance. Consider yet 
another type of avoidance strategy that is even more proactive: policy-neutral strategies. 
The following excerpts are from interviews with executives of firms who deliberately 
engage in business arenas and develop products that are very unlikely to involve 
government attention, regulation, oversight, etc. 
“in the lifecycle of a firm, the orientation can change, …earlier in our lifecycle we believed 
we could influence, then so many strange events happen that you can’t” “I’m just going to create 
products, services that are policy neutral” –CEO and CFO, public, 1-5k   
“we are, right now, not regulated by Health and Human Services, but [we] constantly ask if 
adding [a] new service, does it bump us into falling under [it]? [this] adds [a] layer of complexity 
to [the] decision-making process” “I don’t know that our business would be able to have [an] 
impact on policy, and [we’re] certainly not interested in spending time and money trying to do so, 
and [we’ve got] other things to spend time and money on, opportunities, … avoid it” –President, 
private, 1-5k 
While the first interview excerpt is from a firm holding a strategic choice orientation, the 
second is from a firm holding a deterministic orientation. And while the first excerpt is 
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from a firm who targets young consumers between 18 and 24, the second firm targets 
senior citizens. In fact, beyond sharing a policy-neutral strategy goal, the firms (i.e. 
executives) holding non-traditional management strategies share very little in common. 
Instead, these data reveal a management strategy that is both proactive and reactive in 
nature, both strategic choice and deterministic with regards to orientation, and both 
concerned and somewhat unconcerned with potential threat sourced by government 
public policy. Perhaps firms utilizing this last management style, i.e. policy-neutral, are 
the true escape artists who are proactive, yet intelligently uninvolved. Escape strategies 
that involve evading the government force is new to external environmental management. 
It is different from determinism in that is does not involve allowing the force to dictate 
the firm, yet different from strategic choice in that it does not proactively manipulate the 
force. 
 Management through CSR.  While no interview questions involved Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR), the topic came up very often in interviews. This involved 
mentioning worry about the public’s perception of the company, (natural) 
environmentally sound product development, a responsibility to engage in politics as 
good businessmen, the lack of ethics involved in attempts to influence the Government, 
doing good, partnering with agencies in efforts to protect consumers, consumer demand 
for CSR behaviors and products that symbolized such, etc. Some follow-up questions did 
involve an inquiry into a participant’s statement about not engaging in political behaviors 
because it was inappropriate (e.g., follow-up question in a semi-structured interview). For 
example, when one participant said “the last thing [we] want is [for] … [a] guy from 60 
Minutes [to] show up on [our] door step (Senior Director Transactions and eCommerce, 
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public, 5-10k),” it was asked if public image is factored into decisions involving 
influencing government public policy. Yet, the notion that responsible behaviors on the 
part of the firm are a very important part of the firm’s culture and/or strategy became a 
significant element of discussions. From these mentions, four types of corporate 
responsibility arose. 
 As seen in Figure 2, two major themes appeared across interviews in which this 
notion of corporate responsibility dominated the conversation, i.e. the type of behavior, 
and who the firm behavior was intended for. Cells along the y-axis of Figure 2 depict two 
types of corporate responsibility perceptions that grew from the interviews, i.e. strategic 
and altruistic responsibilities. In some interviews, executives of firms volunteered 
information about their responsible behaviors as a for-profit business, but did so in a way 
that was synonymous with smart business. In other words, executives of firms practicing 
strategic corporate responsibility mentioned in the interviews that doing so drove sales or 
facilitated compliance with threatening public policies, for example. And as these two 
examples imply, strategic responsible behavior was described by the given executives as 
useful for competing in the marketplace, but also for avoiding government sanctions. The 
other type of corporate responsibility that appeared in interviews with executives desiring 
conversation about this topic involves altruistic behaviors in which the firm believes 
acting responsible is the right thing to do for society without mention of business 
benefits.  
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 Cells along the x-axis of Figure 2 depict two groups of people the firm’s 
responsible behaviors are concerned with and, thus, directed towards, i.e. members of the 
public and government agents/or agencies. Participants discussing worry about public 
image often also mentioned that they alleviated such worry with visible, responsible 
behaviors. These behaviors included avoiding political tactics in influencing government 
agents that might “end up on the front page of the WSJ the next day” or working with 
supply chain members in finding new ways of reducing product waste that might harm 
the natural environment, for example. However, firms describing responsible behaviors 
in the same statement which described their concern, or lack thereof, for government 
public policy threats are examples of engaging in responsible behaviors designed with the 
Government in mind. 
 Together these two dimensions of corporate responsible behaviors, i.e. type and 
target, combine to create four types of firms that the interviews suggest exist in the 
marketplace. These firm types involve firms behaving responsibly so as to manage the 
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government force and include the utilization of responsible behaviors to 1) Manage Sales, 
2) Manage the Government, 3) Serve the Public, and 4) Ignore the Government. The next 
few sections explicate these four types of firms further by turning to interview excerpts 
that illustrate each. 
 Executives of firms which Manage Sales offered examples of responsible 
behaviors they engage in as for-profit businesses, but never without also mentioning the 
marketplace rewards of doing so. Because marketplace position (e.g., sales) was always 
associated with corporate responsibility among these firms, they can best be positioned as 
engaging in strategic (rather than altruistic) behaviors that are responsible, but in an effort 
to positively persuade members of the public, which include consumers. Consider the 
following interview excerpts as examples of such firms which do not mention responsible 
behaviors without also mentioning market rewards or incentives, a discussion trend 
common throughout such interviews. 
“[you’re] not gonna see companies take [a] hard issue, no profit in doing that, [people] much 
less likely to rally to [your] cause, people who disagree with you will react more negatively than 
people agreeing with you acting more positively…people who disagree with me [are] probably 
gonna take some kind of action and the other part may be quiet and do nothing at all, how do I 
come out better doing this, I don’t, so why would I do it?” “not so much influencing government, 
what you do is when see consumers caring about something you reformulate products, free of 
preserves, free of GMOs, … we’ve appealed to them” “nobody saying not [they’re] gonna eat 
[the] product cause no [there’s] GMOs in it where there are people saying [they’re] not gonna eat 
[it] cause it does have GMOs, so you market that action and try to get appeal without alienating 
[the rest of [the] population” –President and CEO, public, 51-200 
“everyone has limited marketing dollars so try to get [the] biggest bang for it, but entertaining 
clients, trying to stay engaged with various chambers, various nonprofits including UNL, … invest 
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resources so that you would be an important part of consideration” –President of Neb. Operations, 
public, 10k+ 
“[we’ve] been proactive in going out and reaching out and engaging with [the] NFL and 
leading physicians” “you’re not gonna sell a billion extra pieces because of that, at least not yet, 
what do we invest in, we gotta make money to stay in business, so [it’s] part of that, societal 
expectation though” –President and CEO, public, 10k+ 
These excerpts, as well as other examples of responsible behaviors offered by executives 
of firms that Manage Sales through corporate responsibility are, in fact, responsible with 
regards to being safe and fair. Yet, the following excerpts which describe firms using 
responsible behaviors to Serve the Public are in sharp contrast to firms that use 
responsible behaviors in Managing Sales. The former firm type described responsible 
behaviors without also describing potential marketplace rewards for conducting 
themselves in this manner. As such, firms that engage in responsible behaviors to Serve 
the Public, do so out of altruistic motives, as seen in the following interview excerpts. 
“[we’re a] very ethical company, our founder is not in it for [the] money at all, we don’t work 
for shareholder value, that means nothing, we have a vision for what it means to be a good citizen” 
“our primary responsibility is the 900, 800 families that build great products for our consumers, 
[yes, we] have to pay bills at end [the] of [the] day, but take pride in being [a] company that’s an 
unusual company in this world, I got enough money to live my life, I’m in it for the families” –
Director of Marketing, private, 1-5k 
“our primary job is to make a consistent long term profit, [it’s the] objective of every 
business, if [I] do that, [then] I have to be respectful to [the] community, such as how I treat 
employees and [the] environment, if [I] trash both I won’t be in business for [the] long haul, doing 
right things over the long term to help [the] community, environment, and owners of business, the 
shareholders” –President and CEO, public, 10k+         
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“we were trying to source out cocoa beans from different parts of the world, and we’re trying 
to source out products that were family-owned instead of conglomerate, that’s where [the] rice 
stove project started, …there’s an issue for farmers, the husks of rice plants, [meant] to help 
farmers, but ended up taking oxygen or something, hurting them [more] than helping them so 
[we’re] sending [a] percentage of sales back for rice stoves that burn husks without hurting the 
environment” –Owner and Founder, private, 11-50 
While the excerpts just offered describe firms that engage in responsible behaviors 
altruistically so as to serve members of the public, another group of firms with altruistic 
motives are engaged in such behaviors to ignore, rather than serve, the Government. 
Firms that Ignore the Government do engage in responsible behaviors, but do so without 
the intention of serving some stakeholder, such as the public or the Government. Instead, 
these firms are either too concerned with other stakeholders to serve the government 
stakeholder in an effortful manner, or simply are not threatened enough to view the 
Government as a stakeholder to serve. Regardless of the context, however, executives of 
firms that Ignore the Government provide examples and discussion points in interviews 
that suggest their motives for behaving responsibly are without concern for marketplace 
rewards. Consider this first set of interview excerpts as examples of responsible 
behaviors of firms that Ignore the Government because other forces in their external 
business environment require much more relative attention and motivation. 
“not (government public policy) one of the primary forces we consider on [a] daily basis, 
weather, competitors, people’s general recreational choices are all [a] bigger force, general 
economy, those things are forces we deal with regularly” –Marketing Director, private, 1-5k 
 “view public policy as doable if the market will allow us to price for the additional risk 
and/or expense.  Our feelings are that public policy is a cost of doing business in a highly 
regulated industry.” – 
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Executive VP, private, 1-5k 
And consider this set of interview excerpts as examples of altruistically responsible 
behaviors among for-profit firms without conviction to serve any person or group simply 
because a lack of pressure exists for doing so.  
“highly ethical, conserve in nature, [we’re] not stepping out on [a] limb, from [a] business 
perspective [we’re] very aggressive, but conservative” “we always set [the] bar high, if they say 
go 4 inches, we go 6.5 inches, we would rather be conservative than reckless, [we’re] probably 
proactive to that sense” “but in my mind it’s about … working with [the] Government, [we] don’t 
view [it] as adversaries” –Senior Director Transactions and eCommerce, Information and 
Technology Services, public, 5-10k 
“[we’ve] never [been] limited [by] those types of situations, …there hasn’t been any …as far 
as what we could or could not do , just have to make sure in guidelines, anticipate” “no, would be 
unethical and very short-sided and we are not just wired that way, would rather get it done right, 
go forward” “amount of regulation exists is enormous so what one co can do is almost irrelevant, 
very mature segment of [the] economy” “most of its fine, fair, reasonable” –President and CEO, 
private, 250-499 
“here are the facts, here are how things work, you can do things this way” “(Montana, 
Nebraska), no government force to do anything, so just continue on” –Founder and President, 
private, 0 
“restricting free speech, trade, can and cannot advertise, privacy laws, …have to be really 
respectful” “laws for privacy [are] pretty clear, …I totally agree with privacy laws, I think as a 
company we do , I think as an industry we do” “we won’t actively or publicly condemn 
restrictions, there’s an old adage that you need to pick the hill you’re willing to die on…” “we’ve 
been fortunate… very strict when I started but eased quite a bit” –Account Executive, private, 51-
200     
Finally, and similar to firms engaging in responsible behaviors strategically so as to 
Manage Sales, some of the executive descriptions offered in interviews of corporate 
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responsible behaviors suggested the motives for doing so are to Manage the Government. 
Similar to the firms engaging in such behaviors to Manage Sales, executives of firms 
doing so to Manage the Government never described their responsible behaviors without 
mentioning a reward or strategic incentive as well. Unlike those firms concerned with 
Managing Sales through responsible behaviors, however, executives of firms Managing 
the Government were concerned with behaving responsibly so as to avoid public policy 
attention or threat. These executives discussed volunteering for Government projects, 
partnering with the Government so as to assist in an effort to benefit society, offering 
services that allow marketplace fairness to disadvantaged vendors, etc. And the 
incentives for acting in these responsible ways included more effectively being able to 
predict the drafting or materialization of public policy, ‘keeping your friends close and 
your enemies closer’, avoiding negative government sanctions, etc. Consider the 
following interview excerpts as examples of firms acting responsibly in an effort to 
Manage the Government, rather than for purely altruistic reasons. 
“car seats, influenced by government regulators” “interactive with [the] Consumer’s Union 
and Highway HS, mostly in outreach” “figure out what policies they’re pushing, … so advocacy 
and associate with [the] National Highway Transportation Safety Administration” “they [are] very 
powerful in pushing consumers so we want to align with them” –CEO, private, 500-1k 
“I really believe it’s … 75% compliance driven, 25% society driven, and that balance is 
usually closer to a Pareto, everything in life boils down to 80 20, everything we do boils down to 
us reacting to the environment in which we operate, the industry, the market, the threats, 
opportunities, and 20 is okay if this is for the good of society” “any corporation, any company are 
going to be socially responsible, of course, because there’s a carrot and a stick, the stick is they’re 
gonna be hit by this stick cause there’s a federal repercussion or consequence” –HR Strategic 
Intelligence, public, 10k+ 
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“amount of reimbursements, …less machines needed, less scanning done, less equipment 
needed, affects us but also society because you could provide preventative care” “can take [the] 
high ride and say we care about health, can take [the] other road about, we care about standards, 
can take [a] stance on either side and be fair and correct” –President and CEO, public, 10k+ 
“making sure we are having engagement in [a] highly transparent way” “innovation, being 
innovative in [the] way we partner with government entities, with competitors, [it’s in our] 
corporate DNA” “our organization [was] established to address significant impacts of diseases in 
emerging economies” –CCO, 10k+ 
Uncovering the firm management type Manage the Government is in sync with literature 
discussing the theory of the firm discussed in Chapter 2. It described one scholarly 
perspective of firm duty as revolving around surviving the marketplace by not only 
serving stockholders, but also avoiding sanctions from the external business environment 
that might signal negative survival skills to stockholders. Narver’s (1971) thesis on 
corporate responsibilities and firm welfare describes firm survival in the long-run as 
dependent on the ability to avoid long-run sanctions, particularly from government 
sources. This ability signals to investors that the firm is able to maximize long-term 
wealth. Thus, while Narver’s thesis does describe firms’ motivations for managing sales 
as well as the Government, it is somewhat limited in describing CSR motivations in this 
respect. However, the findings of this study perhaps extend Narver’s thesis by suggesting 
two ways in which firms can signal to stockholders their ability to survive the external 
business environment and persist is through visible responsible behaviors. 
 These four types of firm behaviors with regard to responsibility enrich literature 
conceptualizing CSR (e.g., Ackoff 1974; Berens, van Riel and Van Bruggen 2005; Hult 
2011). To the researcher’s knowledge, this literature stream has yet to study responsible 
behaviors among for-profit firms through the lens of environmental management of the 
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external business environment, and especially not through the lens of managing threats 
posed by the government force of this external environment. Furthermore, while this 
literature stream has considered strategic motivations behind CSR behaviors that are 
visible to the public and its members (e.g., Hill and Watkins 2007; Maignan and Ralston 
2002; Rapp and Mikeska 2014), it has yet to consider these motivations in avoiding 
government sanctions. Instead, the only examination of a relationship between 
management of business environment forces and CSR is that of Bocquet et al. (2013) 
who study firm innovation as a result of European Union regulation regarding firm waste 
and pollution. They find firms to innovate as a result of such pressures which result in 
societal benefit, but do not study CSR strategy or motivations. The present study, 
however, finds that some firms engage in visible behaviors that portray the firm as 
responsible so as to positively impact consumer attitudes towards the firm and its 
products, but also as a form of impression management to avoid negative attitudes 
towards the firm held by members of the Government who draft and enforce public 
policy.  
Study 1 Discussion 
 This study is important to environmental management literature because it allows 
individuals to share the noetic (structured, textural description) story and, thus, allows the 
researcher to glean the individual’s noesis (underlying meaning). This study found that 
exploration of firm environmental management orientation should allow for both firm-
level and executive-level descriptions. It found a second layer of firm orientation beyond 
the categorical description of strategic choice and determinism: that of belief or trend. 
And through this exploration process, this study found that ignoring whether the firm 
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describes such management to be actual or perceptual also ignores whether the 
orientation belongs to the firm or senior executive team. The implication of this finding 
may be important to researchers wishing to study empirically environmental management 
orientations in that the potential outcomes of such orientations will likely depend on 
whether the measurement revolves around actual or convicted strategic choice. 
 The confirmation goals of this study were to resolve whether strategic choice and 
determinism orientations exist (or not) as well as to confirm that strategic choice includes 
both marketing and political activities. Not only did this study meet these goals, but also 
it found that firms are relatively more likely to engage in political activities, i.e. push 
back, in managing government public policy threats. It further found a third type of 
environmental management that fit into neither strategic choice or determinism 
orientations, designated in this analysis as policy-neutral strategies designed to all 
together avoid this threat in a very proactive and explicit manner. While it was suggested 
that this third orientation is proactive in nature and among only strategic choice oriented 
firms, it is yet to be clarified if this strategy is explaining an orientation beyond the two 
focal orientations highlighted throughout this study. Future research should work to parse 
out these differences and allow for policy-neutral strategies to be measured in research 
working to understand the antecedents and outcomes of managing the government force.  
 It is because individuals perceive phenomena through both consciousness and the 
object in reality that descriptions of the Government, the external business environment, 
the firm’s ability, or lack thereof, to manipulate government agents or agencies, etc. vary 
so widely among participants. While some executives described contingencies in public 
policy influence as size, others described size as the platform for influence. While some 
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executives described orientations toward managing government public policy threats as 
culturally-based, others did so through personal conviction (i.e. conviction-based). While 
some executives described responsible behaviors as a tool important for managing the 
marketplace, others did so by emphasizing the importance of managing the Government, 
and so on. The similarities and differences were only partially explained by strategic 
choice and determinism orientations. In some instances, the orientation was the impetus 
behind the behavior being described, while in other cases, such as policy-neutral 
strategies or cases in which uncertainty prevented active management, the orientation 
could not be used to describe the patterns found in this study. This is likely due to past 
experience, such as prior fines, government as consumer exchanges, existing political 
ties, etc. And it is this directedness that transcendental phenomenology allows to both 
come about in data and explain data results. The directedness understood as inherent in 
qualitative designs may be used by participants as a coping mechanism for survival, 
success, reinvention, persistence, etc. As suggested earlier, studying firms is messy, 
plagued with confusion, and full of contradiction. This research was able to capture some 
of this messiness and induce patterns of non-traditional CSR, non-traditional government 
management strategies, contingencies to engaging in political behaviors revolving around 
the sensitive nature of products, and degrees of strategic choice and determinism 
orientations. It is this messiness, the varying degree to which firms perceive and manage 
the same force, which is the phenomenon of environmental management of government 
public policy threats.  
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Study 2: Quantitative Findings 
Descriptive Characteristics.  The final dataset analyzed using HLM in this second 
study represents a heterogeneous set of firms (n = 17 firms, 76 respondents). Six are 
publicly-traded and eight manage a product portfolio revolving around offerings that are 
consumed or applied physically by consumers (e.g., running shoes, blood glucose 
meters). Firms categorized as managing product portfolios not revolving around 
consumed or physically applied products offer products for home construction or 
improvement, bathroom fixtures, computers, etc. In total, four firms’ offerings mostly 
revolve around residential maintenance and improvement (e.g., home appliances, yard 
maintenance), three around computers and software, and the remaining around consumer 
personal hygiene and/or packaged foods. 
Five of the sampled firms employ 999 or fewer individuals, 2 employ 5-9,999 
individuals, 1 employs 10,000 or more individuals, and all other sampled firms employ 1-
4,999 individuals. Among those publicly-traded, the average annual sales (reported on 
2012 annual reports gathered through COMPUTSTAT) are $60,922 and $67,224 is the 
median sales figure (as of 2012). Firms are 66.7 years old on average, and 4 of the 17 
firms are 100 years or older. 
 Most (12) of the 17 firms sampled are represented by two senior-level executives, 
and one is represented by 23 executives. On average, firms are represented by 5.2 
executives. Fifteen respondents reported only 1 government public policy instance in full 
(i.e. including the strategic response), while 53 respondents reported two instances. 
Twenty one reported on 3 instances, 18 on 4, 13 on 5, and 1 respondent reported 6 
instances (excluding those removed which pre-dated 2004).  
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The most common type of government public policy influence reported on was 
government regulation, representing approximately 38 percent of all instances. Examples 
of such include “California law to prohibit "natural" eggs vs caged free,” “New ISO 
regulation for product accuracy,” and “Energy Efficiency Standards - Changing 
minimum eficiencies for heating and ac products.”  
“Access of National parks to mountain bikes” is an example of land management/ 
ownership policies reported, “Business expansion incentives” an example of government 
incentive policies, and “last yr fda published list of diseases they would focus on” an 
example of a policy of government disclosure of information impacting the way a firm 
does business. Fifty four of the instances of government public policy influence involved 
firm decisions to only comply and 19 indicated they did nothing, i.e. “did not formally 
respond;” the epitome of determinism for at least that moment in time. Of the 100 
instances that comprise the strategic tendency measure (i.e. included enough information 
for analysis), 45 involve strategic responses revolving mostly around marketing activities 
(i.e. competition-altering strategy), 35 around political activities (i.e. policy-altering 
strategy), and 20 involving deliberate non-response.  
Examples of competition-altering strategies include “Increased sales and 
educational efforts in select regions where legislation has passed,” “we built toilets, 
faucets and showers that provided excellent performance with reduced water 
consumption,” and “Product design and promotion of dust collection systems-from tools 
to accessories.  Developing training courses and videos on safety.”  
Examples of policy-altering strategies include “Our response was to better 
educate the local municipal governments on the advantages of this type of Siding 
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material, reflecting the new formulations that have earned NHAB green status.”, “the 
company has used the combination of political influence, legal fight and compliance to 
adhere to these issue.  The company initially appealed the ruling and then it has reached a 
settlement with EU.”, “direct legal engagement with US government to influence H1-B 
visa quotas and policies,” and “We updated our transparency reporting to provide new 
information relating to governmental demands for customer data.  Beginning last 
summer, Microsoft, Google, and other companies filed lawsuits against the U.S. 
government arguing that we have a legal and constitutional right to disclose more 
detailed information about these demands.  …, the Government recently agreed for the 
first time to permit technology companies to publish data about FISA orders.”  
After responding to questions revolving around the government public policy 
influence, respondents were asked to identify the influence as a threat or benefit and the 
degree of such. Setting aside policy and orientation type, respondents rated the degree of 
sentiment involved in government public policy influences as 4.66, which indicates most 
policy influences experienced were experienced as a slight threat where 1 on this scale 
reflects extreme threat and 9 extreme benefit. Among only those holding a strategic 
choice orientation towards managing the socio-political force (i.e. the upper end of a 
strategic choice construct score median split), respondents rated the degree of sentiment 
involved in government public policy influences as 5.06 on average. This is expected, 
considering strategic choice oriented firms view government public policy as a force that 
is malleable and something that can be overcome with savvy strategy. Thus, executives 
of strategic choice firms view government public policy influence as neither a threat nor a 
benefit. 
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It should be emphasized here that this dissertation revolves around firms’ formal 
strategies for managing socio-political threats. However, the actual data collection lacked 
this emphasis and, instead, measured mere influence. Yet, threat was the overall theme 
voiced in the online survey and in the qualitative interviews. Among all qualified 
respondents, i.e. the larger dataset of n = 183, only 7.8 percent reported experiencing a 
public policy incentive rather than the other three types (i.e. regulation, land 
ownership/management, information disclosure), which can be considered relatively 
threatening to business. Thus, while the idea of government public policy threats was 
captured in this study, the remaining content will appropriately report on the findings in 
regards to government public policy influence since this is what was measured. At any 
rate, the goal of this dissertation is to uncover how marketing skills and tools are involved 
in managing the socio-political force, which is likely to take place in contexts of both 
threat and benefit sourced from the Government. 
 In regards to the endogenous variables of this study, the average Consumer 
Reports’ 5-point product quality rating among all products rated, of all 17 firms sampled, 
over the past 10 years is 3.28 with 2.82 representing the median Consumer Reports’ 
rating. This suggests all products considered in this study are of “GOOD” quality on 
average. The average price per products rated, among all 17 firms across the past 10 
years reported by Consumer Reports is $275.40 with $67.23 representing the median 
price. Products considered both across and within firms ranged greatly in price and 
included products such as refrigerators, computer monitors, bike helmets, a gallon of 
paint, a tube of toothpaste, and a single light bulb.  
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The average patent application tally among all firms over the past 10 years (after 
being divided by the respective firm’s product portfolio) is 8.24 patents per year and .09 
socially innovative patents per year. One and 11of the 17 firms have no patent 
applications and socially innovative patent applications filed over the past 10 years, 
respectively. And one firm files 85.70 patent applications with the US Patent and 
Trademark Office on average per year (after dividing the original per year tally by the 
firm’s product portfolio). Table 2 (p. 72) displays additional descriptive characteristics of 
the data, including correlation and reliability coefficients of the constructs of Study 2. 
 Confirmatory Factor Analysis.  A CFA was attempted utilizing the MPlus 
software package Version 7.1. The CFA was developed to utilize the Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988) two-step procedure. First, the CFA was conducted without phi constraints 
between factors. According to the chi-square test, the perfect fit null hypothesis should be 
rejected, suggesting that the model does not have exact fit with these data.  
The measurement model has a chi-square of 2236.312 (df = 776) and meets Hu 
and Bentler’s (1999) fit criteria. Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2010) also 
recommend a CFI greater than or equal to .95 or an RMSEA less than or equal to .08. 
The scores on the measurement model of CFI = .46 and RMSEA = .11 indicate that the 
factors are not loading on the correct constructs. Hu and Bentler (1999) further 
recommend an SRMR of less than or equal to .08. The score on the measurement model 
of SRMR = .13 indicates the chance of errors in the structure of the model is high.  
These results provide evidence of poor convergent validity (i.e. items did not 
converge appropriately). Although all 41 items of the three constructs significantly 
loaded on their respective factors (i.e. constructs), only one factor (strategic choice 
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orientation) met the criteria of both significance and a standardized weight above .50 
(Hair et al. 2010). One item loaded onto the strategic choice factor at .21, one item loaded 
onto the determinism factor at .16, and seven items loaded onto the determinism factor 
below a loading of .40.  
The results of this CFA indicate that these data do not fit the factor model well 
and a second CFA was run with adjusted constructs, explicated in the following section. 
In this adjusted factor model, one item was dropped from the strategic choice orientation 
scale and four from the determinism orientation scale. After some reflection, two of the 
four items dropped from the determinism orientation scale caused some respondents 
confusion in the pilot study due to the complex wording and the other two items dropped 
from this scale are at a level of abstractness that may have caused difficulty in respondent 
interpretation and, thus, difficulty in responding. At any rate, it is not believed that by 
dropping these five items in total that a significant portion of the domains of the two 
constructs were lost. 
As seen in Table 8 of Appendix D, the second measurement model has a chi-
square of 1637.21 (df = 591) and meets Hu and Bentler’s (1999) fit criteria. Hair et al. 
(2010) also recommend a CFI greater than or equal to .95 or an RMSEA less than or 
equal to .08. The scores on the measurement model of CFI = .54 and RMSEA = .11 
indicate that the factors are loading on the respective constructs in a manner less than 
ideal. Hu and Bentler (1999) further recommend an SRMR of less than or equal to .08. 
The score on the measurement model of SRMR = .07 indicates an unlikely chance of 
errors in the structure of the model. The results also provide evidence of convergent 
validity. All factor loadings on the construct items were significant and substantial. In 
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fact, only the seventh, eighth, and ninth items on the determinism orientation scale, while 
still significant, have standardized weights (.36, .38, and .37, respectively) below a 
standardized weight of the recommended .50 (Hair et al. 2010).  
In the second step of the two-step procedure recommended by Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988), an assumption was made that there is no discriminant validity and was 
done so by setting the phi values to 1. After conducting this second CFA with this 
constraint, the fit indices comparison (x
2
 2036.646 (627) – x2 1637.208 (630) = 399.438) 
indicates that the unconstrained CFA model fits these data better than the constrained 
CFA model, suggesting discriminant validity exists among the factors (i.e. constructs).  
Fornell and Larker (1981) posit that the AVE extracted should be examined and 
compared to the correlations among the factors. Discriminant validity is demonstrated if 
the AVE for both factors is less than the correlation squared of the two factors. The phi 
squared for the strategic choice and society-serving orientation constructs is .04, which is 
lower than both the AVE coefficients (.62 and .11, respectively) for the two constructs. 
The phi squared for the determinism and society-serving orientation constructs is .03, 
which is lower than both the AVE coefficients (.60 and .11, respectively) for the two 
constructs. And the phi squared for the determinism and strategic choice orientation 
constructs is .02, which is lower than both the AVE coefficients (.62 and .60, 
respectively) for the two constructs. It should also be noted that the adjustments made in 
the strategic choice and determinism orientation scales as a result of the coefficients 
indicating poor fit of these data to the factor model actually improved the reliability of 
these two scales. The original strategic choice and determinism orientation scales which 
included all originally-planned items had reliability coefficients of .61 and .82, 
135 
 
 
 
respectively, and now have reliability coefficients of .66 and .85 respectively. Thus, not 
only are these adjusted reliability coefficients close to or well above Nunnally’s (1978) 
suggested criterion for reliability of .70, but also are improved after dropping items that 
lead to poor fit of these data to the measurement model described in the preceding 
section. Additionally, none of the three correlation tests between these three factors 
resulted in significant relationships. Throughout the remaining of this dissertation, only 
the adjusted constructs are considered, analyzed, and discussed unless noted otherwise. 
Common Method Variance.  The results of the marker variable tests indicate that 
all ten paths between the marker variable, shopping ambivalence, and the endogenous 
constructs in the study are non-significant, with the exception of the determinism 
orientation: society-serving orientation (β = -.43, p = .20), strategic choice orientation (β 
= .65, p = .20), determinism orientation (β = .98, p = .02), strategic tendency (β = -.61, p 
= .15), Δproduct quality (β = -.04, p = .68), Δproduct price (β = .72, p = .36), 
Δinnovativeness (β = 1.93, p = .64), Δsocial innovativeness (β = -61.20, p = .62), 
Δadvertising expenditures (β = .14, p = .44), and firm performance (β = -.69, p = .35). 
These findings indicate that common method variance is likely not an issue.  
Unfortunately, the job satisfaction marker variable could not be used as a second 
test of common method variance because the surveys this variable was tested in were all 
excluded in this final dataset that includes policies within the past 10 years and firms 
represented by at least two executives. However, when utilizing the job satisfaction 
marker variable among the larger dataset not entirely utilized in the analysis that follows, 
similar results are found. For example, the results of the marker variable tests indicate 
that paths between the marker variable job satisfaction and the focal endogenous 
136 
 
 
 
constructs in the study are non-significant: society-serving orientation (β = .29, p = .35), 
strategic choice orientation (β = -.74, p = .14), and determinism orientation (β = .44, p = 
.63). These findings offer further evidence that common method variance bias was not an 
issue throughout the entire data collection process. 
Social Desirability.  Simple correlation tests were conducted between the social 
desirability scale and the six self-reported focal measures of Study 1. No significant 
correlations were found, suggesting social desirability bias does not exist in this study: 
society-serving orientation (r = -.12, p = .35), strategic choice orientation (r = -.20, p = 
.13), determinism orientation (r = .20, p = .13), strategic tendency (r = .10, p = .52), 
Δadvertising expenditures (r = -.29, p = .06), firm performance (r = .08, p = .54), and the 
screener used to qualify respondents (i.e. knowledge of the employing firm’s strategies; r 
= -.14, p = .33). 
 Hypotheses Testing.  In testing Hypotheses 1-7b, the Mixed Models application in 
SPSS with the linear design was utilized (i.e. HLM) with REML as the estimator. The 
orientation interaction terms served as interaction-main effects and the firm nest (i.e. firm 
identifier variable) as the random, unstructured effect. Using unstructured analysis allows 
for variable dependency to be based on the variables of interest (rather than based on 
variance components, for example). The control variables firm sales, firm type, product 
type, and employees were first entered, in this order, into the HLM test as fixed-effect, 
independent variables in all hypothesis testing. All independent variables throughout the 
testing of H1-7b utilized a grand mean-centered version of the variable. Finally, in testing 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, these data were nested within firms. And in testing Hypotheses 3-7b, 
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these data were nested with the government public policy instance (i.e. 1-6 policy 
instances) and then within the firm. 
H1 hypothesizes that a society-serving, strategic choice orientation is positively 
associated with a competition-altering strategic response to government public policy. So 
as to test this hypothesis an interaction term that represented society-serving*strategic 
choice served as the independent variable predicting the strategic tendency variable in an 
HLM test in which respondents were nested within firms. H1 is supported in that the 
interaction term society-serving*strategic choice did positively, significantly predict 
strategic tendency (β = .02, p = .06). This suggests that as the firm orientation moves 
from Self-Serving (i.e. low scores on the society-serving scale) to Society-Serving (i.e. 
high scores on the society-serving scale), the firm’s strategic response to government 
public policy moves from policy-altering to competition-altering (i.e. from negative to 
positive scores on the tendency variable) among firms strongly (i.e. high scores on the 
strategic choice scale) oriented towards managing the malleable agencies involved in 
government public policy. H2 hypothesizes that a society-serving, deterministic 
orientation is positively associated with a non-strategic response to government public 
policy. A significant relationship between the interaction term society-
serving*determinism and strategic tendency with a β close to 0 would support this 
hypothesis and indicate that firms oriented towards serving society as well as 
determinism deliberately choose not to strategically respond to government public policy. 
However, this interaction term does not significantly predict strategic tendency (β = .01, p 
= .25).  
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So as to test the remaining hypotheses, dataset cases in which strategic tendency 
contained positive numbers were selected to test instances involving marketing activities, 
and vice versa. H3a hypothesizes that policy-altering firm strategy (i.e. negative values of 
the strategic tendency variable) is positively associated with firm product price changes. 
So as to test this, and the remaining hypotheses, HLM nested policy instances within 
managers (i.e. respondents) and then managers within firms and continued to control for 
the influential variables described in the preceding section. H3a is not supported in that 
strategic tendency did not significantly predict product pricing changes (β = -.03, p = 
.95), suggesting that the degree to which a firm’s tendency in managing government 
public policy involves policy-altering (i.e. political activities) behaviors does not predict 
how the firm utilizes product pricing strategies in the midst of pushing back against 
public policy that alters the firm’s business operations.  
H3b hypothesizes that policy-altering firm strategy is also positively associated 
with non-personal promotions change and is supported (β = .08, p = .05). This suggests 
that the greater degree to which a firm engages in policy-altering strategies to manage 
government public policy, the more likely the firm is to alter their promotions activity. 
Furthermore, this relationship suggests firms involved in political behaviors are more 
likely to increase rather than decrease their promotional activity. H4a hypothesizes that 
competition-altering firm strategies are positively associated with a change in firm 
innovativeness and is not supported (β = .23, p = .50). This suggests that the degree to 
which a firm is engaged in altering the competition so as to offset a government public 
policy influence is not useful in predicting a firm’s decision to be innovative as part of its 
competition-altering strategy. H4b hypothesizes that competition-altering firm behavior 
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is also positively associated with a change in firm product development and is supported 
(β = .02, p = .00). This relationship suggests that as the degree to which a firm is engaged 
in competition-altering behavior increases, so too does the firm’s product development 
activities. 
H5a hypothesizes that a competition-altering strategy is positively associated with 
firm performance and is supported (β = .23, p = .00). This relationship suggests that the 
greater degree to which a firm is engaged in competition-altering strategies, the greater 
marketplace success it is enjoying. H5b hypothesizes that competition-altering strategies 
mediate a positive relationship between a strategic choice, society-serving orientation and 
firm performance, but because competition-altering strategies does not significantly 
predict firm performance, this hypothesis is not supported. And the society-serving, 
strategic choice orientation does not significantly predict firm performance (β = .70, p = 
.48), nor do society-serving and strategic choice orientations in isolation predict firm 
performance (β = -.02, p = .86 and β = -.09, p = .80, respectively). 
H6a hypothesizes that policy-altering strategies are positively associated with 
firm performance, but is not supported (β = .06, p = .12). This suggests that the degree to 
which the firm turns to political behaviors in pushing back against government public 
policy is not useful in predicting the firm’s marketplace performance level. H6b 
hypothesizes that policy-altering strategies mediate a positive relationship between 
society-serving, strategic choice orientations and firm performance. A Sobel test (e.g., 
MacKinnon et al. 2002) indicates that policy-altering strategies do not act as a mediator 
in this way (z = 1.20, p = .23). As an additional test, the percent change in sales growth 
between the years 2009 and 2013 was calculated for publicly-traded firms using 
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COMPUSTAT annual report data and entered into an HLM as a dependent variable. 
Among the cases in which only strategic tendency cases involving political activities are 
selected in the dataset, the degree to which a firm is engaged in policy-altering strategy 
significantly predicts firm sales growth (β = .35, p = .02). And society-serving (β = 3.73, 
p = .68) and strategic choice (β = 1.87, p = .75) orientations also do not predict sales 
growth. H7a hypothesizes that competition-altering strategies are positively associated 
with an increase in firm social innovativeness and is not supported (β = -124.94, p = .55). 
Finally, H7b hypothesizes that competition-altering behavior mediates a relationship 
between a society-serving, strategic choice orientation and an increase in firm social 
innovativeness. According to a nonsignificant Sobel test (z = .70, p = .48), it is found that 
competition-altering behavior does not mediate the relationship between society-serving, 
strategic choice firm orientations and social innovativeness. A summary of all hypothesis 
tests can be seen in Table 4. 
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Study 2 Discussion 
The overall goal of Study 2 was to examine the relationship between firm 
orientation and strategic management of the government force. The findings of this study 
suggest 1) strategic choice oriented firms’ strategies are shaped by their concern for 
serving stakeholders, 2) firms oriented towards both strategic choice and determinism are 
proactive in their management of government public policy, 3) firms engaged in policy-
altering strategies adjust their promotions strategies rather than invest in product 
development or innovation and firms engaged in competition-altering strategies adjust 
their product quality rather than merely adjust prices or promotions, and 4) competition-
altering strategies earn firms relatively greater market share. 
 Included in the first major finding, firms that hold strategic choice orientations 
towards managing government public policy and also serve society’s stakeholders 
manage the socio-political force by attempting to improve their marketplace position 
rather than engage in political behaviors. This finding is important in that it both confirms 
environmental management theories which posit that firms with strategic choice 
orientations formally and explicitly manage forces in the external business environment 
and also suggests empirical studies of environmental management must incorporate 
measures of serving society.  
An additional HLM test was conducted with strategic choice orientation alone 
(but in addition to the control variables) as a main-effect, independent variable in 
predicting strategic tendency. In this test, strategic choice does not significantly predict 
tendency (β = -.40, p = .70), suggesting that strategic choice is truly constrained by firm 
beliefs in serving society and doing ‘good.’ In a similar test, society-serving orientation 
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was entered alone (but in addition to the control variables) as a main-effect and is found 
to positively, significantly predict strategic tendency (β = .61, p = .01). Because the 
coefficient in this test is positive, this test suggests that firms strongly oriented towards 
serving society are relatively more likely to engage in marketing over political activities 
in managing the socio-political force (and government public policy that influences the 
way a firm does business).  
To reiterate, these findings confirm the proposed relationship between strategic 
choice and proactive management of original environmental management theories, but 
also extends such theories by noting that 1) this proactive management depends on and is 
shaped by attempts at serving external stakeholders and 2) involves marketing tools. 
Strategic choice alone is not meaningful enough in this study to predict firm management 
strategies of the socio-political force. It is only when this orientation is combined with the 
firm’s orientation towards serving society that strategic choice meaningfully predicts the 
behaviors involved in managing government public policy. This makes sense in that 
concern for serving the Government, one of many stakeholders measured in this study, 
for example, might cause a firm to exclude some tools in a firm’s tool belt for managing 
government public policy. A firm that attempts to serve the Government might, for 
example, not use political ties to alter a Bill or look for loopholes in current legislation 
drafted and enforced by the Government in trying to mitigate a public policy threat. 
Beyond serving stakeholders, a strategic choice oriented firm which is also 
oriented towards serving society might simply not want to be viewed by the public as 
engaging in political behaviors which often carry negative connotations. For example, 
these firms might not want to be known for capitalizing on legislation loopholes or 
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funding a political candidate’s travels so as to help a candidate that might draft and fight 
for legislation advantageous (e.g., conservative, likely to reduce business taxes, holds 
ideas for flexible definitions of acceptable product labeling) to the given firm get elected. 
Thus, marketing activities allow a firm which is proactive in managing government 
pressures (i.e. strategic choice oriented) mitigate the threat while still serving, or at least 
appearing to serve, society and stakeholders. This is an important finding in that it 
illustrates how environmental management is indeed a marketing concept. 
However, firms which are deterministic and serve stakeholders do not appear to 
engage in a pattern of environmental management. An HLM test did not reveal this firm 
type to engage in deliberate choice to not respond to a government public policy pressure 
by way of reacting through compliance, exit, restructuring, etc. Again, because this type 
of non-response typical of deterministic firms, according to environmental management 
theories, was measured in the online survey, a significant parameter is needed to confirm 
this theoretical pattern of firm behavior. However, it should be at least noted that 
deterministic firms (also oriented towards serving society) were not found to engage in 
either competition- or policy-altering behaviors in managing government public policy, 
i.e. the relationship was nonsignificant. Furthermore, a test in which only a determinism 
orientation was entered in as a main-effect in predicting strategic tendency was conducted 
and a positive, significant relationship was found (β = .57, p = .02). Counter to what was 
hypothesized, this relationship suggests that the greater the degree to which a firm is 
oriented towards determinism, the more likely the firm is to engage in competition-
altering strategy.  
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Thus, while the four firm types represented in Figure 1 (i.e. Self-Serving, 
Strategic Choice; Society-Serving, Strategic Choice; Self-Serving, Deterministic; 
Society-Serving, Deterministic) were not all found to predict a firm’s strategic 
management of government public policy, the firm orientations of society-serving, 
strategic choice (i.e. society-serving*strategic choice), strategic choice in isolation, and 
determinism in isolation are found to predict such management practices. The stronger 
(i.e. higher society-service scale scores) the firm is oriented towards serving society, the 
more likely the firm’s strategic management of government public policy tendency is to 
include marketing activities relative to political activities or no activity, i.e. a deliberate 
non-response, deterministic-type reaction.  
The second major finding of Study 2 involves the proactive nature of the 
deterministic firms sampled. Surprisingly, the stronger (i.e. higher determinism scale 
scores) the firm is oriented towards determinism, the more likely the firm’s strategic 
management of government public policy tendency is to include marketing relative to 
political activities. This is surprising in that deterministic firms are believed to merely 
react to government public policy that alters business operations. Further reflection that 
takes into account the way government public policy was measured as well as the types 
of firms sampled, however, mitigates the surprise. The online survey asked respondents 
to report instances of government public policy that altered the way the firm does 
business instead of instances of public policy that threatened the firm’s operations. The 
respondent even had the opportunity to categorize the instance as a government incentive 
when responding to the multiple-choice question regarding policy type. Thus, while 
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deterministic firms are unlikely to strategically manage government public policy threats, 
it is reasonable to assume they are likely to take advantage of a government incentive.  
Furthermore, six of the firms sampled are believed to perform market transactions 
with government agencies, i.e. the Government as a purchaser/customer. This is believed 
to be true based on the qualitative findings of Study 1. Interviews with participants who 
are not respondents in the dataset involved in Study 2, but who are employed by firms 
sampled in Study 2 indicated these firms transact with the Government for profit. In fact, 
three of the firms sampled in Study 2 being analyzed in this section employ a participant 
(3 participants total) in Study 1 and the interviews of these three senior-level executives 
explicitly indicated these firms sell products to the Government for profit. And the other 
three firms sampled are of a similar industry to the employing firms of those three 
participants interviewed in Study 1 in a manner that suggests respondents of these other 
three firms in Study 2 may also sell to the Government. In essence, the positive 
relationship between a deterministic orientation and marketing activities in strategically 
responding to a government public policy likely is partially an artifact of the client list of 
these deterministic firms and partially the responses to a policy involving a government 
incentive. 
The third and fourth major findings of this study involve firm decisions to utilize 
product- or process-focused activities in their proactive strategy for managing 
government public policy pressures. Again, firms engaged in policy-altering strategies 
adjust their promotions strategies rather than invest in product development or innovation 
and firms engaged in competition-altering strategies adjust their product quality rather 
than merely adjust prices or promotions. Returning back to Chapter 3, Mahon and 
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Murray (1981) theorize that firms which choose to become political experts so as to push 
back against threatening policy or take advantage of a policy opportunity invest in 
learning the political process and, as a result, have few material or immaterial resources 
left over for effectively marketing their products, and vice versa. This was partially found 
to be true in this study.  
This dissertation defines product-focused activities as firm activities that rely 
relatively more on marketing research, a substantial resource relative to decisions in 
altering a product’s price, for example. And according to this definition, it is found that 
firms which manage government public policy through competition-altering strategies do 
indeed have and use substantial resources in pushing forward in the marketplace in spite 
of a government public policy pressure. Competition-altering strategies involved firms 
improving their products’ quality (i.e. developed products) and this is a substantial 
investment of time, energy, skill, money, etc. relative to the change in promotions 
budgets typical of firms engaging in policy-altering strategies found in this study. 
However, the other product-focused activity of innovativeness was not predicted by firm 
decisions to push forward in spite of the pressure through competition-altering strategies. 
Likewise, the other process-focused activity of product price adjustments was not 
predicted by firm decisions to push back against the legislation in a manner which might 
soak up the resources necessary in developing quality and innovation strategies.  
Overall, the pattern of firms “delearning” marketing activities that involve 
relatively greater resources when managing government public policy pressures through 
political behaviors (i.e. altering the policy) was found in this study. It should be noted 
that, although not hypothesized, policy-altering strategies do not involve product-focused 
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activities (i.e. policy-altering as an antecedent to product development: β = .00, p = .34; 
and to innovativeness β = -.01, p = .11). Furthermore, competition-altering strategies do 
not involve process-focused activities (i.e. competition-altering as an antecedent to 
pricing strategies: β = 1.43, p = .11; and to promotions strategies β = .04, p = .32).  
This is an important finding in that it both shows how marketing is used in 
environmental management and also shows how environmental management of the 
socio-political force directly impacts consumers. This study finds that when firms choose 
to push back against the government public policy pressure, consumers are less likely to 
be rewarded with higher quality products available for sale. Additionally, this study finds 
that when firms choose to push back against the pressure, consumers are more likely to 
see, hear, be exposed to, etc. product advertisements; an outcome relatively less 
rewarding than quality improvements among firms which manage their external 
environment through competition-altering strategies.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Discussion 
 The two research questions posed in the beginning of this dissertation ask Why do 
some firms manage threatening public policy while others do not? Additionally, of those 
that do manage these pressures, why do some push back by influencing the policy and 
others push forward by influencing competition? At a glance, firms manage threatening 
government public policy because the agents and agencies involved are viewed as 
malleable in regards to firms developing environmental management strategies. 
Furthermore, some firms do not manage public policy because they legitimately, or 
apparently, serve society. And although it was found that firms are more likely to engage 
in political behaviors relative to marketing activities in managing the socio-political 
force, firms utilize marketing tactics in competition-altering strategies (over political 
behaviors in policy-altering strategies) so as to either avoid unethical behavior or stay 
true to their society-serving orientation. The following discussion attempts to answer 
these two questions further and revolves around five major take-aways from Studies 1 
and 2: 1) strategic choice is sometimes only a belief, 2) deterministic firms are in fact 
proactive in their environmental management strategies, 3) management of government 
public policy pressures lends itself to a pattern of consumer benefits, 4) environmental 
management involves the dimensions of ability AND duty, and 5) environmental 
management can be firm- or team-based. 
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 In Study 1, approximately a quarter of all firms diagnosed by the researcher as 
strategic choice oriented, hold this orientation almost entirely on belief. In other words, 
these participant firms experience government public policy with strong conviction in 
possessing the ability to influence the agents or agencies involved, but absent an actual 
influence. In some of these instances, this lack of activity is simply an artifact of not 
having the opportunity to influence government agents. However, in other instances these 
belief-based strategic choice executives expressed viewpoints in which government 
agents and agencies were positioned as malleable and manageable, but also expressed 
beliefs that doing so would be unethical or risky with regard to their firm’s public image. 
Thus, future environmental management research should consider strategic choice as 
purely an orientation and be sure to measure this orientation in a way that captures actual 
management activity. If future research does not take this step, it could artificially 
measure strategic choice management (over orientation alone). 
Surprisingly, and counter to original environmental management theories which 
posit deterministic firms as reactionary and most likely to restructure operations in the 
face of a threatening government public policy, deterministic firms are similarly 
proactive to those oriented with strategic choice. In Study 1, executives of deterministic 
firms were found to utilize explicit strategy in avoiding markets with heavy government 
oversight and/or developing products likely to call government attention. Aside from very 
proactive evasion strategies, executives of deterministic firms also engage in heavy 
monitoring of administration trends (e.g., President Obama’s administration), Bills likely 
to materialize into legislation, changes in government public policy discussed on Capitol 
Hill, etc. And in other cases, executives of deterministic firms described government 
151 
 
 
 
agents and agencies very similar to the accounts of strategic choice oriented firms but 
describe management as unethical or ‘below them.’ These executives are so effective, 
concerned with, and proactive at managing their customers, products, markets, etc. that 
there is little need to manage the government force OR there are few resources and time 
left over.  
In other words, Study 1 found that deterministic firms are very proactive in 
managing the forces in their external business environment, but not concerned with 
managing government public policy. And in Study 2, a deterministic firm orientation did 
not predict a reactionary management style (i.e. formal decision to not manage the policy 
pressure) and, instead, was found to lead firms to engage in marketing activities when 
faced with a government public policy that alters the way the firm does business. Thus, 
an empirical examination of these two management orientations is important to 
environmental management theories because to hold a deterministic orientation does not 
appear to mean that a firm’s business operations and organizational structure is 
determined by the force as original environmental management theories suggest. Instead, 
this dissertation finds a deterministic orientation to more often mean proactively avoiding 
instances in which management of government public policy is necessary because doing 
so would be unethical or inefficiently divert management resources away from managing 
the other forces in the external business environment.  
This also lends credence to measuring management of the socio-political force in 
addition to the other forces of the external business environment. Although prior 
literature largely ignores this force in terms of environmental management, this 
dissertation’s findings hint that firm’s management orientations towards the socio-
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political force is different from orientations towards managing the other forces. In other 
words, a deterministic orientation might hold different meanings depending on the force 
potentially determining the firm. Thus, it is important that this literature stream works to 
extend environmental management theories by including the measurement of managing 
all forces. 
Although not all were beneficial to customers, executives in Study 1 described 
their firms as developing new products, protecting product strategies by buying ahead of 
the public policy threat, stealing customers from firms who did not have the capacity to 
maintain market share when limited by the threat, etc. “Introduction and re-positioning of 
technologies to enable users / customers attain compliance.”, “Increased sales and 
educational efforts in select regions where legislation has passed,” “Product design and 
promotion of dust collection systems-from tools to accessories.  Developing training 
courses and videos on safety.”, and “Going green with our floor products” are examples 
of marketing tactics firms use to manage a government public policy pressure that has 
real potential to positively impact customers.  
These executives described marketing as a tool in either mitigating the pressures 
of government public policy or outwitting the agencies that source the pressures by 
buying ahead of the policy, creating safe and good products that do not call for 
government attention, creating product portfolios that are policy-neutral, etc. And in 
Study 2, firms engaged in competition-altering strategies to manage government public 
policy were likely to develop products and NOT likely to engage in marketing activities 
that do not directly benefit consumers, including pricing and promotions strategies. In 
other words, this dissertation finds that firms which choose to manage the socio-political 
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force though altering competition, create some instances of consumer benefit through 
marketing. As such, the marketing behaviors of the firm depend on how the firm chooses 
to deal with government pressures! This is an important confirmation and contribution of 
this dissertation in that this finding is due to the marketing activities of firms’ 
environmental management strategies. In other words, marketing is an inherent part of 
environmental management and one of two ways firms manage the socio-political force. 
This dissertation found that firms which decide to push forward in the marketplace so as 
to offset the business adjustment the government public policy posed benefit to 
consumers by developing products of higher quality.  
 Environmental management is a richer concept than ability to strategically 
manage forces in the external business environment and, instead, also depends on duty. 
Remember that in Study 1 a belief among executives was found that suggests it is 
unethical to attempt to influence government agents and agencies, even though these 
executives’ firms were, in fact, engaged in political behaviors. Thus, measuring 
environmental management as two-dimensional, i.e. as a function of both duty and 
ability, effectively captures strategic choice instances in which no proactive action is 
actually taken; i.e. the firm does not choose to manage the force. 
 And notions of CSR was a common and strong undertone to the data collection of 
Study 1 and involved mentioning worry about the public’s perception of the company, 
(natural) environmentally sound product development, a responsibility to engage in 
politics as good businessmen, the lack of ethics involved in attempts to influence the 
Government, doing good, partnering with agencies in efforts to protect consumers, 
consumer demand for CSR behaviors and products that symbolized such, etc. Study 1 
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finds that some firms engage in visible behaviors that portray the firm as responsible so 
as to positively impact consumer attitudes towards the firm and its products, but also as a 
form of impression management to avoid negative attitudes towards the firm held by 
members of the Government who draft and enforce public policy. Study 2 similarly finds 
that strategically managing government public policy depends on the degree to which the 
firm is orientated towards serving society. Strategic choice not only loses its ability in 
predicting firm environmental management strategies when it is considered in isolation, 
but also predicts marketing over political strategies when the firm is oriented towards 
serving society. This dissertation extends not only environmental management theories’ 
use of a one-dimensional view of environmental management (in terms of ability alone), 
but also extends Narver’s (1971) thesis by suggesting an additional method through 
which firms can signal to stockholders their ability to survive the external business 
environment and persist:  through visible, but artificial, responsible behaviors.  
 The final, and perhaps most important, finding of this dissertation is that 
environmental management orientations exist at the firm-level SOMETIMES. In Study 1 
it was overwhelmingly indicated that the tendency to allow government public policy to 
dictate ones business is the culture. And the tendency to push back against legislators 
constraining ones business is also the culture, but of senior-level executives. In other 
words, while some executives’ management of government public policy is personally 
motivated (or biased), none could explain action without also discussing cultural 
accounts. All of those with deterministic orientations accounted their reactions to culture 
and about half of those executives of firms with strategic choice orientations to the 
culture of “the leaders.” In Study 2, respondents were nested within firms using multi-
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level analysis instead of aggregating scores across respondents to develop firm-based 
measures. In other words, Study 2 allowed managers of a given firm to hold varying 
degrees of the firm’s orientation, as should future research regarding environmental 
management.  
 A distinction involving environmental management as sometimes residing within 
the firm and other times within the team of executive leaders is important in two ways. 
First, almost all executives of firms attributed orientations to culture, and in many cases, 
to personal convictions in Study 1. Thus, future research exploring these orientations may 
be more appropriately measuring strategic choice and determinism if it does so as habits. 
While habits suggest an almost accidental behavior (i.e. cultural), they also suggest 
repeated activities (i.e. strategic tendencies). Second, it was found in Study 1 that some of 
those executives of firms with a strategic choice orientation actually have tendencies to 
influence government public policy, while others believed in their ability to influence 
government agencies but typically choose not to do so. Further examination of these 
strategic choice orientation groups reveals that these two distinctions, i.e. culture of who 
and actual behavior, are related. Almost all of those who have actual tendencies to act out 
strategic choice orientations in influencing government public policy also attribute their 
orientation to the personal conviction and interest in public policy.  
Theoretical Implications 
Because the main objective of this dissertation was to apply environmental 
management theory to management of government public policy, meeting this objective 
filled several gaps in prior marketing literature. First, this research is the first to 
successfully develop and test reflective, managerial scales useful for measuring 
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constructs involved in environmental management, i.e. strategic choice and deterministic 
orientations. Additionally, the items of these constructs measure such management 
through a public policy lens, while the items are easily (and intended to be so) adaptable 
to measure management of other forces of the external business environment. Reflecting 
back to the summary of prior literature on environmental management offered in the 
beginning of Chapter 4, a measure utilizing primary data of environmental management – 
of any force in the external business environment – has yet to be offered. Instead, 
researchers testing environmental management orientations either judge a firm’s 
orientation through secondary data or collect primary data but question managers or 
customers about specific firm activities. For example, Lawless and Finch (1989) use 
secondary census and economics data to compare firm performance (e.g., return on 
investment, earnings per share) across firms that have minimum, differentiated, 
maximum, or incremental choice in managing the environment. But these four 
environmental management profiles are developed by the authors and based on their 
judgment of the degree to which the market a firm competes in involves determinism and 
strategic choice through examination of secondary data. And while other research utilizes 
survey data that questions managers directly about firm behavior, the approaches do not 
generalize to classifying firm orientation towards environmental management. Not only 
does this dissertation fill this measurement gap, it also does so by offering future 
researchers flexibility in adapting items for other forces the firm manages (e.g., 
“Government public policy constrains the way we do business”. altered to “Vendor 
relationships constrain the way we do business.”) 
 To reiterate Chapter 1, even though researchers continue to highlight the need for 
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greater understanding of firm-government relationships (Wilkie and Moore 1999) as well 
as firm response to public policy (Lusch 2007), prior research either only tests 
environmental management theory with distant regard to public policy (e.g., McDaniel 
and Kolari 1987) or examines strategies without testing environmental management 
theory (e.g., Goll and Rasheed 2011; LaBarbera 1983; Kaikati and Label 1980). And 
when prior literature does apply environmental management theories to firm political 
activity, it is done so conceptually (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman, Keim and Schuler 
2004; Zeithaml and Zeithaml 1984) rather than empirically. This dissertation fills this 
third gap by empirically studying environmental management of holistic public policy, 
rather than a given policy with unique antecedents and outcomes, through primary data 
collection using reflective, managerial scales. 
The final, and perhaps most important, environmental management literature gap 
this dissertation fills regards the reliance on marketing activities in managing the external 
business environment, and public policy specifically. Research in political science and 
public administration fields examines firm strategic response to public policy holistically, 
but without incorporation of important marketing variables, such as new product 
development or market share. And research in marketing fields does incorporate 
marketing variables when examining firm strategic response to public policy, but most 
often with regard to one policy at a time. This research found firms use marketing 
activities (i.e. competition-altering strategy) in managing government public policy 
pressures and the socio-political force; a holistic approach to understanding the 
relationship between many types of policy pressures and many types of marketing 
responses. In addition, it found those firms which rely on marketing over political 
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strategies (i.e. policy-altering strategy) are likely to utilize produce development (i.e. 
product quality improvements) in such marketing strategies. This unequivocally proves 
that the marketing discipline is an inherent part of firm environmental management. 
Implications for Public Policy Leaders 
In essence, this dissertation examines the societal impact of public policy that 
attempts to limit the business by taking into account firm environmental management of 
socio-political pressures. The introduction of this dissertation illustrated two examples of 
public policy designed to benefit society and consumers, but with ultimate unintended 
consequences likely due to the absence of predicting how firms would respond to such 
policies. While both the Green Guides and NFP policies were designed to benefit 
consumers directly and indirectly, firms responded to the Green Guides with aggressive 
marketplace competition and product improvement but to the NFP with aggressive 
political competition and stagnation in product quality. Thus, understanding firm 
response to public policy is important for predicting firm marketplace activities and this 
dissertation extended this understanding in two direct ways. 
First, confirming that a society-serving, strategic choice orientation leads firms to 
improve their product quality when faced with government public policy pressures allows 
researchers an additional tool in predicting firm strategy in managing the socio-political 
force as well as the firm’s impact on society. In this way, firm orientation also allows 
researchers to predict how public policy impacts society by taking into account firm 
strategy. 
 Second, this dissertation finds that firms which manage the socio-political force 
through political behaviors not only do not invest in product development, but also resort 
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to mere promotions strategies so as to persist in the marketplace. Most US public policy 
aims to directly or indirectly protect and benefit end consumers, some policies also work 
to protect consumers by altering or limiting the way for-profit firms conduct business. 
Thus, not only are firm attempts to change threatening public policy an unintended 
consequence of public policy, but also firms not engaging in product improvement and/or 
social innovation in response to public policy that often attempts to benefit end 
consumers by altering the basis of firm competition is an unintended consequence.  
Predicting firm strategic response to threatening public policy should be important 
to public policy leaders. When firms push forward in light of threatening public policy, 
environmental management literature implies competitive strategies could result in 
consumer benefits (e.g., Hambrick 1983; McDaniel and Kolari 1987; Snow and 
Hrebiniak 1980). And when firms push back at threatening public policy, environmental 
management literature implies strategies involving lobbying, political ties, campaign 
contributions, etc. ensue (e.g., McDaniel and Kolari 1987; Miles and Snow 1979). While 
these references to prior literature in environmental management hinge on “implies,” this 
dissertation explicated direct links between marketing strategies (i.e. competition-
altering) and improved product quality and between political strategies (i.e. policy-
altering) and mere promotions tactics and no changes in product quality or 
innovativeness. Aggressive political behaviors are an unintended consequence of most 
society-benefiting public policies. Thus, measuring firm environmental management 
orientation towards threatening public policy offers those who develop and draft US 
public policy another tool in predicting unintended consequences and consumer benefit.   
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Limitations 
 Two major and two minor limitations exist within this dissertation. The two major 
limitations involve desiring cause and effect conclusions and a sample with few 
innovative market sectors represented. First, this research was not of experimental design. 
This means it does not allow the researcher to conclude that the antecedents tested caused 
changes in the outcomes involved. The findings of this dissertation suggest firms who 
engage in political behaviors in managing government public policy are likely to increase 
their advertising budgets as part of this strategy, for example. However, this research 
cannot conclude the firm decision to engage in such policy-altering strategies causes 
firms to increase their advertising budgets. Second, because the sampling design of Study 
2 relied heavily on firms rated by Consumer Reports, rather than other marketplace 
characteristics (e.g., market concentration, market sector, type of product offered), a high 
proportion of firms in the technological or pharmaceutical industries were not sampled. 
These industries, among others, might have included relatively more firms engaged in 
innovativeness. And this would have greatly impacted the innovativeness and social 
innovativeness measurements of Study 2. It might have led to this dissertation capturing 
higher levels of innovativeness and social innovativeness. 
 The two minor limitations involve years in which no secondary data was available 
in Study 2 and a possible bias in the original development of environmental management 
orientation scales. First, Consumer Reports did not rate every focal product of Study 2 
(i.e. products the participating firms offer) every year. While it is explained in Chapter 4 
that the researchers of the Consumer Union (i.e. Consumer Reports) would have rated a 
focal product in a given year in a way that would have reflected the marketplace at that 
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time, this marketplace adjustment-like procedure taken on by the Union researchers is not 
without its limitations. No missing data (i.e. years in which Consumer Reports did not 
rate a given product) would have led to findings slightly closer to a cause and effect 
relationship between firm strategy and the marketing tactics of product development and 
product price adjustments. Second, the items of both strategic choice and deterministic 
orientations lean towards firms choosing to manage (or not) the socio-political force 
through political activities. Items involve (dis)agreement and reports of (in)frequency 
among respondents to political activities such as “influencing government public policy.” 
Few items reference marketing activities, such as the item that references depart “from 
our original marketplace strategy.” It is possible that the firm strategy tendency (to 
engage in political versus marketing activities) measurement of Study 2 was slightly 
biased towards measuring more political activities (i.e. policy-altering strategies) relative 
to marketing activities (i.e. competition-altering strategies) for this reason. 
Areas for Future Research 
 Perhaps the most important next step in this research area is to conduct an 
experiment so as to parse out the cause and effect relationships between firm orientation 
and firm management strategy as well as the relationship between firm management 
strategy and the political and/or marketing activities utilized. This research could also be 
strengthened by both an incorporation of other forces as well as a longitudinal extension. 
Similar research that also tests the orientations towards the other three forces of the 
external business environment (i.e. consumer demand, supplier relationships, 
technological turbulence) and the likely management strategies that ensue would enrich 
the environmental management literature stream. This extension would allow scholars to 
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compare and contrast strategies occurring due to the given force. Gaining greater 
understanding of whether or not firm strategic responses to two or more threatening 
forces were (dis)similar would enhance understanding of environmental management 
theories overall. 
Knowing whether or not a firm maintains a strategic response to government 
public policy pressures several years into the future would offer scholars greater 
understanding into the nature of such strategies, such as if they are short- or long-term 
responses. This would involve simple data collection of additional years of secondary 
data post 2014 and matching such to present orientations towards and the strategies 
involved in government public policy pressures. Finally, future research should continue 
to tease out the differences between strategic choice belief orientations versus strategic 
choice trend orientations explicated in the findings of Study 1. This study suggests that 
two separate firms could hold a strategic choice orientation towards government public 
policy threats while one’s orientation revolves around the belief and confidence that the 
firm can manipulate the agencies or market elements involved and the other’s around 
actual behaviors involved in such manipulation (i.e. trends). Future research could 
develop a multi-dimensional scale for quantitative data collection that tests both a belief 
and trend dimension of a strategic choice orientation scale and manipulate tests (i.e. test 
dimensions as antecedents separately and together) to see if measuring both dimensions 
predicts outcomes in a manner similar to those involved in this dissertation. 
Conclusions 
This dissertation asked if environmental management theories can be empirically 
tested and, in testing such theories, when public policies lead firms to provide society and 
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consumer with benefits and when with detriments. After successfully developing two 
environmental management constructs, this dissertation found that some firms do not 
manage public policy because of concern for serving society. It further found that this 
notion of firm duty, a second dimension of environmental management lacking in prior 
literature and introduced in this dissertation, led firms to utilize marketing tactics in 
competition-altering strategies (over political behaviors in policy-altering strategies) and 
invest in product quality improvements. These findings are important in that they not 
only prove firms very proactively and strategically manage government public policy, but 
also encourage public policy leaders to factor in likely firm strategic responses in drafting 
legislation designed to keep consumers safe and healthy. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUALITATIVE QUESTIONING 
Pre-Interview Self-Reporting 
[brief description of the topic: “I’m testing a management theory which suggests 
firms formally and strategically manage events occurring outside company walls. And 
this theory suggests there are five forces in this external business environment: consumer 
demand, supplier relationships, competition, and the last two which I’m focusing on, 
societal concerns, such as concern for the natural environment or worry about targeting 
vulnerable consumer groups, and government public policy, which really runs the gamut 
in the way I’m studying it. In my study it includes both formal policy, such as legislation, 
and informal policy, such as Bills, trends on Capitol Hill, or even press conferences. So, 
I’m studying how firms manage these two forces, society and government concerns.] 
Now that you know more about the topic, can you tell me if you feel comfortable 
in participating in questioning of this topic?  
1) [If “Yes” in question 1:] Can we spend a minute or two discussing at least one 
example you can think of right now of your firm’s management of either of these 
forces? 
2) [If not already gleaned through the answer to question 2:] What role did you play 
in [example shared in question 2]? 
[Two Comfort-Level Questions] 
 
Non-Structured Interview Guide 
a) Could you describe your role at [Company Name]? 
b) In what ways are you involved in developing marketing strategy at [Company 
Name]? 
a. [If participant unsure of what is being asked, follow-up questions:]  
i. Do you play a role in developing promotions strategies? If so, how 
would you describe your role? 
ii. Do you play a role in developing pricing strategies? If so, how 
would you describe your role? 
iii. Do you play a role in developing distribution strategies? If so, how 
would you describe your role? 
iv. Do you play a role in product development? If so, how would you 
describe your role? 
1. Tell me about a time when government public policy 
altered your decision-making regarding [participant 
example] (repeat for each example provided). 
2. Are there times when you use marketing activities to offset 
the limitation of a government public policy? 
c) Can you think of a time when government public policy provided you a business 
opportunity?  
d) What would be your thoughts if I described the Government as a force? 
e) What does a strategic response mean to managers faced with a government 
threats? 
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f) Do you believe your senior colleagues experience these pressures or threats in a 
similar manner? 
g) Has the way [Company Name] experienced government threats changed in recent 
company history?  
h) [share hypothesis with participant] 
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APPENDIX B 
 
MEASUREMENT SCALES AND ITEMS 
 
Italicized text reflects items dropped after a measurement model that did not fit these data 
well.  
 
Strategic Choice Orientation (anchored by “very infrequently” and “very frequently”) 
Our influence on government public policy is different than the typical influence 
our competitors hold. 
We attempt to influence government public policy for desirable profit levels. 
It is important that we attempt to influence government public policy (anchored 
by “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”)… 
  that affects our business rather than change our business. 
  so as to achieve desirable consumer demand for products. 
  so as to remain competitive. 
 
Deterministic Orientation (anchored by “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree” 
 We are not big enough to influence a government public policy that changes the 
way we do business. 
We do not have the appropriate resources to be able to influence a government 
public policy that changes the way we do business. 
Government public policy changes too frequently to be able to influence it to our 
benefit. 
Government public policy is too complex to be able to influence it for our benefit. 
Government public policy is too intolerant for us to be able to influence it to our 
benefit. 
Government public policy constrains the way we do business. 
Government public policy makes it impossible for us to reach our strategic goals. 
Government public policy forces us to depart from our original marketplace 
strategy. 
 When a government public policy (potentially) alters the way we do business 
(anchored by “very infrequently” and “very frequently”)… 
  we emphasize bypassing traditional levels so that people at the same level 
communicate across departments. 
  we emphasize specialized roles for managing elements of policy. 
  we reduce our presence in the affected market. 
  we break-down large departments into smaller, more differentiated 
departments. 
  we restructure departments to soften the potential firm alteration. 
 
Society-Serving Orientation (anchored by “very infrequently” and “very frequently”) 
Customer Orientation 
We initiate product/service improvements in response to customer expectations. 
We provide quality goods and services to customers. 
We provide reputable products and services to customers for value. 
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We maintain programs so as to protect consumers against faulty products. 
If we encounter a customer complaint regarding a product or service deficiency, 
we respond quickly. 
Community Orientation 
We financially support charitable and philanthropic activities. 
We support the arts and other cultural activities. 
We financially support colleges and universities. 
We respond to requests for support from social service agencies. 
Stockholder Orientation 
We pursue opportunities that have the highest expectations for maximizing 
earnings (per share). 
We perform in a manner that leads to great market performance (high stock 
market valuation). 
We invest in opportunities that promise maximum return on (stockholders’) 
investments. 
We meet (stockholders’) investors’ expectations for high future earnings. 
We allocate resources to activities that promise maximum return on investment. 
Government Orientation 
We cooperate with governmental and regulatory agencies. 
We maintain corporate staff to ensure compliance with governmental regulations. 
We develop mechanisms and technical expertise to comply with governmental 
regulations regarding environmental issues. 
We voluntarily support enforcement activities of regulatory issues. 
We publicly support governmental regulations. 
Employee Orientation 
We provide employee programs to cope with work and family stress. 
We provide training and employment for those that are disadvantaged and looking 
for employment. 
We provide programs and services to meet physical and mental health needs of 
employees. 
We provide ongoing training opportunities for employees. 
 
Consumer-Related Outcomes  
Whether related to the policy you just described or not, can you remember if your 
advertising budget changed immediately following your strategic response? If so, to what 
degree? (anchored by “extreme decrease” and “extreme increase”) 
 
Market Share 
Please note the % of your firm’s net sales relative to your largest industry competitor. 
>25%, 25-49.9%, 50-74.9%, 75-100%, largest in sales, clarification __________ 
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APPENDIX C 
 
IRB STUDY APPROVAL, INCORPORATED RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT 
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APPENDIX D 
 
ITEM RELIABILITY AND CFA FIT INDICES COEFFICIENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
Item
Item-to-
Total 
Correlation
Alpha if 
Deleted
Please rate the following statement in terms of frequency:
1. We attempt to influence government public policy for 
desirable profit levels.
.46 .65
Please rate the following statement in terms of 
(dis)agreement:
2. It is important that we attempt to influence government 
public policy that affects our business rather than change 
our business.
.55 .64
3. It is important that we attempt to influence government 
public policy so as to achieve desirable consumer demand 
for products.
.57 .64
4. It is important that we attempt to influence government 
public policy so as to remain competitive.
.59 .64
Strategic Choice Scale Item Reliabilities (n=76 respondents, 17 firms)
FINAL COEFFICIENT ALPHA = .66
TABLE 5
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Item
Item-to-
Total 
Correlation
Alpha if 
Deleted
Please rate the following statement in terms of agreement:
1. Government public policy changes too frequently to be 
able to influence it to our benefit.
.38 .83
2. Government public policy is too complex to be able to 
influence it for our benefit.
.55 .82
3. Government public policy is too intolerant for us to be able 
to influence it to our benefit.
.20 .84
4. Government public policy constrains the way we do 
business.
.11 .85
5. Government public policy makes it impossible for us to 
reach our strategic goals.
.10 .85
6. Government public policy forces us to depart from our 
original marketplace strategy.
.42 .83
Please rate the following statement in terms of frequency:
7. When a government public policy (potentially) alters the 
way we do business we emphasize bypassing traditional 
levels so that people at the same level communicate across 
departments.
.42 .83
8. When a government public policy (potentially) alters the 
way we do business we break-down large departments into 
smaller, more differentiated departments.
.52 .82
9. When a government public policy (potentially) alters the 
way we do business we restructure departments to soften 
the potential firm alteration.
.37 .83
TABLE 6
Determinism Scale Item Reliabilities (n=76 respondents, 17 firms)
FINAL COEFFICIENT ALPHA = .85
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Item
Item-to-
Total 
Correlation
Alpha if 
Deleted
Please rate the following statement in terms of agreement:
We initiate product/service improvements in response to 
customer expectations.
.21 .91
We provide quality goods and services to customers. -.02 .91
We provide reputable products and services to customers 
for value.
-.02 .91
We maintain programs so as to protect consumers against 
faulty products.
.41 .91
If we encounter a customer complaint regarding a product or 
service deficiency, we respond quickly.
-.01 .91
We financially support charitable and philanthropic 
activities.
.55 .90
We support the arts and other cultural activities. .35 .91
We financially support colleges and universities. .26 .92
We respond to requests for support from social service 
agencies.
.66 .90
We pursue opportunities that have the highest expectations 
for maximizing earnings (per share).
.66 .90
We perform in a manner that leads to great market 
performance (high stock market valuation).
.67 .90
We invest in opportunities that promise maximum return on 
(stockholders’) investments.
.63 .90
We meet (stockholders’) investors’ expectations for high 
future earnings.
.74 .90
We allocate resources to activities that promise maximum 
return on investment.
.45 .91
We cooperate with governmental and regulatory agencies. -.07 .91
We maintain corporate staff to ensure compliance with 
governmental regulations.
.72 .90
We develop mechanisms and technical expertise to comply 
with governmental regulations regarding environmental 
issues.
.86 .89
We voluntarily support enforcement activities of regulatory 
issues.
.22 .91
We publicly support governmental regulations. -.19 .92
We provide employee programs to cope with work and family stress..82 .89
We provide training and employment for those that are 
disadvantaged and looking for employment.
.56 .90
We provide programs and services to meet physical and 
mental health needs of employees.
.68 .90
We provide ongoing training opportunities for employees. .73 .90
TABLE 7
Society-Serving Scale Item Reliabilities (n=76 respondents, 17 firms)
FINAL COEFFICIENT ALPHA = .91
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x
2
 (591) = 1637.21
CFI = .54
RMSEA = (.12 - .13) .11
SRMR = .07
2nd CFA Fit Indices Coefficients
TABLE 8
